CA Unpub Decisions

S.C. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e))[1] terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her four- and three-year-old daughters. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding there was not a substantial probability the children could be returned to her custody. She seeks an order from this court directing the juvenile court to vacate its section 366.26 hearing and to continue reunification services. We decline to do so and deny the petition.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
On August 26, 2010, a probation search of Carli Smith’s home at which defendant Jonathan Dale Johns was present revealed several items of stolen property including several driver’s licenses, 20 cell phones, three laptop computers, Social Security cards, cameras, and methamphetamine pipes. A complaint in case number CM033904, filed August 30, 2010, charged defendant and Smith with receiving stolen property (count 1; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a))[1] and possession of a smoking device, a misdemeanor (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, former § 11364, subd. (a); as amended by Stats. 2004, ch. 608, § 4, pp. 4785-4786). Smith was also charged with child abuse (count 2).[2]

The father of a minor child appeals from a juvenile court’s disposition order. We appointed counsel for the father. Father’s counsel filed an opening brief informing us he was unable to find an arguable issues, and requested that we exercise our discretion to permit father personally to submit a supplemental brief, which we did. Neither father’s supplemental brief, nor our independent review of the record have revealed any arguable issues. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

An information, dated September 13, 2010, charged Isidore B. Mensah with three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). According to the preliminary hearing transcript, the charges related to oral copulation and sexual intercourse between Mensah, when he was 37 and 38 years old, and a 13-year-old girl, whose mother was Mensah’s friend. Mensah pleaded not guilty to the charges.

We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this matter. After examining the record, counsel filed a “Wende” brief raising no issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We directed appointed counsel to immediately send the record on this appeal and a copy of the opening brief to appellant and notified appellant that within 30 days from the date of the notice he could submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions or argument he wished us to consider. We received no response from appellant.

P.B. appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring her a ward of the court after sustaining a petition alleging she committed grand theft from the person of another, and resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer attempting to discharge his duties. Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction on either count. We remand the matter to the juvenile court with instructions to calculate appellant’s predisposition credits and otherwise affirm.

Beginning in 2002, three attorneys in succession handled legal matters for plaintiffs that in 2005 resulted in a substantial judgment being entered against them. Plaintiffs filed this legal malpractice action against the attorneys in 2005, alleging the attorneys breached their professional duties. The first attorney, whose representation of plaintiffs had ended in 2003, moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was time barred as to him. The trial court granted the motion, concluding the action was time barred because no triable issue existed as to whether (1) plaintiffs knew or should have known of the attorney’s negligence or (2) suffered injury more than one year before they filed their malpractice complaint. The court also concluded the first attorney’s negligence could not have proximately caused plaintiffs’ damages because the negligence of the second and third attorneys constituted an intervening, superseding cause of plaintiffs’ damages.
We conclude no evidence indicates when plaintiffs sustained actual injury, and no evidence indicates the intervening conduct of the second and third attorneys superseded that of the first attorney. Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary judgment.

Lalanie Herath appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion to disqualify opposing counsel in this marital dissolution action. We affirm.

James Ellis Arden (Arden) appeals judgment in favor of Martina Silas (Silas) in Silas’s action against Arden for malicious prosecution of a malpractice action against her. Silas represented Ross Gunnell (Gunnell) in a personal injury action resulting in a jury award that was later overturned on the grounds that worker’s compensation was the exclusive remedy. Gunnell filed a malpractice action against Silas, asserting she failed to assert a meritorious defense to worker’s compensation exclusivity, and Gunnell was represented by Arden in that action. Silas’s motion for summary judgment was granted in Gunnell’s malpractice action, and she commenced this action for malicious prosecution against Arden, resulting in a jury award.
On appeal, Arden contends the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, and insufficient evidence supports the malicious prosecution award and punitive damages. We affirm.

Timothy D. Reuben, Inc. (the Reuben Firm) appeals from the order denying its motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 708.470, subdivision (c),[1] to recover from One West Bank $103,240.69 that it maintains was subject to a lien in its favor but wrongfully transferred by One West Bank to the Reuben Firm’s judgment debtor. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision that One West Bank did not pay money to the judgment debtor as contemplated by section 708.470, subdivision (c), we affirm the order.

A jury convicted Pierre Armond Gilbert of second degree murder and firearm allegations, and the trial court sentenced Gilbert to 60 years to life in state prison. Gilbert appeals, and we affirm.

Erik Ybarra challenges his convictions on counts of kidnapping, rape, and forcible oral copulation. We conditionally reverse and remand for a hearing on the timeliness of the charges.

Plaintiffs Charlene W. Corrin, as Trustee of the Corrin Family Trust dated August 3, 1992, and William R. Corrin and Barbara B. Corrin, as Trustees of the William R. and Barbara B. Corrin Living Trust dated December 19, 1991, appeal from the judgment entered after a bench trial in which the trial court found in favor of defendants Signal Hill West Limited Partnership and Signal Hill Petroleum, Inc. Plaintiffs contend that, in rejecting their causes of action against defendants for specific performance and termination of surface and subsurface rights under an oil and gas lease pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 772.010 et seq.,[1] the trial court applied an incorrect burden and standard of proof and thus that the judgment should be reversed for a new trial. We disagree with plaintiffs’ contentions and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

Mother S.S. seeks an extraordinary writ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l) [1]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to overturn two orders of the Solano County Juvenile Court in a dependency for her daughter L.A. S.S. challenges the order terminating reunification services provided her by real party in interest Solano County Department of Health and Social Services (Department) and setting a hearing at which the permanent plan for L.A. will be decided and S.S.’s parental rights possibly terminated in accordance with section 366.26. She also attacks the order directing the Department to reconsider its recommendation regarding L.A.’s placement for adoption.
Concerning the six months of reunification services S.S. received, she contends that the court erred in concluding that the services already provided were adequate, and, moreover, that she was statutorily entitled to six additional months of services. Concerning the daughter’s placement, S.S. contends that, notwithstanding just granting the foster parent’s request to be upgraded to de facto parent status, the court erred in believing this new status gave the foster parent a preference in consideration for adoption. We conclude these contentions have no merit, and deny the petition on its merits.