CA Unpub Decisions

At the outset of this dependency proceeding, the juvenile court erroneously found that O.G. (father), father of C.G., was C.G.’s “alleged” father and not her “presumed” father. Although the juvenile court corrected its error some 10 months later, father contends that he suffered prejudice. Father also contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that he failed to provide C.G. with the necessities of life thereby placing her at substantial risk of harm and damage within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Because father suffered no prejudice from being designated temporarily as an alleged father and father does not challenge all of the grounds on which the juvenile court found jurisdiction over C.G., we affirm.

At the preliminary hearing on July 30, 2009, defendant’s 11-year-old daughter, E.P., testified that she was in the second grade in 2006. Defendant was in her bedroom and touched her “private parts.” Defendant touched her in the chest and below her chest in the vaginal area. E.P. told an older sister, A.P., about the incident.
J.B. is defendant’s niece. She was 17 years old when she testified at the preliminary hearing. When she was about 10 or 11 years old, she visited defendant’s home. Sometimes J.B. would spend the night with her cousins. Defendant would often touch her private parts at night while she was in her cousins’ bedroom. At other times, he would touch her while they were in the living room. Defendant touched her chest and buttocks over her clothes. The touching occurred every time she visited defendant’s house until she was about 13 or 14 years old. J.B. and A.P. are best friends. Eventually, they confided to each other that defendant was touching both of them.
Defendants’ daughter, A.P., was 18 years old at the time of the preliminary hearing. Defendant began touching A.P. inappropriately when she was five years old. At that time, he touched her in the vaginal area over her clothes. This occurred mostly at night while A.P.’s mother was working. Defendant would touch her about three times a week. Defendant continued to touch A.P. until she was 17 years old.
Between the time A.P. was 9 and one-half to 12 years old, the touching started to go under the clothes. Defendant would touch her in the vaginal area every day. As A.P. got older, the touching became worse. Defendant would touch her once or twice a week. Defendant would try to put his finger inside of her vagina. This happened about two or three times. Defendant would try to put his mouth on her vagina but she would move. When A.P. was 14 years old, defendant would get on top of her. Defendant, who would be naked, would hold A.P.’s hands over her head and sit on her feet. He would try to put his penis inside of her. This happened about twice a week. Defendant would put his penis inside her vagina about twice a week when she was in the tenth grade. When A.P. was in the eleventh grade, defendant stopped trying to put his penis in her but he continued to touch her. A.P. first revealed the incidents to the authorities in February 2009. A.P. and J.B. confided in one another about the incidents when they were younger.

M.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child, A.S., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court violated her due process rights when it denied her request for a contested hearing on the application of the parental visitation exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). The juvenile court did not err.

Terry Gonzalez, Warden of the California Men’s Colony in San Luis Obispo, appeals from the superior court’s order granting the petition of Bruce Davis for a writ of habeas corpus and vacating the Governor’s reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings’ (the Board) decision to parole him. We conclude that some evidence supports the Governor’s order to deny parole and reverse the superior court’s order. Davis is the respondent on this appeal.

At the time of initial contact with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), mother, then 17 years old, lived with her paternal grandparents, who had been appointed her legal guardians in 1998 and with whom she had resided since the age of two; also living in the home were mother's 20-month-old daughter S.O. and her 15-year-old sister. Mother was in her last semester of high school at an alternative school for teenage mothers and mothers-to-be. In March of last year, she learned that she was again pregnant; upset about this news, she did not return home, or notify her grandparents of her whereabouts, for six days.
Lawrence O. (grandfather) called DCFS to report that mother had not returned home. He was concerned for his granddaughter, believing that her boyfriend used drugs and was a bad influence. Grandfather did not report, and DCFS did not uncover, any harm suffered by the minor S.O. as a result of mother's absence. To the contrary, the social worker opined that grandfather (S.O.'s great-grandfather), in whose care mother had left her daughter, was an appropriate caretaker for the baby.

Appellant Barbara J. (mother), seeks to reverse the trial court’s jurisdictional finding that her daughter, Christina J. (Christina), is a dependent of the court and the trial court’s dispositional order removing custody of Christina from mother.

Plaintiff Charles Wood filed a complaint for breach of contract against California Business Bank, his former employer, in which he alleged defendant failed to pay him severance benefits due under an employment agreement. Judgment was entered after plaintiff accepted defendant’s offer to settle the litigation pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (section 998). Defendant appeals from the judgment and an order denying its motion to vacate the judgment, contending plaintiff never accepted its offer, and any settlement was subject to prior approval by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. We affirm.

Phil Millman and Chemique Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal from an order denying a motion in which they challenged the Department of Health Care Services and its director’s compliance with a peremptory writ of mandate issued by the trial court. We affirm.

Appellant Andrew Manley (Manley) seeks to reverse the trial court’s issuance of a restraining order against him in favor of Respondent Turesi H. Faniel (Faniel). Manley contends that the trial court abused its discretion (1) in issuing a restraining order on the basis of its finding that Manley threatened Faniel with a firearm because there is no competent, relevant evidence supporting such a finding; (2) in issuing a restraining order on the basis that Manley controlled Faniel because control is not a legal basis for finding abuse under Family Code section 6203[1] and, further, the evidence does not support a finding of such control; and (3) when it found that Manley was not credible and that Faniel was credible.
As we conclude that the trial court’s restraining order is supported by substantial evidence and that it did not abuse its discretion in issuing that order, we will affirm.

S&M Auto Sales (S&M) appeals from a judgment denying its claim for compensation for loss of business goodwill in this condemnation action brought by the City of South Gate (South Gate). Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that S&M failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was entitled to compensation for loss of goodwill under the prerequisites of Code of Civil Procedure section 1263.510.[1] We conclude that S&M’s challenges to the trial court’s determination are not well taken, and thus we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs Thomas V. Girardi and Erika Girardi (collectively, the Girardis) appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Alta San Rafael Association (erroneously sued and served as San Rafael Homeowners Association), and Board of Directors of Alta San Rafael Association (erroneously sued and served as Board of Directors of San Rafael Homeowners Association) (collectively, the Association). The Girardis sued the Association for negligence after their home was burglarized twice. They alleged that the Association, which manages and maintains a common interest development in the Alta San Rafael neighborhood of Pasadena in which the Girardis own a house, owed the development’s homeowners a duty to keep the premises reasonably safe, and breached that duty by failing to hire a security guard, have monitored gates, and maintain street lights. The trial court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the Association owed no duty to protect homeowners’ property from theft, and even if there were such a duty, there was no causation in this case. We affirm the judgment on the ground that the Girardis failed to show a triable issue regarding causation.

Defendant Bobbie Beal was convicted of possessing hydrocodone for sale and sentenced to an eight-year prison term. He contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 706 (Wheeler) to the prosecution’s peremptory excusal of three African-American jurors. We conclude that the trial court’s denial of the Batson/Wheeler challenge to one juror was supported by substantial evidence, but that the trial court erred in finding defendant’s challenge to the other two untimely. We therefore conditionally reverse the judgment and remand with directions.

Defendant was in presentence custody for 515 days from September 1, 2009 to September 24, 2009 and from October 6, 2009 to February 8, 2011. He was entitled to conduct credit under section 2933.1, subdivision (a), which credits are calculated to the greatest whole number without exceeding 15 percent. (People v. Duran (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 267, 270; People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815-817; see In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 775.) Therefore, defendant was entitled credit for 515 days in presentence custody plus 77 days of conduct credit for a total presentence custody credit of 592 days. The judgment will be modified to so reflect.

On typed opinion page 21, delete section IV and replace it with the following:

Plaintiff Nettie Corbin appeals from the trial court’s order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by defendants the City of Los Angeles Department of Public Works, Eric Russell, and Mihran Sarkisian. Corbin contends she was unaware that she was agreeing to retire as part of the settlement, and that the retirement provision of the settlement agreement inherently conflicts with the provision of the settlement whereby the defendants agreed that the settlement would have no effect on her pending workers’ compensation action. We find no merit in Corbin’s contentions and affirm the trial court’s judgment enforcing the settlement agreement.