CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant's appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. In accordance with Kelly, we will provide a summary of the offenses and the proceedings in the trial court.

On appeal, defendant Jacoby Donell Cushman contends that (1) the prospective application of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482) violates his right to equal protection of the law, and (2) the trial court did not determine defendant’s ability to pay various fines and fees or specify the statutory basis for each fine, fee, and assessment. Following the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896 at page 906, footnote 9 (Lara), we reject defendant’s equal protection contention. With respect to the fines and fees imposed upon defendant, we remand for a new hearing on fines and fees to allow the trial court to determine ability to pay and to itemize all fines, fees, and assessments. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Bernice Erwin filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus against defendants Calaveras County Board of Supervisors, Planning Commission, Planner Debra Lewis, and Department of Public Works (sometimes collectively referred to as defendants) alleging they violated her constitutional rights when they issued a notice of violation against a parcel of land she purportedly acquired by gift deed (parcel 29) in 1984, and thereafter conditioned approval of her tentative parcel map on completion of improvements to roads accessing the property (Condition II-1) in 1995.
Defendants demurred, arguing plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as the issues essential to her claims were previously decided against her in two prior federal actions she filed against the same parties. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the lawsuit.

A jury convicted defendant Reginald Dennis Scott of driving under the influence (DUI) (count I) and driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or more (count II). Prior to trial, defendant had entered a plea of guilty to driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor (count III), and admitted a prior DUI offense within 10 years for purposes of punishing his current offenses as felonies (Veh. Code, § 23550.5), and six prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) with a reservation that he could argue at sentencing whether all were applicable.
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of seven years consisting of the upper term of three years for count I; a concurrent upper term for count II; and one year each for the prior prison terms.
Defendant appeals. Defendant contends the sentences imposed for the prior prison terms must be stricken because he was denied due process by not having a jury trial on these priors and the trial court did not make the required findings on these priors. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to state the statutory bases for the $25 court processing fee and the $500 felony report fee. The People properly concede this error.
We conclude defendant admitted the prior prison term allegations but did so without waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and his rights to jury trial and confrontation. Accordingly, we reverse the prior prison term enhancements and remand for further proceedings on these allegations. We also direct the trial court to state the statutory bases for all fees, fines, and penalties imposed upon defendant. Defendant’s convictions on counts I and II are affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Tyrone Page of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1), repealed by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4, operative on Jan. 1, 2012),[1] and possessing a short-barreled shotgun (former § 12020, subd. (a), repealed by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4, operative on Jan. 1, 2012).[2] The trial court found defendant had four prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court dismissed three of the prior serious felony convictions as well as one of the prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison.

A jury found defendant Marcus Zapata guilty of three counts of second degree robbery (counts 1-3; Pen. Code,[1] § 211), evading a peace officer (count 4; Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), assault with a firearm (count 5; § 245, subd. (a)(2)), attempted second degree robbery (count 6; § 664/211), misdemeanor resisting arrest (count 7; § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and attempted murder (count 9; § 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true allegations defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of counts 1, 2, 3, and 6. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
Sentenced to 23 years and 8 months in state prison,[2] defendant appeals, contending (1) his conviction for robbery of Wells Fargo Bank (count 1) must be reversed because robbery of a bank is not a crime; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault with a firearm (count 5); (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder; and (4) the trial court’s failure to stay his sentence for resisting arrest (count 7) violated section 654.
We shall reverse defendant’s convictions for robbery of Wells Fargo Bank (count 1) and assault with a firearm (count 5), stay his sentence for resisting arrest (count 7) and otherwise affirm the judgment. The reversals do not affect the length of defendant’s sentence since the sentence on count 1 had been stayed and the sentence on count 5 had been made concurrent. In addition the stayed sentence on count 7 had been made concurrent.

Defendant Paul Alexander Hinojosa carjacked and kidnapped a father and his three young sons in an attempt to obtain money from the father. The jury convicted defendant of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery ( "Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)" Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)[1] (count 1 - victim "G.S." G.S.)); kidnapping a child under age 14 for extortion ( "§§ 209, subd. (a), 667.9, subd. (c)" §§ 209, subd. (a), 667.9, subd. (c) (count 2 - victim M.P.)); kidnapping for extortion ( "§ 209, subd. (a)" § 209, subd. (a) (counts 3 & 4 – victims R.J & C.J.)); carjacking where a victim was under age 14 ( l "§§ 215, subd. (a), 667.9, subd. (c)" §§ 215, subd. (a), 667.9, subd. (c) (count 5 - victim M.P.)); assault ( "§ 240" § 240) as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon ( "§ 245, subd. (a)(1)" § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 7 – victim 2 G.S.)); felony child endangerment "(§ 273a, subd. (a) (counts 9, 10, & 11 - victims M.P., R.J. and C.J.))" (§ 273a, subd. (a) (counts 9, 10, & 11 - victims M.P., R.J. and C.J.)).[2]

Defendant, Uriel Gonzalez, purports to appeal from July 20, 2012 post-judgment orders denying his motion to vacate sentence and habeas corpus petition. The August 1, 2012 orders do not appear to be appealable. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We issued an order to show cause and calendared the matter for oral argument.
The post-judgment motion argued that defendant did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with the removal of a spectator. The July 20, 2012 post-judgment order is not appealable on that ground. (People v. Cantrell (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 40, 43; People v. Bowles (1933) 135 Cal.App. 514, 516; see People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) “Criminal Appeals,” § 65, pp. 341-342.) Further, insofar as the July 20, 2012 post-judgment order may be construed as one denying a habeas corpus petition, it is not appealable. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 876, disapproved on other grounds in In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070, fn. 3.) We have considered the views expressed in defendant’s pro se filing. They have no merit.

Christopher G. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s May 22, 2012 orders denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights over Peter G., born in June 2010.[1] Father contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petition because he demonstrated a change of circumstances such that a change in placement would be in the best interests of Peter and that the court erred in terminating his parental rights because the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied. Susan G. (Mother) filed a letter brief under In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 and In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. Father adopts by reference Mother’s arguments, but in a separate order filed on January 15, 2013, we dismissed Mother’s appeal. We disagree with Father’s contentions and affirm the orders.

Felipe Aguilar pleaded no contest to one count of a lewd act upon a child under the age of 10 years (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)),[1] and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)). In return, the trial court sentenced Aguilar to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison. Aguilar appeals an order denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

William Michael Callahan appeals from the judgment entered after he pled guilty to petty theft with three or more prior convictions and admitted that he suffered a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. (Pen. Code, §§ 666, subd. (a), 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170, subd. (h)(3).) The trial court sentenced Callahan to 32 months in state prison, consisting of a low-term of 16 months, doubled for the prior serious or violent felony conviction.

After a jury trial, defendant and appellant Michael Calimon was convicted of one count of violation of Penal Code section 211, robbery. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered four prior convictions within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and had served one prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court struck three of the four Three Strikes convictions and sentenced appellant to a total of 16 years in state prison. We appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief which contained an acknowledgment that he had been unable to find any arguable issues. We, and counsel, advised appellant that he could submit a supplemental brief in his own behalf.
Appellant has submitted such a brief. We consider each of his contentions, and, finding no error, affirm.

Joshua Adlai Greer appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] The trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of six years state prison and ordered appellant to pay a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), victim restitution, (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).
We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.
On November 30, 2012, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider.
On January 3, 2013, we received a letter from appellant stating, among other things, that: he was arrested for assault with a firearm and erroneously charged with first degree residential burglary with a firearm enhancement; that he was convicted on inconsistent hearsay evidence; and that he was denied a fair trial.

Shane Stirling appeals a summary judgment in favor of Fremantle North America, Inc. (Fremantle), and The Price Is Right Productions, Inc. (TPIR Productions). She contends the evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants terminated her employment as a model on a television game show because of her prior pregnancy and the fact that she was a new mother, contrary to public policy. She also contends the summary adjudication of her counts for negligent hiring, retention and supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress was error, and challenges the sustaining of the defendants’ evidentiary objections. We conclude that Stirling has shown no prejudicial error and will affirm the judgment.