CA Unpub Decisions

Minor, D.M., appeals from an order continuing him as a ward of the juvenile court, directing him to undergo a substance abuse assessment and directing him to participate in juvenile drug court due to his violation of the terms of his probation. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Based upon our independent review, we affirm.

Smiley James Harris appeals from an order (1) granting a permanent injunction against harassment in favor of his next-door neighbors and (2) dissolving a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the neighbors granted in his favor. We affirm.

E.R., mother of S.K., appeals from a dispositional order declaring the child to be a dependent of the court and removing the child from her custody.[1] The appeal also brings up for review the juvenile court’s finding that it had jurisdiction over the child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b).[2] Mother contends the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s section 300 jurisdictional finding and the dispositional order directing the removal of the child from her custody. However, mother has not preserved her sufficiency of the evidence challenges for our review. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant Robert M. Colombo appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on the basis of a jury verdict, of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a))[1] and writing a check on an account with insufficient funds. (§ 476a, subd. (a).) His court appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no legal issues and requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

A jury convicted Jamil Najm Muhammad of making criminal threats and false imprisonment, among other offenses. Finding separate punishment could not be imposed for the false imprisonment conviction because it was part of an indivisible course of criminal conduct, the court imposed a concurrent sentence for that offense. We modify the judgment to strike the concurrent sentence and stay sentence on the false imprisonment conviction instead.

D.Q., the father of J., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency case, has filed a petition for extraordinary writ seeking review of the juvenile court’s September 24, 2012 order setting a Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26[1] permanency planning hearing. The father, a self-represented litigant, requests that the order setting the section 366.26 be vacated and that he be provided with reunification services, visitation, and return or custody of J.
For the reasons stated below, we find that D.Q. does not have standing to seek review of the September 24, 2012 order, which terminated reunification services to J.’s mother. We also find that since D.Q. failed to appeal the March 26, 2012 dispositional order denying him placement, reunification services and visitation, that order is final and we lack jurisdiction to review those rulings. We will therefore dismiss the writ petition.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Robert King (defendant) pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)), and one count of battery (Pen. Code, § 242, 243, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted that he had a prior strike conviction (robbery) within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12. In exchange for his no contest pleas defendant was promised a four-year prison sentence.
On September 13, 2011, the court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison consisting of the midterm of two years on the grand theft count doubled because of the prior strike, plus a concurrent 60-day jail term for the battery conviction. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant's appointed counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.
On August 30, 2012, we notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. That time has passed and we have not received a response from defendant.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the entire record and have concluded there are no arguable issues on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we provide "a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed." (Id. at p. 110.)

In contested proceedings in juvenile court, two minor siblings, R.S. and G.S., were declared dependent children of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,[1] and reunification services were ordered for their parents. R.S., the father of the minors, appeals from a dispositional order and a subsequent interim order, contending that the Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) made inadequate inquiries regarding the minors' Indian ancestry, and thus insufficient notice was provided under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. (ICWA or the Act). We find sufficient compliance with the Act, however, and therefore must affirm the orders.

A jury found Stephen Magee (appellant) guilty of one count of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count one), two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 644/211, counts two and three),[1] two counts of making criminal threats (§ 422, counts four and five), one count of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), count six), one count of assault with a deadly weapon with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a), count seven) and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (§ 136, subd. (a)(1), count eight). As to counts one through six, the jury found true the allegation that appellant personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of each offense; and as to count six the jury found true the allegation that appellant used force of fear or an express or implied threat of force in the commission of the crime.

Samantha W. (mother) appeals from judgment terminating dependency court jurisdiction over her son, P.W., and vesting sole custody in his father, Edward H. (father), without any provision for visitation. Mother argues the order must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s determination it was in P.W.’s best interests to deny her visitation; there was insufficient evidence of changed circumstances to support father’s petition for an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388; and because she was not given proper statutory notice of father’s petition. We find none of these contentions persuasive, and affirm the judgment.

Family Code section 3047 is intended to protect the parental rights of deployed service members and to promote the expeditious resolution of custody disputes in deployment situations.[1] The statute establishes a presumption that a service member returning from military service should regain his or her pre-deployment custody of a child, unless the court determines it is not in the child’s best interest.
The case before us illustrates the challenges faced by military parents upon their return home from serving their country. After protracted legal proceedings, the court ruled that E.U. (father) should lose primary care of his child due to father’s temporary deployment to Afghanistan, during which the child’s mother assumed primary custody. We hold the court erred by failing to enforce a court order which provided that father’s custody should be reinstated upon his return from military service, and by failing to provide the “fair, efficient, and expeditious process to resolve [the] child custody and visitation issue[]” intended by the Legislature when it enacted section 3047.

Gary and Rhonda Goodman (the Goodmans) are keenly interested in
mid-century modern architecture and hired Dion Neutra (Neutra) to design a custom home for them. Richard Neutra (Neutra’s deceased father) is their favorite architect. The Goodmans bought a vacant lot in San Clemente and contacted Neutra, who was continuing his father’s architectural practice. All did not proceed as planned, and the parties ended up filing lawsuits against each other.
The jury awarded the Goodmans $100,000 on their professional negligence claim but found in favor of Neutra on the other causes of action. The jury also awarded Neutra $30,000 on his cross-complaint for breach of contract. The trial judge declared Neutra the prevailing party on the contract and awarded him attorney fees. The final judgment awarded the Goodmans $100,000 plus their costs, but this amount was offset by the $30,000 awarded Neutra plus his attorney fees and costs. The net result was a judgment ordering Neutra to pay the Goodmans $27,626.92, which he paid in full.

Julio Cesar Hernandez appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder, aggravated assault, and street terrorism, and found true he used a deadly weapon, inflicted great bodily injury, and committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Hernandez argues the prosecutor committed misconduct, the sentence for street terrorism should be stayed, and he is entitled to conduct credits. We agree with his latter two contentions but not the first. We affirm the judgment as modified.

This is the second appeal (Second Appeal) filed in a dispute between a homeowner, Sharon Nagaoka (Nagaoka), and a contractor, Sean Ponce doing business as Ponce Construction, Inc. (Ponce). The first appeal (Sharon Nagaoka v. Sean Ponce (Feb. 2, 2012, G044757) (the First Appeal)[1] was previously dismissed. The Second Appeal was taken by Ponce from an amended judgment awarding damages against him for breach of contract, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees and costs.
We agree with Nagaoka that it is too late for Ponce to challenge the award of $5,680 for breach of contract. An appeal from that award was properly taken in the First Appeal. However, that appeal was dismissed and Ponce cannot now pursue a challenge to that award in the Second Appeal. We consider only Ponce’s challenge to the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney fees. With respect to those awards, he has not met his burden to show error. We affirm.