CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Neil Smith sought to save his home from foreclosure by filing a complaint for declaratory relief and quiet title. The trial court dismissed the action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), and Smith appeals from that dismissal. We conclude the court properly sustained the demurrer to the quiet title cause of action but should have overruled the demurrer to the declaratory relief cause of action because Smith stated a claim for violation of Civil Code section 2923.5 (section 2923.5). We reverse the order of dismissal.

In a prior litigation, plaintiff and appellant Robin Rosen filed a personal injury action against the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and its bus driver, claiming she suffered a debilitating stroke a month after the MTA bus rear-ended the school bus in which she was traveling.[1] Plaintiff retained expert biomechanical and medical witnesses—defendants and respondents in the instant action, Jai Singh and Franklin Moser, M.D.—to help prove liability and damages. The MTA and bus driver, however, prevailed when the jury specially found they were not negligent in the underlying accident. In the instant action, plaintiff sued experts Singh and Dr. Moser, alleging they conspired with the MTA’s counsel in the personal injury action to sabotage her case by giving detrimental testimony, thereby violating their fiduciary and contractual obligations to plaintiff.
Singh and Dr. Moser brought anti-SLAPP[2] motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to dismiss the action on the ground that all the claims against them were premised on their testimony in the personal injury action, which was an exercise of constitutional rights of petition and free speech. The trial court granted the motions, finding plaintiff’s causes of action arose out of protected speech and plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims.[3] In her timely appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion. We affirm.

Appellant Michael Carl Helm was charged with criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422); attempt to burn (Pen. Code, § 455); misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); and misdemeanor illegal conduct at a burning building (Pen. Code, § 148.2).
A jury found appellant not guilty of criminal threats, but guilty of attempted criminal threats, a lesser included offense of criminal threats. He was convicted on all other counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of 16 months on the attempted burning count and concurrent terms on the remaining counts.
Appellant appeals only from the conviction for attempted criminal threats. He contends that the jury instructions were inadequate, that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and that he was improperly punished twice for the same act.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Computer Sciences Corporation (Computer Sciences) appeals from the summary judgment entered against it and in favor of plaintiffs and respondents The Travelers Property Casualty Company of America and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (collectively Travelers), declaring that Travelers had no duty to defend Computer Sciences in a class action suit. Computer Sciences contends: (1) Travelers’ duty to defend does not depend on there being a claim in the underlying complaint that Computer Sciences caused the alleged bodily injuries; and (2) the allegations of the underlying complaint can be construed as alleging Computer Sciences was negligent. We affirm.

Appellant Naim Ojeil, aka Naime or Naimie Ojeil, challenges a family law court order requiring him to pay his son’s college tuition. The order is consistent with a prior judgment and we affirm.

On May 28, 2009, appellants Omar Rodriguez, Cindy Guillen-Gomez, Steve Karagiosian, Elfego Rodriguez and Jamal Childs (collectively appellants) brought an action against respondent City of Burbank (City) and the Burbank Police Department under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)[1] and the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA).[2] City filed its motion for summary judgment against appellant Elfego Rodriguez[3] on February 26, 2010. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 2010, a judgment was entered, and Elfego has appealed from the judgment against him.
In the meantime, on June 17, 2010, appellants filed a motion to disqualify the two law firms that represent City. The trial court denied that motion, and all appellants have appealed the denial of this motion.
We have consolidated the appeals for the purposes of oral argument and decision, and affirm the trial court’s rulings.

This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Marianne Meeker appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in her unlawful detainer action against tenant Bank of America. Bank of America also appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to award attorney fees after granting summary judgment. We affirm the summary judgment and hold that as a matter of law, Bank of America was the prevailing party in the litigation and was entitled under Civil Code[1] section 1717 to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

Jesse James Hollywood appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] and kidnapping. (§ 207.) The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder had been committed while appellant was engaged in the commission of the kidnapping. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B). The jury also found true an allegation that a principal in the commission of the murder had been armed with an assault weapon or machine gun. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2).) The People sought the death penalty, but the jury decided that appellant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court imposed a sentence of LWOP for the murder plus three years for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed a determinate term of eight years for the kidnapping.

Defendant Ezequiel Garcia timely appealed from his conviction for first degree murder. The jury found true firearm and gang allegations. The court sentenced defendant to a total of 50 years to life. Among other issues, defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement and the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancement and the murder charge. We reverse and remand.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Juan Vasquez was sentenced to 10 years, four months in state prison. At the time of sentencing, the court awarded defendant credit for 420 actual days served, plus 62 days of local conduct credit, for a total of 482 days. On appeal, defendant challenges the calculation of the conduct credits, arguing that he was entitled to 63 days, rather than the 62 days awarded. As the People concede, defendant is correct. We therefore order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect 63 local conduct credits, for a total of 483 credits.

Plaintiff Alexander Paras appeals from a judgment entered following a grant of summary judgment and denial of leave to amend in this action against his former employer, defendant Delta Dental of California (Delta), for wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of public policy. Like the trial court, we conclude that plaintiff’s claims fail for lack of evidence that plaintiff suffered any adverse employment actions in retaliation for his alleged participation in protected activity. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

Several teenagers, including appellant M.S., entered the home of a vacationing neighbor and committed various acts of vandalism and theft over a one-month period. Appellant was continued as a ward of the juvenile court after he admitted a petition alleging a single count of residential burglary. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) He now challenges the order directing him to pay restitution to the victim as a condition of probation, arguing that he was deprived of due process during the restitution hearing. We affirm.

We directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the question of which judgments and orders designated in the notice of appeal were appealable and thus not subject to dismissal. Having received that briefing, and treating respondent’s brief as including a motion to dismiss, on September 21, 2011, we filed an order stating, in pertinent part: “Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal from orders dated November 21, 2008, February 23, 2009, March 30, 2009, May 18, 2009 . . . is granted on the ground that these orders are not appealable. Respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s appeal from the July 20, 2009, and September 28, 2009 orders is granted because the appeal from these orders is untimely.” Our September 21, 2011 order is now final.
That ruling, therefore, left the following six: (1) May 26-27, 2009; (2) February 23, 2010; (3) March 24, 2010; (4) March 24, 2010; (5) April 14, 2010; and (6) May 7, 2010.