CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Tony Cleveland of possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code,[1] § 12021,[2] subd. (a)(1).) Subsequently, the jury also found Cleveland had three prior strike convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The three prior strike convictions were for residential burglary in 1998 (§ 459), making terrorist threats in 1999 (§ 422); and assault with a firearm in 1999 (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true the allegation Cleveland served a prior prison term for his 2004 conviction for possession of a narcotic. (§ 667.5.)
The court sentenced Cleveland to prison for a term of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Cleveland appeals, contending his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment and violates the California and United States Constitutions. We affirm.

A modification decision.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
In January 2011, defendant was found in possession of a usable quantity of methamphetamine. He pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) in exchange for being granted Proposition 36 probation (case No. 11F00334). Defendant also agreed to an intended sentence that if he failed the Proposition 36 program or was found ineligible, he would be sentenced to 180 days in county jail. He was ordered to pay various fines and fees. The probation conditions imposed included that he not associate with known gang members or be in places frequented by known gang members. Defendant accepted these terms of probation without objection. Defendant did not appeal from that judgment.

Plaintiff Stella Onyeukwu brings this pro se judgment roll appeal following a bench trial of her breach of contract action against defendant Marjorie Howton, in which the court found that plaintiff -- rather than defendant -- breached the contract, and entered judgment in defendant's favor.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erroneously interpreted the parties' contract in light of â€

A jury found defendant Earl Morrishow, Jr., guilty of attempting to make a criminal threat (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 422)[1] and making an annoying phone call (§ 653m, subd. (a)). After finding true a prior strike allegation, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years four months in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempting to make a criminal threat. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss his prior strike conviction. Defendant's contentions lack merit and we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Robert Lee Stringfellow was convicted of five counts of second degree burglary, two counts of possession of a completed check with intent to defraud, and two counts of identity theft. The trial court sustained two strike allegations and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 (defendant's flight as evidence of awareness of guilt), because (1) there is no substantial evidence that defendant fled, (2) the instruction is improper where identity is the main issue, and (3) CALCRIM No. 372 violates due process because it presumes the crime was committed, it misleads the jury into presuming the crime was committed, and it varies significantly from Penal Code section 1127c.
Defendant's contentions lack merit. We will affirm the judgment.

Daniel J. Scotti, a defendant in an eminent domain action now settled and dismissed, claims he is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1268.610, subdivision (a), which entitles a defendant in an eminent domain action to recover litigation expenses if the action is dismissed â€

Defendant Glenn Mark Robinson appeals the sentence imposed following his convictions for two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] with true findings he had six prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero[2] motion and failing to dismiss at least five of his six prior convictions. We affirm.

Defendant Steven Berdett Lee appeals from his conviction of one count of felony cruelty to animals. (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b).) We affirm, concluding substantial evidence supports the conviction, and defendant's other claims of judicial error are harmless or without merit.[1]

The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information that alleged that defendant and appellant Derek Scott committed the offense of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459[1].) The information further alleged that in case number VA114259 defendant suffered a prior conviction for first degree burglary (§ 459), an offense that was a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the â€

Plaintiff and appellant Eddie Lockhart (Lockhart) appeals a judgment denying his petition for a traditional writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085)[1] wherein he sought an order directing defendants and respondents City of Huntington Park, Huntington Park Police Department, and Chief of Police Jorge Cisneros (the Chief) (collectively, the City) to issue him a concealed weapon permit.
The City's decision to issue a concealed weapon permit is discretionary, and traditional mandamus does not lie to control the Chief's exercise of his discretion in that regard.
Further, Lockhart failed to show the City's decision was arbitrary, capricious or entirely without evidentiary support. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Eric Kaesman (Eric or son) appeals a judgment in favor of his father, plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent John Kaesman (John or father), following a court trial.[1]
Eric contends the trial court erred in denying his request for statement of decision and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.
We conclude the trial court properly denied Eric's untimely request for statement of decision and that substantial evidence supports the judgment. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

On November 23, 2010, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602) in case number TJ19105 that alleged that defendant and appellant J.I. committed the felony offense of possession of a deadly weapon, brass knuckles. (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1).) On January 18, 2011, the District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to section 602 in case number TJ19139 that alleged that J.I. committed the felony offenses of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). The juvenile court consolidated the petitions under case number TJ19105. The juvenile court found the allegations true, found the possession of a deadly weapon offense to be a misdemeanor, and placed J.I. home on probation in his mother's home.
On appeal, J.I. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding true the allegation that he received stolen property because, under the facts of this case, he could not be found to have both unlawfully driven or taken a vehicle and to have received the same vehicle as stolen property. We affirm.

James Dunne appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Michael and Betty Slifka and their corporation, TXL, Inc. (together, the Slifkas) following a trial to the court of Dunne's cross-complaint to recover attorney fees in defense of the underlying action pursuant to an indemnity agreement. The trial court found that the Slifkas had offered to defend Dunne in the underlying action but that Dunne had declined the offer, and that there was no actual conflict of interest that would justify Dunne's refusal to join in the defense and still recover attorney fees. Because the record supports the trial court's findings, we affirm the judgment.