CA Unpub Decisions

After a plea bargain with the assistance of counsel, defendant David Villa pleaded no contest to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and admitted a prior juvenile strike adjudication (Penal Code § 1170, subd. (c)(1)). Two other counts and special allegations, one of which would have precluded probation, were dismissed as part of the bargain. A Romero motion[1] was granted, imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on three years’ probation with credit for county jail time. Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
Defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief that raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief and has not done so. After independent review of the record, we conclude there are no arguable issues to brief and affirm the judgment.

Mother A.A. appeals from an order granting guardianship of her daughter, K.C., to her maternal aunt, R.A., in a proceeding brought under the Guardianship-Conservatorship Law provisions of the Probate code. Most of the issues Mother raises were forfeited because they were not first presented to the superior court. The remaining issues present no reversible error. Thus, we affirm.

In 1993, defendant Gregory Chatten Stockman was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state mental hospital.[1] In this appeal and related petition for extraordinary writ,[2] defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to hold a hearing on a petition he filed seeking conditional release for outpatient treatment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2.[3] As discussed below, events subsequent to the completion of briefing have rendered both the appeal and writ petition moot. Finding no factors requiring a determination on the merits notwithstanding this circumstance, we dismiss the appeal and deny the petition as moot, by separate order.

Shortly before midnight on June 19, 2008, Charles Chandler II was murdered in the common area of the Marina Vista Apartments (Marina Vista) in Vallejo. Chandler was not a tenant at Marina Vista, but was on his way to visit an aunt who lived there. Chandler’s four-year-old son, Jayden Lewis Chandler,[1] brought this wrongful death action, by and through his guardian ad litem David Lewis, against Marina Vista’s owners and operators, its management and security services providers, and against the Solano County Affordable Housing Foundation (defendants). [2] The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding plaintiff had failed to present any admissible evidence raising a triable issue of material fact as to either duty or causation. Plaintiff contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying plaintiff’s request for a continuance, finding defendants had met their burden, and concluding plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to duty and causation. We affirm.

Appellants Joe Requa, Wendell G. Moen, Jay Davis, and Donna Ventura (hereafter collectively Retirees) all spent decades working at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore). During their employment there, Livermore was operated by the University of California (the University or UC), a state agency governed by the Regents of the University of California (the Regents). After retiring from Livermore, Retirees all received University-sponsored group health insurance benefits.
In 2007, management and operation of Livermore was transferred from the University to a private consortium. On January 1, 2008, Retirees’ University-sponsored group health insurance was terminated, and the consortium assumed responsibility for providing Retirees’ health insurance benefits.

S.Q.’s mother died in 2007. S.Q.’s father, Corey Q., now has sole custody. Father’s relationship with S.Q.’s maternal relatives is strained, at best. The maternal relatives—grandmother and appellant Nancy T., great grandmother Nelle F., uncle Anthony N., and aunt Linda N.—petitioned the family court for ordered visitation with S.Q. The family court denied the petition; we affirm.

Diane Cheryl Warrick appeals from her conviction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] She contends the lawyer who defended her at trial rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by making offensive and insensitive remarks during closing argument. In her closing, defense counsel quoted from William Shakespeare’s play, The Merchant of Venice, and she repeatedly referred to the character Shylock as “the Jew.” Warrick argues that her counsel’s language must have offended the jury and undermined counsel’s credibility as an advocate.
We conclude Warrick has failed to establish she was prejudiced by defense counsel’s comments. Accordingly, we reject her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm her conviction.

A modification decision.

Acting under the authority of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6500 et sequitur, the trial court granted an order extending the commitment of appellant C.B. to the Department of Developmental Services (Department) on a finding that she suffered from mental retardation and was a danger to herself and others. On appeal she contends that the trial court committed reversible error by relying on a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof when the correct standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and by failing to find that appellant’s dangerousness to self or others was a product of mental retardation. Respondent concedes that the court committed reversible error but contends that the appeal is moot because the one-year commitment has expired. We conclude that because appellant was previously committed on the same grounds under an order which has now become final, a reversal of the order now before us cannot relieve appellant of any stigma that might otherwise warrant reversal. We will therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.

An amended felony complaint filed April 20, 2012, charged defendant Julio Arteaga Sanchez with 13 counts of grand theft, 12 counts of vandalism, and possession of a controlled substance. On April 23, 2012, Sanchez waived his constitutional rights and pleaded guilty to the theft and drug charges in exchange for the prosecution dismissing the vandalism charges. As part of his guilty plea, Sanchez waived his right to appeal “from any and all decisions and orders made in [the] case,” including any “legally authorized sentence the court imposes which is within the terms and limits of [the] plea agreement.”
Sanchez nonetheless appealed, asserting the appeal was based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B).) We appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case, but advised this court she found no issues to support an appeal. We provided Sanchez 30 days to file his own written argument, but he has not responded. After conducting an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we dismiss the appeal.

A jury found Carlos Cruz Gonzalez guilty of two counts of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a)[1] by willfully touching a minor “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying [his or the minor’s] lust, passions, or sexual desires” between March 1, 2011 and April 28, 20011. The trial court denied his motions for a new trial and his requests the court waive section 290 registration and to reduce the felony convictions to misdemeanors. The court granted Gonzalez formal probation for five years under various terms and conditions, including one year of incarceration in the county jail. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he twice touched the minor with lewd intent during the relevant time period. We affirm.

Defendant Nicolas Paul Balbas appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted first degree robbery, one count of residential burglary, and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic weapon, with related enhancements. The trial court accepted defendant’s admission of prior conviction allegations, and sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 17 years.
Defendant contends that although the trial court advised him of his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations before accepting defendant’s admission of them, the trial court failed to also advise him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and confront witnesses. Defendant further contends the trial court also erred by failing to completely advise him of the consequences of admitting the prior conviction allegations.
We affirm. After reviewing “the totality of the circumstances” surrounding defendant’s admission of the prior conviction allegations, we conclude his admission was voluntary and intelligent. (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 (Mosby).) The trial court’s failure to advise defendant of the consequences of admitting the prior conviction allegations did not constitute prejudicial error because defendant failed to show it is reasonably probable he would not have admitted them had he been so advised. (People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 378.)

Between June 21, 2010 and August 1, 2010, four fires of incendiary origin occurred in the City of Taft. Appellant Richard Scott was charged with setting all four fires. He was convicted after jury trial of arson to an inhabited structure (count 2), arson to forest land or structure (count 3) and arson to property belonging to another (count 4). (Pen. Code, § 451, subds. (b)- (d).)[1] The jury found true special allegations attached to counts 2 and 3 that appellant caused multiple structures to burn. (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(4).) The jury found appellant not guilty of two additional counts of arson to forest land or structure (counts 1 & 5) and one additional count of arson to an inhabited structure (count 6). The jury’s verdicts reflect a determination that appellant was guilty of setting one of the fires but not guilty of setting the three other fires.
Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years’ imprisonment, calculated as follows: the five-year mid-term for count 2 plus a consecutive four-year term for the enhancement attached to count 2; the sentences imposed for counts 3 and 4 were stayed pursuant to section 654.
Appellant argues the corpus deliciti rule was not satisfied as to counts 2, 3 and 4. He also contends that two of the arson convictions must be reversed because he cannot be convicted of multiple counts of arson for setting a single fire. Neither argument is persuasive. The judgment will be affirmed.

A bullet fired from a passing pickup truck struck Ricardo Uribe Castro in the leg.[1] He lost consciousness and fell to the ground. After he regained consciousness, he used his other leg to push himself beneath a parked truck, from where he heard a truck stop, heard doors open and close, and heard, “Where’s that punk?,” and, “Where’s that buster?”[2] He lost consciousness again. A helicopter airlifted him to a hospital where he had surgery to repair a shattered bone in his leg. He first told police that he did not see the person with the gun because the cab of the pickup truck was dark and he was just trying to get away. He later told police that José Antonio Herrera shot him and that Herrera had threatened him earlier.[3] Still later, he identified Herrera in a photo lineup. At trial, he testified that he could not identify Herrera as the shooter because he was running away when he heard the gunfire and because the back-seat passenger had a firearm, too.[4]
A jury found Herrera guilty of attempted murder and found criminal-street-gang and firearm allegations true. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 56 years to life. On appeal, he challenges the criminal-street-gang and firearm enhancements. We order the criminal-street-gang enhancement stricken but otherwise affirm the judgment.