CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Janet Rebecca Weiss pleaded no contest to transportation of methamphetamine ( "Health & Saf. Code, § 11379" Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine ("Health & Saf. Code, § 11377" Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), possession of drug paraphernalia ( "Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)" Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)), and driving without a valid driver’s license ( "Veh. Code, § 12500" Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and admitted enhancements for a prior drug-related offense conviction ( "Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)" Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and a prior prison term "Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)" Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b))[1]. The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in state prison.

During an argument with his wife, defendant Hari Prasad threw household objects at her and kicked her. Defendant’s daughter was also injured during the altercation. A jury found defendant guilty of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and endangering the life or health of a child. The court placed defendant on five years’ probation on the condition he serve 365 days in jail and have no contact with “the victim or the victim’s family.” Defendant challenges the no-contact provision of his probation, arguing it unconstitutionally delegates judicial power to an executive officer and is vague because it lacks a knowledge requirement. We shall affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Billy Henderson of felony evading (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count I). The jury acquitted defendant of two counts of felony resisting with force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69; counts II and III) but convicted him of two counts of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted a strike prior and four prior prison terms.
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of nine years.
Defendant appeals. He contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity in connection with the two felony/misdemeanor resisting counts, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to stay the sentence on one of the two misdemeanor resisting counts. We reject both contentions and will affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Candace M. (Mother) appeals from a dispositional order, seeking review of jurisdictional findings as to her children Hannah M., C.M., Isaiah M., and Nathan M. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j).[1] We determine that substantial evidence supports jurisdictional findings made pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) as to Hannah, C.M., and Isaiah, but must be reversed as to Nathan. We further determine that substantial evidence supports jurisdictional findings made pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j) as to Hannah, C.M., Isaiah, and Nathan, and affirm those jurisdictional findings.

Darryl Aishiay Jackson appeals from a judgment following a guilty plea. Because defendant pled no contest after waiving his right to a preliminary hearing, the following facts are taken from the probation report.
On February 29, 2012, appellant was walking through the parking lot of a 99 Cent Only Store carrying an open container of beer. Two officers from the Pomona Police Department approached appellant and asked him if he was on parole. Appellant took a few steps away from the police officers. He then dropped a small off-white, rock-like substance on the ground and attempted to crush it with his foot. The officers recovered the rock-like substance and appellant was arrested. A subsequent search of appellant’s left rear pants pocket produced a cocaine pipe.
After consulting with counsel, appellant pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). Appellant also admitted having suffered one strike under the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)(d))[1] and having served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court sentenced appellant to state prison for seven years comprised of the upper term of three years doubled for the strike, plus one year for the prior prison term. The trial court imposed various fines and court fees and appellant was awarded three days of actual custody credit and two days of conduct credit, for a total of five days of presentence credit.

Bryan A., a minor, appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by reason of his having committed battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (a)). The trial court committed him to a residential facility, with a maximum term of confinement of six months.
The matter arose from the following facts. On November 11, 2009, appellant’s mother, G.A., asked him to do his laundry. Two hours later when G.A. did not see the laundry done she asked again. Appellant had hidden his dirty laundry behind the bathroom sink but pretended to look for it in the kitchen. An argument ensued and appellant got up close to G.A. and intimidated her. G.A. raised a plastic sandal above her head “to stop him because he was starting to become violent.” Appellant picked up a folding chair and pushed G.A. with the chair. G.A. suffered a broken nail and her hand was hurt as a result of appellant’s actions.

Defendants Chase Auto Finance Corporation (Chase) and Ford of Santa Monica, Inc., dba Subaru of Santa Monica (SSM) appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement found in a vehicle purchase contract executed by plaintiff Stephen Norton. Because we find that provisions of the arbitration agreement were procedurally and substantively unconscionable, we affirm the order denying defendants’ petition to compel arbitration.

Morris F. Griffin appeals from a default judgment entered against him in the amount of $17,724.52 in favor of Charles D. Adams on a cross-complaint for slander and defamation. Griffin argues that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment and in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment. We reverse.

In this marital dissolution action, Christian Garris challenges the trial court’s determination of the amount of the equalization payment he owes his former wife, Evangeline Garris.[1] We affirm.

Appellant Jesse Silva appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187;[1] counts 1 & 3), each with a multiple murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and a gang special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and on count 4 – attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664,187) with, as to each of the above offenses, findings appellant personally, and a principal, used a firearm, intentionally discharged a firearm, and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (former § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)).
Appellant also appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on count 2 – discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a)) and count 5 – assault with a firearm (former § 245, subd. (a)(2)) with personal use of a firearm (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The jury found each of the above offenses was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and the trial court found appellant suffered a prior felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (d)). The trial court resentenced appellant to prison for life without the possibility of parole, plus 80 years to life.[2] After reconsideration of the matter in light of Miller, supra, 567 U.S. __ [183 L.Ed.2d 407], a decision the trial court did not have the benefit of, we affirm the judgment in part, vacate the judgment in part, and remand the matter for resentencing with directions.

C.C. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the San Francisco City and County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, entered September 28, 2012, which terminated her reunification services after a six-month status review hearing, and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for J.C. (born October 2011). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) offered or provided her with reasonable services, and the Agency further failed to provide her with sufficient visitation with her infant son, contrary to the court’s visitation order. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding concerning reasonable services, and find no error in the Agency’s efforts to provide visitation. Accordingly, we deny Mother’s petition on the merits.[2]

In September 2012, the juvenile court found that returning Ernest and Stacey N.’s four minor children to the parents would be detrimental to them. It terminated reunification services for both parents and set a January 2013 permanency planning hearing date. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 366.26.) Ernest and Stacey each petition for review of the order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing date, seeking a stay of that hearing. (See § 387.)
In her petition, Stacey contends that the minors should have been returned to her care because there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of detriment. Both parents contend that reasonable services were not provided to them and that additional services should have been given. In his petition, Ernest challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services. Real party in interest Solano County Department of Health & Social Services opposes the petition. We deny the petition on the merits.

Appellant C.L., appeals from a jurisdictional admission and dispositional order of the Alameda County juvenile court. The appeal is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 800. Appellant’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.