CA Unpub Decisions

Edward Renteria was convicted after jury trial in 1994 of the second degree murder of his first wife, Valerie, in 1980 (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and possession of a controlled substance in 1993 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to prison for 17 years to life. Following a subsequent parole hearing on February 3, 2010, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found Renteria not suitable for parole. On March 10, 2011, the superior court granted Renteria’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Board to conduct a new parole hearing within 100 days. The warden where Renteria is incarcerated (the Warden) filed an appeal and a petition for writ of supersedeas requesting a stay of the superior court’s order. On May 31, 2011, we granted the Warden’s petition for writ of supersedeas. For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the superior court’s March 10, 2011 order and remand the matter to the superior court with directions to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5),[1] defendant Stephanie Marie Stafford pleaded no contest to misdemeanor receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on probation for two years. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the impoundment and search of her vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree with defendant’s contention and, therefore, we will affirm the judgment.

The Jarvis Ranch, which includes more than 300 acres of agricultural land in Monterey County, is an asset of the Jarvis Replacement Administrative Trust (the Trust). Appellant Todd Jarvis and his brother James Jarvis[1] are beneficiaries of the Trust. Respondent John McDonnell, Jr. is the court-appointed trustee.
In his capacity as trustee, McDonnell filed in the probate court on December 23, 2009, a petition for authority to execute and perform right of way contracts with the State of California Department of Transportation (CalTrans). The right of way contracts included the settlement of three eminent domain actions brought by CalTrans to acquire portions of the Jarvis Ranch. The terms of the Trust required McDonnell to petition the court for authority to execute and perform the right of way contracts, because James had consented to the CalTrans contracts while Todd had objected. The probate court granted the petition on February 9, 2010.
On appeal, Todd argues that the order should be reversed because the probate court lacked jurisdiction and made several procedural and evidentiary errors. McDonnell has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that an event occurring during the pendency of the appeal has rendered the appeal moot; specifically, the probate court’s subsequent order of April 26, 2010, finding that that Todd has a right to appear as a defendant in the eminent domain actions and granting his motion for joinder.

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This is appellant Paula Skerston’s third trip to the Court of Appeal to protest a restraining order issued against her in 2007, and in favor of respondent Linda Sheehan.[1] In October 2010, Skerston, an attorney, filed a complaint against Sheehan and her attorney, Robert Newman, purportedly based on the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 52.1.[2] Actually, the complaint was based on Sheehan’s restraining order and on allegations regarding Newman’s activities while representing various clients, including Sheehan, in cases against Skerston.
The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the acts upon which Skerston based her complaint were all acts in furtherance of Sheehan’s and Newman’s rights of petition or free speech, and Skerston had not shown a probability of prevailing. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and Skerston appeals.
We affirm. The complaint clearly implicates Sheehan’s and Newman’s rights of petition. Because of the absolute privilege afforded to litigants by Civil Code section 47, Skerston cannot possibly prevail on her claims against either Sheehan or Newman. The statements made in the course of the litigation are absolutely privileged. The act of applying for a restraining order itself is protected by the constitutional right to petition the courts and cannot be a basis for a lawsuit except one for malicious prosecution. This remedy is unavailable to Skerston because the restraining order process did not terminate in her favor. This should therefore be the last of the appeals by Skerston regarding the Sheehan restraining order.

Laurence L. Grabowski (Grabowski) owes the law firm Rutan & Tucker (Rutan) legal fees for litigation involving a family trust dispute. After Grabowski failed to make payments or honor his promissory note, Rutan filed a lawsuit against Grabowski and obtained a default judgment. Approximately five years later, Rutan learned Grabowski was going to receive a large monetary settlement arising out of litigation involving a family business dispute (hereafter Orange County Litigation). Rutan filed a notice of lien in the pending action. After the court ordered the parties to prepare a final judgment, Rutan filed a motion for order regarding satisfaction of the lien. The court granted the motion. A few months later, Grabowski filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment claiming it was void because he was not properly served with the summons and complaint. The court denied Grabowski’s motion and deemed the lien, based on the default judgment, to be valid. This appeal challenges the order denying Grabowski’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment as void. Finding no error, we affirm the order.[1]

Cross-complainant Mark Seidenberg[1] (acting as executor of the estate of Sophie H. Seidenberg) appeals the court’s judgment of dismissal with regard to two of the seven cross-defendants he sued for slander of title and cancellation of cloud on title, (1) John Needham and (2) Tustin Ave. Trust #500-110 UDT 5/8/03, Needham Family Investments, Inc. as Trustee (Tustin Ave. Trust). We affirm.

Angel Duarte Cerna appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree murder. Cerna argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code 1109.[1] We find no merit to his contention and affirm the judgment.

An information charged John Lake with 10 counts of residential burglary (counts 1-10), two counts of vehicle theft (counts 11-12), one count of receiving stolen property (count 13), and two counts of unauthorized use of an automated teller machine (ATM) access card (counts 14-15). In addition, the information alleged Lake had sustained five prior felony convictions or “strikes,” under the “Three Strikes” law, two prior serious felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1),[1] and had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The law firm Rutan & Tucker (Rutan) obtained a default judgment against Laurence L. Grabowski (Grabowski) after he failed to pay his legal fees or honor his promissory note to pay legal fees. Approximately five years later, Rutan learned Grabowski was going to receive a large settlement arising out of litigation involving a business dispute against his brother, Patrick Grabowski, and other family members (hereafter collectively referred to as Patrick). Rutan filed a notice of lien in the pending family business dispute (hereafter the Orange County Litigation). After the court ordered the parties to prepare a final judgment in that case, Rutan filed a “motion for order for satisfaction of [the] judgment lien.” The court granted the motion over Grabowski’s and Patrick’s objections. A few months later, Grabowski filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment claiming it was void because he was not properly served with a summons and complaint. The court denied Grabowski’s motion and again determined the lien was valid.

Defendant John Francis Davila challenges his probation revocation. He contends the probation condition that he avoid “places where minors congregate, including but not limited to . . . parks” was overbroad as applied to a soccer field in a park. He also contends the court failed to award him custody credits. Only the second contention has merit. We modify the judgment to correct the custody credits, and affirm.

Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations set forth in a juvenile wardship petition that appellant Alex R. committed (1) first degree burglary, a serious and violent felony (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 1192.7, subd. (c), 667.5, subd. (c))[1] for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) (count 1), (2) receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) (count 2), (3) participation in a criminal street gang, a serious felony (§§ 186.22, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)) (count 3), and (4) grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)) (count 4).[2] The court granted Alex’s motion to dismiss five other counts alleged in the petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court continued Alex as a ward of the juvenile court and ordered him to serve not less than 180 days in juvenile hall. The court calculated Alex’s maximum term of confinement as 18 years and four months.

This is an appeal by the Attorney General from an order recusing the office of the District Attorney of Kings Country (the district attorney’s office) from participating in the prosecution of sexual assault charges it filed against respondent Richard Flores Valle, who is an elected member of the Board of Supervisors of Kings County (Board of Supervisors). The Attorney General argues the recusal order constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion.[1] We are not persuaded and will affirm.

David Arnold Rodriguez, Jr., was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, infliction of corporal injury on his spouse, and false imprisonment.[1] The jury also found true various enhancements as well as the allegation that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Rodriguez admitted he suffered two prior convictions that constituted strikes. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 29 years and an indeterminate term of 75 years to life.
Rodriguez argues that one of the attempted murder convictions, along with the special allegation associated with that conviction, was not supported by substantial evidence. He argues the trial court erred in excluding some evidence and admitting other evidence. Finally, he asserts the sentence for false imprisonment must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.[2] We find no merit to any of these arguments and affirm the judgment.

David Arnold Rodriguez, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s order finding that he had violated his probation in this case and sentencing him to prison. Appellate counsel found no appealable issues and requested this court conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. After reviewing the record, we agree with appellate counsel that there are no appealable issues and affirm the judgment.