CA Unpub Decisions

This case comes before us a second time. In August 2006, Pedro Flores was riding his bicycle away from defendant Joshua Pablo Rosales when defendant shot and killed him. A jury convicted defendant on one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and one count of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm
(§ 246.3) and found true the alleged firearm-use enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of 40 years to life. Defendant appealed, and this court reversed the conviction for second degree murder on the ground of instructional error relating to a theory of felony murder, but affirmed the conviction for grossly negligent discharge of a firearm. (People v. Rosales (Feb. 16, 2010, B210251) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following a retrial, a jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and found true the same firearm-use enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, plus 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm-use enhancement. The court ordered the previously-imposed sentence for negligent discharge of a firearm to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have stayed imposition of sentence for grossly negligent discharge of a firearm pursuant to section 654 and miscalculated his presentence custody credits. We affirm the judgment as modified.

On March 30, 2011, William G. Wells (also known as W.G. Wells) was disbarred for misconduct occurring during his 10-year vendetta against a former employee. Among other wrongdoing, Wells violated the doctrine of res judicata by relitigating an issue that was determined against him. During the State Bar Court proceeding, Wells filed 144 unmeritorious motions and pleadings. Apart from the behavior that led to his disbarment, Wells maintained at least five litigations that were determined adversely to him in this appellate district. Based on his repeated acts of misconduct, we declare William G. Wells to be a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391 et seq.)

Plaintiff and appellant tenant Maneva A. Currie appeals from two judgments of dismissal following orders sustaining demurrers without leave to amend in favor of US Bank National Association and the law firm Parker Stanbury LLP in this action arising out of a residential property foreclosure. Currie contends that if given leave to amend, she could allege sufficient facts to state causes of action against US Bank, as the principal of One West Bank, FSB FKA Indymac Bank FSB, and Parker Stanbury. We conclude Currie has not demonstrated that she can allege any cause of action against US Bank, but we agree that a breach of contract cause of action can be alleged against Parker Stanbury. Therefore, we affirm the judgment as to US Bank but reverse as to Parker Stanbury with directions.

Appellant Marcos Sanchez appeals from the judgment following a trial by jury in which he was convicted of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a)[1] (count 1), and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of section 182, subdivision (a) (count 2). The jury found true the firearm allegations that a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)), and did so causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)). The jury also found true the criminal street gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 50 years to life in state prison, calculated as 25 years to life on count 1, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm allegation that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. The court imposed the same sentence on count 2, which was stayed pursuant to section 654. The court awarded appellant 998 days of actual custody credit and ordered him to pay $6,382.17 to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board jointly and severally with his codefendant.
Appellant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, (2) his sentence was cruel and unusual in light of his young age of 16 years and eight days, and (3) modifications must be made to the abstract of judgment. We agree that modifications must be made to the abstract of judgment, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

This case involves two consolidated appeals: one from a special verdict and judgment entered thereon, and one from the subsequent order approving the final accounting report prepared by the referee. Saeed Farkhondehpour (Farkhondehpour), individually and as trustee of the 1993 Farkhondehpour Family Trust, Morad Neman (Neman), individually and as trustee of both the Neman Family Revocable Trust and the Yedidia Investment Defined Benefit Plan, 416 South Wall Street, Inc., and 241 E. 5th St. Partnership, L.P. (defendants) argue that reversal is compelled because the special verdict and judgment in favor of Siry Investment, L.P. (Siry) are “fatally indefinite in imposing liability.” We agree. Siry’s arguments notwithstanding, the judgment and special verdict are hopelessly ambiguous because the jury made disjunctive findings—it found Farkhondehpour, either individually or in his capacity as trustee, liable, and it similarly found Neman, either individually or in his capacity as trustee, liable. Thus, the judgment is too uncertain to be enforced and must be reversed.
Moreover, because the trial court expressly relied upon the jury’s ambiguous findings in approving the referee’s final report, the order approving the final report must be reversed as well.
The matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

C.T. (referred to as Father) appeals an order made at a post-permanency plan hearing for his son, C.T., contending substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s visitation order. We conclude the juvenile court’s visitation order was proper.

On September 26, 2011, a home in Nicasio was burglarized. Defendant was arrested and charged with burglary, receiving stolen property, and being a past convicted felon in possession of firearms. Defendant’s criminal history went back to 1977, and included three revocations of probation.

This appeal has been taken by Alicia, the mother of the minor A.H., from an order following a dispositional hearing that declared A.H. a dependent child, removed her from the parents’ custody and placed her with respondent Mendocino County Health and Human Services Agency (respondent or the Agency) in foster care, with reunification services granted to the parents.[1] The mother argues that the juvenile court and the Agency failed to give proper notice in the case as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). She also claims that under the ICWA and corresponding California law the trial court erred by failing to transfer the proceeding to a tribal court, and the Agency erred by failing to adhere to specified statutory placement preferences. We find that no prejudicial error is associated with the ICWA notice sent by the Agency. We further find that the trial court was prohibited from transferring the case to a tribal court, and no violation of placement preferences occurred. We therefore affirm the judgment.

A.V. appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court in a proceeding held pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code section 602. He contends: (1) the admission of his confession into evidence violated his privilege against self-incrimination, because his waiver of the privilege was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing; (2) the admission of his confession into evidence violated his due process rights because his confession was not voluntary; (3) certain probation conditions, including conditions precluding him from being alone with other children and requiring him to be of “good conduct” and obey his caregiver, were unreasonable or unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and (4) a minute order erroneously states that A.V. admitted the second count against him.
We will affirm the jurisdictional order. As to the dispositional order, we will order modification of one of the probation conditions, direct that two minute orders be corrected, and affirm the dispositional order in all other respects.

Mary Evelyn Silveira, as executor of the estate of Joseph F. Silveira (the estate), appeals from a judgment directing the estate to convey the interest of Joseph Silveira (Joseph) in the Silveira Ranches partnership to petitioner Anthony F. Silveira (Tony) at the book value of that interest. The estate contends the court erred in reforming the applicable partnership agreements to obligate the estate to convey Joseph’s 50 percent interest at book value and that the court further erred in calculating the book value of the partnership. Tony has filed a cross-appeal challenging the award of prejudgment interest.
We find no error in the court’s reformation of the partnership agreements, but we conclude the court erred in calculating the book value of the partnership. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment insofar as it orders reformation of the partnership agreements but reverse and remand the judgment for recalculation of the book value of the partnership.

Timothy McKnight challenges his recommitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6600 et. seq.[1] (SVPA, or the Act). He contends the Act denies him equal protection of the law because persons committed under it are treated more harshly than MDO’s (mentally disordered offenders) or persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI’s). The recent case of People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II) is dispositive of McKnight’s claim. We therefore affirm his recommitment.

Mother M.T. (mother) and presumed father D.M. (father) (collectively parents) appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan in dependency proceedings on behalf of P.M. (hereinafter P.). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26; 395.)[1] Mother maintains that the court improperly terminated her parental rights because the parent-child relationship exception applies in this case. Father argues that the court's denial of his counsel's request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing constitutes prejudicial error. He also joins in mother's argument. We find no merit to these contentions.

On April 28, 2011, appellant Robert Cota Garcia was convicted in count 1 of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code,[1] § 289, subd. (a)(1)), in count 2 of attempted forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 664), and in count 3 of assault with intent to commit a sexual offense during the commission of a first degree burglary (§ 220, subd. (b)). On the same date, appellant admitted two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(i), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), two serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(12)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
On May 26, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for an aggregate term of 60 years to life.[2] On the same date, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We affirm the judgment of conviction and remand to the trial court with directions for correction of the sentence.

Ronald Allen Patala (appellant) pleaded no contest to one count of receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a))[1] in exchange for a suspended three-year prison term. He subsequently violated probation and sentence was executed. On appeal, appellant contends that: 1) the restitution fine imposed as a condition of probation is unauthorized with execution of the prison term; 2) the court minutes and abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the proper amount of the restitution fine; 3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the proper conviction date and manner; and 4) the abstract of judgment must reflect the fines and fees imposed. We agree with his last two contentions, but in all other respects affirm.