CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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An information charged Carlos Gomez-Estrada with one count of corporal injury to a spouse in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a).
Maria Soto testified at trial. She and Gomez-Estrada married in 2008. On October 28, 2010, during an argument with Gomez-Estrada about money, Gomez-Estrada hit her on both cheeks with his fists and hit her on the forehead with his forehead. This occurred in the kitchen of their apartment. After hitting Soto, Gomez-Estrada left the kitchen and went to a bedroom to find Soto’s brother. As he went, Gomez-Estrada was yelling that Soto had hit herself with a plate. Gomez-Estrada returned to the kitchen and lifted his hands as if he was going to grab Soto. Soto punched him on the mouth. Gomez-Estrada put his arm around Soto’s neck and began squeezing Soto’s neck. Soto bit his arm. Gomez-Estrada threw Soto to the ground. |
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Anthony C. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions with respect to D.C., A.C., and S.L.; denying his request to testify telephonically at a hearing; finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply; and giving the legal guardian of D.C. and A.C. discretion over the time, place, and manner of his visitation.[1] Father’s children D.C. and A.C. were adjudged dependents of the court under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect); (g) (no provision for support); and (j) (abuse of sibling). S.L., the half sister of D.C. and A.C., was adjudged a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). D.B. (Mother) and Larry L., the father of S.L., are not parties to this appeal.
We reverse the March 19, 2012 order granting legal guardianship over D.C. and A.C. and the February 1, 2012 order granting long-term foster care for S.L. and remand the case to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide the Cherokee Nation with proper notice of the proceedings under the ICWA. If, after receiving proper notice, a tribe determines D.C., A.C., and S.L. are Indian children as defined by the ICWA, the juvenile court shall proceed in conformity with the provisions of the ICWA. If no tribe indicates D.C., A.C., and S.L. are Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA, the court shall reinstate the March 19, 2012 order of legal guardianship and the February 1, 2012 order of long-term foster care. The court shall then modify the visitation order to specify the frequency and duration of Father’s visits with D.C. and A.C. |
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Defendant Michael Kang appeals from the judgment entered following a court trial in which he was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, with a finding defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. We affirm, but stay the sentence on one count and direct correction of the abstract of judgment.
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Defendant Robert Lee Woods appeals from the judgment entered following the jury verdict convicting him of second degree robbery, with the finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.7, subd. (a).)[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found that the robbery was committed for the purpose of promoting criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) After a separate bench trial, defendant was found to have suffered prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 667, subdivision (a), and to have served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to 45 years to life in state prison. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the robbery conviction and the true finding on the gang allegation, and the prosecutor committed Batson/Wheeler[2] error. We conclude the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is not supported by the record. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.
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The mother, M.M., (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order of February 24, 2012, declaring her five children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).
On appeal, Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the findings under section 300, subdivision (a) that the children suffered, or were at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by a parent nor the findings under subdivision (b) that the children suffered, or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of a parent to supervise or protect the child adequately or the inability of a parent to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse. We affirm. |
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Appellant Rudy Nicholas Mendoza was convicted of two counts of oral copulation/sexual penetration of a child and two counts of lewd acts on a child. He contends on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of battery. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
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William Powers, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from the order denying his motion to strike causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] The causes of action are alleged in a complaint filed by Costco Wholesale Corporation, respondent. We affirm.
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A jury convicted Erik Brodin of theft of utility service, and following a hearing the trial judge ordered restitution in the amount of $12,890.47. Brodin appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, the court’s instruction on theft of utility services was constitutionally deficient, and the restitution amount was based on speculation. We affirm.
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Steven J. Bernheim appeals from the judgment entered after a one-day court trial awarding Alan Kapilow $311,000 in damages, plus prejudgment interest, under a personal guaranty executed by Bernheim and David DeFalco in connection with Kapilow’s $325,000 investment in Nowhere House, LLC for production of the film “Chaos.†We affirm.
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A jury convicted defendant Mohammad Naseem Hanafi of kidnapping for extortion (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)),[1] kidnapping (count 3) (§ 207, subd. (a)), criminal threats (count 5) (§ 422), and corporal injury to a spouse (count 6) (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The jury failed to reach a verdict on one count of grand theft of personal property (count 4) (§ 487, subd. (a)). The jury found Hanafi not guilty of torture (count 2) (§ 206), and attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (count 14) (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)). The jury convicted defendant Kisasi Liggins of counts 1 and 3, and found him not guilty of all other counts.[2] On the court’s own motion, count 4 was dismissed as to Liggins pursuant to section 1385. As to counts 1 and 3, the trial court found true allegations that Liggins had suffered a prior strike conviction for robbery (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)); served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and suffered a prior conviction of a serious felony, robbery (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
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Victor Meraz appeals from judgment after conviction by jury of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] The jury found two special circumstances allegations to be true: that Meraz committed murder by intentionally discharging a firearm from inside a motor vehicle with intent to kill the person outside (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); and that he intentionally killed his victim while an active participant in a street gang, to further the gang's activities. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) The jury also found true allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death and that he committed murder for the benefit of a street gang. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d), 186.22, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced Meraz, who was a minor, to life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP). (§ 190.5.) For the firearm enhancements, it imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life, and imposed and stayed a 20-year consecutive term. (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d).) For the gang enhancement, it imposed a consecutive 10-year term. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) We reject Meraz' contention that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury in response to a question about self-defense, but we vacate the LWOP sentence and remand so the court may reconsider its sentencing discretion in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [183 L.Ed.2d 407, 424] (Miller). We also conclude that the trial court imposed an incorrect security fine, should not impose a 10-year gang enhancement on remand, and should not impose a parole restitution fine if the sentence on remand does not include a period of parole. |
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On October 2, 1990, Kevin Keables was convicted after a no contest plea of attempted rape, a serious felony. (Pen Code, §§ 261, 664, 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), items [3] & [39].)[1] He was sentenced to five years probation and ordered to register as a sex offender. (§ 290, subd. (c).)
On November 15, 1991, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Keables with one count of forcible oral copulation with a minor, alleging he accomplished the act against the victim’s will “by force, violence, duress, menace, and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury†to the victim and to another. (Former Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c).) It was further alleged that he had been convicted of attempted rape one year earlier. Keables again pleaded no contest, and on July 30, 1992, the trial court found him guilty of forcible oral copulation with a minor and found true the prior conviction allegation. It sentenced him to one year in county jail and five years probation. |
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Paki John Bronson appeals the judgment entered after he was convicted by a jury of corporal injury to a former cohabitant, vandalism, making criminal threats, stalking, burglary, aggravated assault and dissuading a witness from testifying in court. Bronson contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of uncharged prior incidents of domestic violence without considering whether they were unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. He also challenges the court’s jury instructions and aspects of his sentence. We affirm. |
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