CA Unpub Decisions

On February 22, 2011, David Blood pled guilty to 12 felony counts (and related enhancements), and four misdemeanor counts as alleged in a consolidated information arising from two superior court cases: SCD229120 and SCD226977. Blood also admitted two prior serious felonies (Pen. Code,[1] § 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two prior strikes (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court agreed it would not impose a sentence greater than 48 years four months to life.[2] The district attorney made no plea bargain offer in the case, and appellant pled to the "face" of the complaint with no dismissal of any of the offenses, enhancements or allegations.
At sentencing on July 8, 2011, the court denied probation and dismissed the strike priors except as they applied to count 13 (assault with the intent to commit rape, § 220, subd. (a)). For count 13, the court imposed an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus a 10-year determinate term for the two prior serious felonies. It also imposed a consecutive determinate term of 13 years four months for the remaining felony counts and the two prior serious felonies. The total sentence was "48 years and 4 months to life." The court gave appellant credit for time served for the misdemeanor counts, and ordered him to pay victim restitution and various fines and fees.[3]

Appointed counsel for defendant Charlie Smith was asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issue on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no errors and no concerns regarding presentence credits. We shall affirm the judgment.

Kimberly Masbad (mother) appeals from an order modifying child support. On appeal, mother claims the trial court violated her right to due process in ordering her to pay child support and erred by failing to consider Ted Brocklehurst’s (father) earning capacity in calculating child support.
Mother has elected to proceed on a clerk’s transcript. ( "Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121" Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121.) Thus, the appellate record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the hearing in this matter. This is referred to as a “judgment roll” appeal. ( "Allen v. Toten(1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079" Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083; ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 57 s WZLWBS000003 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Krueger v. Bank of America(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204" Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) On the face of this record, no error has been established. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

On August 25, 2008, defendant Donald Salter, Jr., pleaded guilty to three counts of second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] On December 1, 2008, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years’ formal probation with a 360-day jail term.
On July 27, 2009, the trial court found defendant violated his probation and imposed a two-year state prison term. The court suspended execution of the sentence and reinstated probation with a 60-day jail term.
On November 29, 2011, defendant admitted violating probation and the trial court executed the suspended two-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends that the prospective application of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act; Stats. 2011, ch. 15) violates his right to equal protection of the law. We affirm.

Facing a maximum of 16 years in state prison following a preliminary hearing in which victim Fernando Romero testified that he was robbed of his cell phone and wallet at gunpoint by defendant and appellant Erik Cornejo and codefendant Alfredo Cruz,[1] defendant accepted the prosecution’s offer of a case disposition of six years in state prison. Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief raising no appellate issues but asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental letter brief.

Michael Yasunaga appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of probation previously granted following his plea of no contest to two counts of possession of ammunition (former Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1),[1] Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)),[2] after denial of his motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5). The trial court sentenced Yasunaga to three years in county jail (§ 1170, subds. (h)(1) & (2)), suspended imposition of sentence and granted him three years formal probation. We affirm.

E.A. appeals from orders (1) terminating his parental rights with respect to J.O., (2) denying a petition for modification, and (3) denying a request for presumed father status. He contends the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to search for him with due diligence at the outset of the case. He also claims the juvenile court erroneously denied the requests for modification and presumed father status. We conclude substantial evidence supports the due diligence finding. Further, because it appears appellant was aware of the proceedings from the outset but did not wish to participate, any conceivable deficiency in the notice provided was harmless. With respect to the petition for modification, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding the requested modification would not be in J.O.’s best interests. As to the request for presumed father status, we affirm the juvenile court’s findings appellant failed to receive the child into his home, failed to visit or provide regularly, and failed to accept his responsibilities in a timely fashion. We therefore affirm the orders under review.

Karen W. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile dependency court’s orders sustaining the jurisdictional allegations in the juvenile dependency petitions concerning her son Marco W. and daughter M.W. under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300. Before this court, Mother asserts a number of errors. First she claims that the court erred in denying her request for discovery of the social worker’s case activity logs, as well as her request to have the social worker present at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Mother also claims insufficient evidence supported the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), both with respect to the allegations concerning her and those allegations pertaining to the children’s father. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the court did not err in denying Mother’s discovery request and the request that the social worker attend the hearing was untimely. Further, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional findings. Accordingly, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Mark James Simon, of: felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1)); misdemeanor obstructing business operations (§ 602.1, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor battery (§ 242). The jury further found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of the aggravated assault. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Following a jury trial waiver, the trial court found defendant had previously sustained a serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (a) through (i), and 1170.12. Defendant was sentenced to nine years in state prison. We modify the oral pronouncement of judgment to impose certain fees as to each count. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Plaintiff and Appellant Virtual Media Group, Inc. (Virtual)[1] appeals an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)[2] We affirm the order.
FACTS
The current appeal is an outgrowth of fighting over who owns Virtual and who properly controls the company. The fighting has caused multiple rounds of litigation, set forth below to provide context for the current anti-SLAPP motion.

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The jury found defendant Steven David Estell guilty of the second degree murder of Sandra Jones (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and disobeying a domestic relations order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor. The jury also found that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant was sentenced to 16 years to life in state prison and a consecutive jail term of one year.
In this timely appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a relevant portion of his interview with the police; and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the prosecution’s improper closing argument. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Maneva A. Currie appeals from a judgment following an order granting a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute,[1] Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 in favor of respondent law firm Robert J. Jackson & Associates, Inc. (Jackson), in this action arising out of a foreclosure on residential property. Currie contends the trial court should have allowed her leave to amend her complaint. We conclude the anti-SLAPP statute does not allow leave to amend under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, we affirm

Iefenn Adrianne Sumampow (Iefenn) and Ievan Sumampow (Ievan) (collectively siblings) appeal summary judgment in favor of defendant Mercator Property Consultants PTY, Ltd. (Mercator) in a declaratory relief and quiet title action pertaining to properties located in Beverly Hills, California on Rexford Drive (Rexford Property) and Wilshire Boulevard (Wilshire Condo).
We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Maneva A. Currie appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend in favor of Los Angeles Police Department Sergeant Timothy O’Gorman in this action arising out of a bank foreclosure on residential property. Currie contends that if given leave to amend, she could allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for conspiracy to force her out of her home. We disagree and affirm.