CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Robin Miller appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of attempted murder, with findings that he used a knife during the commission of the offense and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187; 12022, subd. (b); 12022.7, subd. (a).)[1] He was sentenced to 13 years in prison. His sole contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term sentence for the attempted murder. We affirm.

Petitioners and appellants La Mirada Neighborhood Association of Hollywood and Gary Slossberg appeal from the trial court’s denial of their petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief and injunctive relief brought against the City of Los Angeles (the City) challenging the meeting agendas published by the City’s Area Planning Commissions (APC’s). Petitioners contend that the use of the phrase “Public Hearing Completed” on the meeting agendas with respect to particular items violates the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act))[1] because it misleads members of the public into believing that they have no right to speak at the meetings regarding those items. Viewing the agenda as a whole, we conclude that reasonable members of the public are not likely to be misled by the phrase. We find no violation of the Brown Act and thus affirm the judgment.

Doctor Jaroslav J. Marik appeals from a judgment after a bench trial to determine payments owed to him under two contracts for medical and surrogacy services. The court awarded appellant $15,446.88 against respondent Yvonne Makkink but made no award against respondent Gary Carlson. Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in not responding to his objections to the statement of decision. By itself, the court’s failure to respond to appellant’s objections does not constitute reversible error. Appellant insists he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; yet he also claims that the court’s statement of decision is not supported by the evidence. Appellant’s scant citations to the record and reliance on arguments made in respondents’ trial briefs fail to substantiate this claim. His alternative argument—that the statement of decision is inconsistent with the court’s own factual findings—is based on a selective citation of these findings. We conclude that appellant has not met his burden of showing reversible error, and affirm the judgment.

Tyrone Johnson appeals from his conviction for assault and battery, contending the trial court erred in denying his motions to strike the jury panel, precluding a defense witness, and failing to instruct sua sponte on self-defense. He also contends his constitutional rights were violated by several acts of prosecutorial misconduct and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Appellant Bruce Allan Dutro, aka Zion Dutro, pled guilty to committing lewd acts on six different children under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288a).[1] The victims were four of his daughters and two of his nieces who were in his custody. He admitted sentencing enhancements under sections 667, 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d), and 1170.12 (a prior 1995 conviction for lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years, a serious felony), and 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) (multiple victims). Pursuant to the plea agreement, 48 other felony counts of sexual assault were dismissed, including 10 counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); three counts of sodomy by threat (§ 286, subd. (c)(3)); one count of sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)); one count of sodomy with a person under 18 (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)); 26 counts of lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)); one additional count of lewd acts on a child under 14 (§ 288a); four counts of oral copulation of a child under 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)); one count of forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)); and one count of sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a)). He received a stipulated sentence to an indeterminate term of 300 years to life.

Defendant Daniel A. Goodman appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed following his entry of a no-contest plea on charges of false personation and receiving stolen property. Defendant’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not file such a brief. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.) We have conducted the review requested by appellate counsel and, finding no arguable issues, affirm the judgment.

Debt collector Asset Acceptance, LLC, (Asset) sued appellant Freida Rose (Rose) for money she allegedly owed to “Pacific Bell Tel/[doing business as] SBC” (SBC) for telephone service. Rose countersued, claiming the telephone bills were not hers and that a statute of limitations had run on any amounts owed to SBC. She sought to certify a class of all California consumers that Asset had pursued to recover debts on telephone bills that were “so poorly documented that their authenticity [could not] be proven” and/or were “so old that they f[e]ll well beyond any pertinent statute of limitations under which they [could] be pursued . . . .” On appeal, Rose challenges the trial court’s order denying her motion for class certification and contends the court: (1) improperly decided a merits issue on the class certification motion, specifically, which statute of limitations applies to telephone bill debts; and (2) erred in ruling that a four-year state statute of limitations applies to such debts. We reject the contentions and affirm.

Defendant Nathan Medina invaded the home of Beverly Rhoads, who was involved in civil litigation with defendant’s mother and stepfather. He assaulted Rhoads with pepper spray, shot her son to death, tried to shoot her, and tried to shoot a family friend. The jury convicted him of murder, two counts of attempted murder, and residential burglary, all with the personal use of a firearm. Defendant contends a document he wrote describing a plan to subdue drug dealers with tear gas should not have been admitted. He also raises Doyle error and certain other contentions. We disagree with defendant’s contentions, find no prejudicial error, and affirm.

Catherine Denise Cranford appeals from the judgment in her action against her former employer, the City of Huntington Beach (the City). Cranford alleged she suffered workplace harassment by a co-worker due to her sexual orientation, and retaliation by the City for having complained about the harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940). Cranford also alleged her medical privacy rights were violated by the City when a letter written by her therapist in connection with her worker’s compensation claim containing Cranford’s allegations of workplace sexual orientation harassment was released to investigators outside the City’s worker’s compensation unit. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on the FEHA causes of action, and a jury found that although Cranford’s medical privacy rights were violated, she was not harmed. On appeal, Cranford contends: (1) there were material issues of fact as to the FEHA causes of action precluding summary adjudication; (2) insufficient evidence supports the special verdict; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motions to exclude certain evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by denying her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Veronica, in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to her daughter, Lily. We deny the petition.

Cynthia A. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] to her four-year-old son Matthew V. Mother contends she established termination would be detrimental to Matthew because of their parent-child relationship (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). On review, we disagree and affirm.

Emmanuel D. appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding true an allegation that he performed a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and later committing him to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF)[1] after he had multiple violations of probation. Emmanuel argues he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. We disagree. Emmanuel further asserts the juvenile court failed to determine whether he had a valid Individual Education Plan (IEP) and that his custody credits were miscalculated. We agree. Emmanuel also challenges his commitment to DJF. Because Emmanuel does not have a prior adjudication for an offense set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b),[2] we are compelled by California Supreme Court’s recent decision of In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94 (C.H.), to reverse the juvenile court’s commitment order to DJF.

On November 5, 2010, the Kern County District Attorney charged appellant, Jesus Alaniz Garibay, with transportation, sale or furnishing cocaine (count 1/Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)),[1] possession for sale of cocaine (count 2/§ 11351), and possession of cocaine (count 3/§ 11350, subd. (a)), a lesser included offense of the possession for sale charged in count 2.
On January 12, 2011, a jury convicted Garibay on count 1.
On February 10, 2011, the court sentenced Garibay to the middle term of four years.
On appeal, Garibay contends the court committed instructional error. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant Anthony Brian Foster, was convicted of aggravated assault of a child, based on sodomy (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(3)),[1] forcible sodomy upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)), sodomy upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 286, subd. (c)(1)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), sodomy upon an unconscious or sleeping person (§ 286, subd. (f)), and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (§ 272, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 27 years and 8 months to life in state prison.