Bonny
Volunteer Fire/Rescue v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Commission
Filed 7/9/12
Bonny Doon Volunteer Fire/Rescue v. Santa Cruz County
Local Agency Formation Commission CA6
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BONNY DOON
VOLUNTEER FIRE/RESCUE, INC. ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SANTA CRUZ
COUNTY LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.
H036492
(Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No.
CV162743)
An
application proposing the formation of the Bonny Doon Fire Protection District
("FPD") and detachment of the Bonny Doon area from the County Service
Area 48 ("CSA 48") came before the Local Agency Formation Commission
of Santa Cruz County ("LAFCO"), which disapproved it by formal
resolution. Bonny Doon Volunteer
Fire/Rescue, Inc., a California non-profit public benefit corporation and the
proponent of the application, unsuccessfully sought a
set aside Resolution No. 913 disapproving the proposal, (2) comply with the
Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000 ("the
Act") (Gov. Code, § 56000 et seq.)
and the Fire Protection District Law of 1987
("Fire Protection District Law") (Health & Saf. Code, § 13800 et
seq.), and (3) adopt a new resolution supported by
its writ petition.
Appellant
argues that LAFCO's Resolution No. 913 is not supported by substantial evidence
and LAFCO prejudicially abused its discretion by failing proceed in the manner
required by the Act and applicable law.
Our thorough review of the record does not show that appellant is
entitled to writ relief. Accordingly, we
affirm.
I
Procedural Background
A.
1.
In October 2006,
LAFCO received a proposal application for formation of a Bonny Doon Fire
Protection District and concurrent detachment of the new service territory from
CSA 48, which funds the Santa Cruz County Fire Department ("County Fire"),
from appellant. This application is
referred to as Application No. 913.
A registered
voter petition for formation of a new Bonny Doon Fire Protection District was
also filed with LAFCO's Executive Officer Patrick McCormick and then certified
by the elections official of
County ("County") in December 2006. The petition stated: "District formation
will significantly improve fire and medical emergency services to the Bonny
Doon community" by eliminating dispatch delays, improving response time,
designing training to "better accommodate volunteer schedules and improve
recruitment and retention," and supplementing volunteer efforts with
"some paid staffing, stipends, paid call, etc."
Appellant's
emergency services plan, dated January 15, 2007 and submitted to LAFCO, laid
out the details of the proposed district's governance and management,
administration, facilities, apparatus, and equipment, service delivery
strategy, and other aspects of its operation.
2. Executive
Officer's Report
Executive Officer McCormick reviewed
Application No. 913 and prepared a report that included his recommendations to
LAFCO for a September 22, 2008 public hearing on the application. This Executive Officer's Report, dated
September 8, 2008, described the proposed reorganization, the existing fire
protection and emergency services, evaluated the proposal, and recommended that
LAFCO disapprove it. Numerous
attachments accompanied the report.
Among other
things, the report explained the provision of current services: "Fire
protection and first response to emergencies in Bonny Doon is the
responsibility of CAL FIRE (the California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection). Under State law, CAL FIRE
is stationed in the County during the fire season to provide wildland fire
protection. In addition, CAL FIRE
provides structural fire and emergency responses year round on contracts with
the County of Santa Cruz. This contract
arrangement has existed since 1948, and is known as the Santa Cruz County Fire
Department, or simply as 'County Fire.'
County Service Area 48 coincides with the County Fire service area. County Service Area 48 funds the County Fire
contracts through property taxes and fire suppression assessments collected
within the County Services Area 48. The
contract covers the 286 square miles of Santa Cruz County outside cities, fire
protection districts, and County Service Area 4 (Pajaro Dunes), which has its
own contract with CAL FIRE."
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
"The State
of California provides wildland fire suppression to areas that meet its
criteria for 'State Responsibility Area.' " The County "contracts with CAL FIRE to
respond to emergencies both during the fire season and outside the fire
season." That response includes
"paid CAL FIRE companies and volunteers who are trained and supported by
CAL FIRE." They support the five
volunteer companies, including the Bonny Doon Fire and Rescue, which had a
roster of 19 volunteers. The County's
contract with CAL FIRE covered four year-round CAL FIRE stations in the County
and four seasonal CAL FIRE stations, including one in Felton.
"Fire
protection and emergency response in Bonny Doon is currently provided by a
combined response of volunteers, CAL FIRE/County Fire paid companies, and
mutual aid from nearby fire agencies."
"Fire protection and emergency response in Bonny Doon is currently
funded by State and County Service Area 48 (County Fire) funds."
The proposed
Bonny Doon FPD would encompass a 49 square mile area. "The subject territory is within the
Sphere of Influence that LAFCO has adopted for County Service Area 48 (County
Fire)" and the proposal would exclude that area from CSA 48's sphere of
influence. "The proposal area
generally coincides with the response area into which the Bonny Doon volunteers
currently provide initial emergency response."
In Bonny Doon,
there are two all-volunteer stations, both owned by the County, but no CAL FIRE
stations. "The volunteers are
trained, insured, and dispatched by CAL FIRE/County Fire." "Under the current CAL FIRE/County Fire
operational plan, [Bonny Doon firefighter] volunteers sleep at their homes each
night and respond to pages." The proposal
contemplated around-the-clock staffing of the McDermott Station utilizing a
combination of paid firefighters, who would be paid "significantly below
market rate," and volunteers or interns called "sleepers."
The application
"proposed purchasing from the County the vehicles, equipment, and two fire
stations that are now used to serve Bonny Doon" for a purchase price of
one dollar. In an October 30, 2006
letter to Executive Officer McCormick attached to the report, appellant argues
that, in conjunction with formation of the proposed district, Santa Cruz County
should transfer two fire station properties, the station on Martin Road and the
McDermott Station and residence on Empire Grade Road, and four County-owned
vehicles to the new district for a nominal cost of one dollar each.
When a 911 call
is received by a Santa Cruz Consolidated Emergency Communications Center
(SCCECC) dispatcher, the dispatcher sends "an alphanumeric pre-alert
page" for a County Fire/CAL FIRE incident.
The dispatcher then transfers the call to the CAL FIRE dispatcher, who
makes the formal radio dispatch and dispatches the nearest paid company, which
proceeds to the incident.
In the summer of
2008, there were four major wildfires in Santa Cruz County, including the
Martin fire in Boony Doon. CAL FIRE
failed to dispatch the Bonny Doon volunteers to the Martin fire. The County's investigation found that the
SCCECC did properly pre-alert the Bonny Doon volunteers, those volunteers did
respond in substantially the same time frame and numbers as they would have if
"CAL FIRE had properly completed the radio dispatch," and "[t]he
CAL FIRE dispatch center was aware that the Bonny Doon Volunteers were
responding to the Martin Fire based on the Volunteers' radio reports that they
were in route."
Two ameliorative
steps were taken in response to Martin Fire dispatch failure. CAL FIRE changed their dispatch procedures to
reduce the likelihood of future error.
In addition, the County had "formed a task force to report on the
feasibility of the [SCCECC] directly dispatching all CAL FIRE/County Fire
volunteer companies."
3.
On September 22,
2008, a public hearing was held on Application No. 913. At the end of the hearing, LAFCO's
commissioners passed, by a roll call vote of four to three, a motion to follow
the staff recommendation to disapprove the application. LAFCO adjourned to its next regularly
scheduled meeting on October 1, 2008.
On October 1,
2008, the matter of a resolution implementing disapproval of the proposed
reorganization was continued until November 5, 2008.
4.
By
Resolution No. 913, adopted November 5, 2008, LAFCO disapproved the proposal
for formation of the Bonny Doon Fire Protection District and detachment of the
Bonny Doon area from CSA 48. LAFCO
explicitly stated in the resolution's recitals that it had "carefully
considered" the Executive Officer's Report, all factors required by
section 56668, the Initial Study and Negative Declaration, and "all
written and oral testimony that was submitted by interested members of the
affected communities."
5.
Appellant
submitted a written request to LAFCO to reconsider Resolution No. 913. Executive Officer McCormick provided a staff
report and recommendation on the request.
The report indicated that LAFCO legal counsel was providing a separate
analysis of the legal issues raised. As
to the factual issues, the report states that "Bonny Doon proponents in
their reconsideration materials have not presented any new or different facts
generally, nor any relevant facts that could not have been presented at the
September 22, 2008 hearing." It was
recommended that the Commission disapprove the reconsideration request.
6.
A
reconsideration hearing was held on December 8, 2008. A motion to deny reconsideration, consistent
with the staff recommendation, passed.
B.
Appellant
filed its petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1085 on February 9, 2009. On
June 11, 2010, it filed a first amended petition pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085.
At a hearing on
October 4, 2010, the court announced its tentative decision denying the writ
petition. After further argument, the
court indicated that it was adopting its tentative ruling and directed County
Counsel to prepare a statement of decision.
The court's
statement of decision denying the writ petition and the court's judgment in
favor of LAFCO were filed November 16, 2010.
II
Legal
Background
The goal of the Act is "to
encourage orderly growth and development which are essential to the social,
fiscal, and economic well-being of the state." (§ 56001.) "To effectuate this purpose, each county
has a [local agency formation commission] that is charged with reviewing and
approving or disapproving proposals for changes of organization. (§§ 56325,
56375.) Through this process, the
[commission] strives to facilitate the logical and reasonable development of
cities, counties and districts in order to provide for the present and future
needs of each county and its communities.
(§§ 56054, 56301.)" (
Dist. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 937, 942.)
Under
the Act, "[a] proposal for a change of organization or a reorganization
may be made by petition."
(§ 56700, subd. (a); see 56650.)
As statutorily defined, a "change of organization" includes a
district formation (§ 56021, subd. (b)) and a detachment from a district
(§ 56021, subd. (c)). The statutory
definition of "detachment" includes the removal of territory from a
district. (§ 56033.) At all relevant times in this case,
" '[r]eorganization' mean[t] two or more changes of organization
initiated in a single proposal."
(Stats. 1985, ch. 541, § 3, p. 1929; see § 56073.)
A
local agency formation commission ("commission") has the power and
duty to "review and approve with or without amendment, wholly, partially,
or conditionally, or disapprove proposals for changes of organization or
reorganization, consistent with written policies, procedures, and guidelines
adopted by the commission."
(§ 56375, subd. (a)(1).)
Such determinations must be "consistent with the spheres
of influence of the local agencies affected by those
determinations."
(§ 56375.5.) Under the Act,
"sphere of influence" "means a plan for the probable physical
boundaries and service area of a local agency, as determined by the
commission." (§ 56076.)
Under
the general provisions governing consideration of a proposed change of
organization or reorganization, a commission's executive officer must
"review each application which is filed with the executive officer"
and "prepare a report, including his or her recommendations, on the
application."
title="">[3] (§ 56665.) A commission must generally hold a public
hearing regarding a proposed reorganization.
(§§ 56662, subd. (b), 56666, subd. (a); see § 56662, subd. (a)
[exception for proposal consisting solely of annexations or detachments or
both].) At the hearing, the commission
must "hear and receive any oral or written protests, objections, or
evidence" and "consider the report of the executive
officer." (§ 56666, subd.
(b).) The Act mandates the consideration
of a number of statutory factors but the list is not exclusive.
"At
any time not later than 35 days after the conclusion of the hearing, the
commission shall adopt a resolution making determinations approving or
disapproving the proposal, with or without conditions . . . ." (§ 56880.) "If the commission disapproves the
proposal . . . , no further proceedings shall be taken" on it. (§ 56880, see § 56884, subd. (a).)
A written
request for reconsideration of a resolution may be filed within 30 days of the
adoption of a resolution. (§ 56895,
subds. (a), (b).) The request is
required to state "the specific modification to the resolution being
requested" and "what new or different facts that could not have been
presented previously are claimed to warrant the reconsideration." (§ 56895, subd. (a).) The request must be placed on the agenda of
the next meeting of the commission for which notice can be given as required
(§ 56895, subd. (e)) and, at that meeting, the commission must consider
the request and receive oral and written testimony. (§ 56895, subd. (f).) "At the conclusion of its consideration,
the commission may approve or disapprove with or without amendment, wholly,
partially or conditionally the request."
(§ 56895, subd. (g).)
"The determinations of the commission shall be final and
conclusive." (§ 56895, subd.
(h).)
III
A petition for
traditional mandamus is appropriate when the challenged action is
quasi-legislative. (See
Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 567.)
"Courts have traditionally held that quasi-legislative actions must
be challenged in traditional mandamus proceedings rather than in administrative
mandamus proceedings even if the administrative agency was required by law to
conduct a hearing and take evidence. (See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 278–279 . . . ; Shapell Industries,
Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 231
. . . ; Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist. (1967)
256 Cal.App.2d 271, 279 . . . .)" (Ibid.)
"The
classification of administrative action as quasi-legislative or
quasi-adjudicative 'contemplates the function performed . . . .'
(Pitts v.
Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 834 . . . .)" (20th
Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 275.) In deciding whether to approve a proposal for
formation of a new fire protection district and detachment of territory from a
county service area, a local agency formation commission acts in its
quasi-legislative capacity. (See
Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 495 ["A LAFCO annexation
determination is quasi-legislative; judicial review thus arises under the
ordinary mandamus provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, rather
than the administrative mandamus provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5. [Citation.]"]; San Miguel
Consolidated Fire Protection Dist. v. Davis (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 134, 152
[LAFCO is a quasi-legislative administrative agency; its proceedings are
quasi-legislative in nature]; City of
South Gate v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1416,
1421 [district's boundary adjustment between high schools was
quasi-legislative]; Fullerton Joint Union
High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786-787
(plur. opn. of Broussard, J.), disapproved on another ground in
Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 917-922 [State Board of Education was
exercising a quasi-legislative function reviewable by traditional mandamus when
it approved a plan to remove a portion of a high school district and create a
new unified school district]; City of
Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 381, 387
["boundary and annexation determinations of LAFCO under the [former
Knox-Nisbet Act were] quasi-
writ proceeding should be regarded as an administrative mandamus action (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), it was properly designated as a petition for
traditional mandamus.
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5]
" 'It
is established that in reviewing quasi-legislative actions of administrative
agencies the scope of judicial review is limited to an examination of the
proceeding before the agency to determine whether its actions have been
arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking evidentiary support, or whether it
has failed to follow the procedure or give the notices required by law.' (County of Orange v. Heim (1973) 30
Cal.App.3d 694, 719 . . . ; see also California Hotel &
Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 211–212
. . . ; Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 833–835
. . . ; Ray v. Parker (1940) 15 Cal.2d 275, 303–312
. . . .) A corollary to
the rule is that an administrative agency exercising a quasi-legislative
function is not required to make detailed findings of fact. [Citations.]" (McKinny
v. Oxnard Union High School Dist. Bd. of Trustees (1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 88.)
In keeping with
this quite limited scope of judicial
review for quasi-legislative actions, section 56107 of the Act states: "No change of organization or
reorganization order under this division and no resolution adopted by the
commission making determinations upon a proposal shall be invalidated because
of any defect, error, irregularity, or omission in any act, determination, or
procedure which does not adversely and substantially affect the rights of any
person, city, county, district, the state, or any agency or subdivision of the
state." (§ 56107, subd.
(a).) "All determinations made by a
commission under, and pursuant to, this division [the Act] shall be final and
conclusive in the absence of fraud or prejudicial abuse of
discretion." (§ 56107, subd.
(b).) "In any action or proceeding
to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a determination by a commission on
grounds of noncompliance with this division, any inquiry shall extend only to
whether there was fraud or a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Prejudicial abuse of discretion is
established if the court finds that the determination or decision is not
supported by substantial evidence in
light of the whole record."
(§ 56107, subd. (c), italics added.)
The
substantiality of the evidence in an administrative record to support a
quasi-legislative administrative decision is a question of law. (Western
States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 573; see San
Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com'n v. Superior Court (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 159, 167.) Likewise,
construction of a statute is a question of law and we are not bound by the
lower court's interpretation. (
562; see Save our Peninsula Committee v.
Monterey County Board of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118.) An appellate court's review of the
administrative record for legal error and substantial evidence in traditional
mandamus cases is the same as the trial court's: the appellate court reviews
the agency's action, not the trial court's decision, and decides questions of
law de novo. (See Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 427; see also Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 368,
387.) Appellant's focus on the trial
court's decision is misplaced.
IV
Alleged Decision-Making Errors
A. Fire Protection District Law of 1987
Citing
Health and Safety Code section 13801, appellant contends that respondent
"evaluated the Application . . . without implementation of the clear
Legislative intent of the Fire Law favoring local
determination of how efficient fire services are to be provided."
of the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 13800 et seq.). (See Health &
Saf. Code, § 13800 [short title].)
This law expressly
provides: "The Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act
of 2000 (Division 3 (commencing with Section 56000) of Title 5 of the
Government Code) shall govern any change of organization or reorganization of a
district." (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 13812; see Health & Saf. Code, § 13822 [once a sufficient
petition for formation of a new fire protection district is filed, the local
agency formation commission must proceed under the Act].) The Act itself states, with exceptions not
here applicable, that it is "the sole and exclusive authority and procedure
for the initiation, conduct, and completion of changes of organization and
reorganizations for . . . districts."
(§ 56100.)
Appellant
has failed to cite any authority showing that the general legislative intent
underlying the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 must be considered when a
local agency formation commission decides whether to approve or disapprove a
proposed reorganization involving the formation of a fire protection district
and detachment of territory from another district.
B.
Section 56668
specifies 15 factors that a commission must consider in the review of a
proposal for a change of organization or reorganization. As indicated, the list is not exclusive. (§ 56668 ["review of a proposal
shall include, but not be limited to . . ."].)
Appellant now
attacks the trial court's analysis with respect to LAFCO's compliance with
section 56668. It specifically complains
about the trial court's analysis of the evidence relevant to subdivisions (b),
(c), (h), (i), and (m) of section 56668.
(See ante, fn. 4.) As we
clarified earlier, we review LAFCO's action, not the trial court's
decision. (See Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p.
427.)
Insofar as
appellant is contending that LAFCO failed to properly consider all the section
56668 factors and merely paid lip service to them, that claim of error is not
substantiated by the record. LAFCO's
Resolution No. 93 expressly states that it considered all the statutory factors
identified by section 56668. LAFCO was
not statutorily required to make express findings concerning those
factors. Section 56668 does not assign a
particular weight or priority to any of the enumerated factors. In considering the relevant factors, LAFCO
enjoyed considerable discretion. (See
§ 56107, see also Bozung v. Local
Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 288.)
Appellant has
not, by reference to the record, demonstrated that LAFCO failed to consider any
factor or sub-factor or the evidence relevant thereto in evaluating the
proposal. In absence of any such
evidence, the presumption that "official duty has been regularly
performed" applies to this mandamus proceeding and we presume that LAFCO
considered all statutory factors and the relevant evidence with regard to those
factors. (Evid. Code, § 664; see
Evid. Code, §§ 606, 660.)
C.
"Adjacent Areas"
Appellant
complains that, in considering Resolution No. 913, LAFCO inaccurately
determined that the "affected territory" under the proposed reorganization
was the whole area of CSA 48 and failed to focus "on the proper 'affected
territory' at issue," in other words, the area of Bonny Doon.
"
"any territory for which a change of organization or reorganization"
is proposed or ordered.
(§ 56015.) One of the
factors that LAFCO was required to consider in reviewing the proposed
reorganization was "information or comments from the landowner or owners,
voters, or residents of the affected territory." (§ 56668, subd. (m), italics
added.) Appellant fails to establish by
reference to the record that LAFCO misunderstood the phrase "affected
territory" or did not consider this factor and it certainly has not shown
that a misunderstanding of that term prejudicially affected LAFCO's decision.
Appellant also
appears to be complaining that LAFCO incorrectly interpreted the term
"adjacent areas" as used in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section
56668, two of the enumerated statutory factors, to encompass the area of CSA
48. Subdivision (b) of section 56668
required in 2008, and still requires, a commission to take into account the
following: "The need for organized community services; the present cost
and adequacy of governmental services and controls in the area; probable future
needs for those services and controls; probable effect of the proposed . . .
formation . . . or exclusion and of alternative courses of action on the cost
and adequacy of services and controls in the area and adjacent areas."
(Stats. 2010, ch. 328, § 93, p. 1521, Stats. 2007, ch. 428,
§ 1, p. 3705, italics added.)
Subdivision (c) of section 56668 required in 2008, and still requires,
consideration of the following: "The effect of the proposed action and of
alternative actions, on adjacent areas,
on mutual social and economic interests, and on the local governmental
structure of the county." (Stats.
2010, ch. 328, § 93, p. 1521, Stats. 2007, ch. 428, § 1, p. 3706,
italics added.)
Under these
provisions, the area proposed for detachment from CSA 48 and inclusion into the
proposed Bonny Doon FPD was not the only valid concern. The impact on "adjacent areas" was
a legitimate consideration. Appellant
disputes that all areas of County Fire are "adjacent" to the proposed
Bonny Doon FPD. It asserts that
"[t]he premise that there are 'areas' adjacent to Bonny Doon subject to
negative impact if the Proposed District is approved is unsupportable"
because, "as the map on page 5 of the Executive Officer Report
shows," "the only area of CSA 48/County Fire adjacent to Bonny Doon is
the Davenport North Coast area" and "there are other autonomous fire districts . . . between Bonny Doon and other
areas of County Fire . . . ."
Appellant's
interpretation of the word "adjacent" is overly restrictive. The adjective can mean "close to"
as well as "adjoining."
(American Heritage College Dict. (3d ed. 1997) p. 16.) Moreover, the statutory factors are not
exclusive. (See § 56668.) Even appellant acknowledges that "LAFCO
was entitled to consider potential
effects on CSA 48 as part of its overall analysis . . . ." We think it indisputable that LAFCO could
reasonably consider the effect of detachment from CSA 48 on the cost and
adequacy of services for the areas remaining within County Fire's and CSA 48's
service area.
One of the
purposes of a commission is to "shape the development of local agencies so
as to advantageously provide for the present and future needs of each county
and its communities."
(§ 56301.) The legislative
statement of intent with regard to the Act indicates commissions have been
tasked with establishing community service priorities "by weighing the
total community service needs against the total financial resources available
for securing community services" and setting priorities in a way that
"reflects local circumstances, conditions, and limited financial
resources." (§ 56001.) This aspect of their responsibility takes on
special significance in times of tight budgets, escalating costs, and economic
challenges.
D.
Appellant
maintains that, in adopting Resolution No. 913, LAFCO "improperly focused
on the County Contract and how best to protect County appropriations for the
County Contract, rather than analyzing whether the Proposed District would be
the most efficient government service provider consistent with Section 56301
and the Act's purpose." It accuses
LAFCO of having a "singular obsession with protecting County Contract
financing and County Fire . . . ."
Without any citation to the administrative record, appellant maintains
that LAFCO "did not consider the potential for the positive impact of an
independent fire protection district on the local government structure . . .
."
Appellant has
not established based on the administrative record that LAFCO disregarded the
issue of efficient or effective delivery of needed fire protection and
emergency response services in Bonny Doon.
LAFCO was statutorily obligated to determine whether County Fire/CSA 48
could "feasibly provide" the needed services "in a more
accountable manner" than Bonny Doon FPD.
(See §§ 56301, 56886.5, subd. (a).)
In Resolution No. 93, LAFCO expressly resolved that question in favor of
the existing agencies and, as we discuss below, we find that determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
It is true that
the Legislature, in its general statement of intent, "recognize[d] the
critical role of many limited purpose agencies, especially in rural
communities" and found that "whether governmental services are
proposed to be provided by a single-purpose agency, several agencies, or a
multipurpose agency, responsibility should be given to the agency or agencies
that can best provide government services." (§ 56001.) But generalized statements of intent do not
control a commission's exercise of its considerable discretion. (See § 56107, see also
supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 288 [former law]; cf. Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 444
[although Legislature had made clear its desire to maximize voter registration,
the decision whether to adopt an employee deputization program rested in the
discretion of the individual counties].)
E.
Appellant argues
that LAFCO improperly relied on its Local Standard 2.1.1 and Local Policy 2.4
because they conflict with the Act.
Under the Act, each commission must adopt its own written policies and
procedures. (§ 56300.) Pursuant to section 56375, subdivision (g), a
commission has the power and duty "[t]o adopt written procedures for the
evaluation of proposals, including written definitions consistent with existing
state law" and a commission "may adopt standards for any of the
factors enumerated in Section 56668."
LAFCO Policy 2.1
reflects a preference for agency consolidation, providing: "Proposals,
where feasible, should minimize the number of local agencies and promote the
use of multi-purpose agencies."
Policy Standard 2.1.1 sets an order of preference for the provision of "[n]ew or consolidated
services" and the formation of a new single-purpose district is least
favored. Policy Standard 2.1.2 states
that "[t]he Commission will promote and approve district consolidations,
where feasible."
LAFCO Policy 2.4
states that "[t]he Commission shall consider the effects of a proposed
action on adjacent areas, mutual social and economic interests, and on local
governmental structure."
Appellate courts
are generally guided by the following rule: "[A]dministrative
interpretations must be rejected where contrary to
But because of the agency's expertise, its view of
enforces is entitled to great weight unless clearly erroneous or
unauthorized. [Citations.] Courts may not substitute their judgment for
that of the agency on matters within the agency's discretion. [Citation.]" (Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101,
111.)
As to Local
Policy 2.4, we discern absolutely no conflict between its language and section
56668, subdivision (c), which likewise requires consideration of "the
effect of the proposed action" "on adjacent areas, on mutual social
and economic interests, and on the local governmental structure of the county." Insofar as appellant is baldly attacking
LAFCO's application of this local policy without any reference to the record,
this assignment of error must be rejected.
As to Local
Standard 2.1.1, appellant charges that it establishes a "rigid order of
preference" that places a single purpose district such as the proposed
district "at the bottom of the list" and prevented LAFCO from taking
into account "the critical role of limited purpose agencies in rural
communities (like the Bonny Doon area) . . . ." To the contrary, this standard is broadly
consistent with the Act, which expresses a general legislative preference in
favor of providing needed services within existing agencies and against the
proliferation of new single-purpose agencies unless they will be the more
efficient and accountable service providers.
The legislative
declaration of intent with regard to the Act states in part: "The Legislature finds and declares that
it is the policy of the state to encourage orderly growth and development which
are essential to the social, fiscal, and economic well-being of the state. The Legislature recognizes that the logical
formation and determination of local agency boundaries is an important factor
in promoting orderly development and in balancing that development with
sometimes competing state interests of discouraging urban sprawl, preserving
open-space and prime agricultural lands, and efficiently extending government
services. . . . [T]he Legislature further finds and declares that this policy
should be effected by the logical formation and modification of the boundaries
of local agencies, with a preference
granted to accommodating additional growth within, or through the expansion of,
the boundaries of those local agencies which can best accommodate and
provide necessary governmental services and housing for persons and families of
all incomes in the most efficient manner feasible." (§ 56001, italics added.) Section 56301, which concerns the purposes of
local agency formation commissions, states in pertinent part: "When the formation
of a new governmental entity is proposed, a commission shall make a
determination as to whether existing agencies can feasibly provide the needed
service or services in a more efficient and accountable manner. If a new single-purpose agency is deemed
necessary, the commission shall consider reorganization with other
single-purpose agencies that provide related services." Section 56886.5, subdivision (a), which
specifically addresses the formation of a district, similarly states: "If
a proposal includes the formation of a district . . . , the commission shall
determine whether existing agencies can feasibly provide the needed service or
services in a more efficient and accountable manner. If a new single-purpose local agency is
deemed necessary, the commission shall consider reorganization with other
single-purpose local agencies that provide related services." Together these statutory provisions express a
general preference in favor of agency consolidation and against the creation of
additional single-purpose local agencies.
We cannot say
that Standard 2.1.1 facially conflicts with the Act's indicated
preferences. It merely states an
"order of preference" and it does not make this standard, or the
policy it implements, the determining factor, to the exclusion of other
relevant factors, in evaluating a proposed reorganization. Neither has appellant established by specific
references to the record that LAFCO actually applied the policy inflexibly
without regard to other valid considerations or in contravention of the Act's
purposes. LAFCO's resolution reflects a
number of policy determinations went into its decision to disapprove the
proposed reorganization.
Evidence
A. LAFCO's
Decision
LAFCO's
Resolution No. 913 specified four of its reasons for disapproving the proposed
reorganization. For its first two
reasons, LAFCO relied upon sections 56301 and 56886.5, subdivision (a),
respectively.
LAFCO
determined, with respect to these statutory provisions, that the existing agencies
could provide fire and initial emergency services more cost efficiently than
the proposed Bonny Doon FPD. It found
the existing agency could "provide fire and initial emergency services
more efficiently than the model presented in Application No. 913" and this
was true for both the Bonny Doon area and the entire area within CSA 48. It stated:
"County Service Area 48 is significantly more cost-efficient than
the cost of services would be in Bonny Doon and elsewhere in rural Santa Cruz
County under the model proposed by Application Number 913." LAFCO further stated that it had evaluated
the "relevant efficiencies" and did not "deem the new district
necessary." It implicitly found
that the existing agencies could feasibly provide the needed services "in
a more efficient and accountable manner."
A third
consideration was its local policy standard that gave the lowest preference to
a single-purpose district, such as the proposed Bonny Doon FPD. The resolution stated: "The service is currently being provided
by an existing district of which the Board of Supervisors is the governing
body, which is a higher priority service organization and a feasible means of
delivering the service."
A fourth basis
for its decision was the adverse impact of the proposed reorganization on
remaining area of CSA 48. Citing its
local Policy 2.4, the resolution explained: "The Commission has considered
the potential effects of the proposal upon Bonny Doon, Davenport, the North
Coast, Skyline, Summit, Corralitos, and the other areas served by County
Service Area 48. The application would
likely result in County Service Area 48 losing significant revenues and
potentially causing a degradation of services in one or more of the four
off-season paid stations . . . . As a
result, formation of a Bonny Doon Fire Protection District would likely have a
negative effect on adjacent areas."
Appellant
challenges the substantiality of the evidence to support LAFCO's determinations
regarding the comparative cost effectiveness of the current fire protection
services and the proposed district and the probability of harm to CSA 48. It maintains that the County's estimates of
potential revenue losses and cost savings to CSA 48 if the proposed reorganization
were approved did not constitute substantial evidence. Appellant questions the evidence indicating
that it would cost approximately $250,000 to relocate a seasonal CAL FIRE
station, funded by the State, to Bonny Doon and convert such station to year-round
service under a cooperative contract with the State. Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conclusion that such a station would be more cost
efficient than the proposed Bonny Doon FPD with a pro forma budget of
approximately $650,000.
B.
The legal
principles governing judicial review of the substantiality of the evidence,
which appellant often overlooks, are well established. In determining whether substantial evidence
supports LAFCO's Resolution No. 913, "we resolve all conflicts in favor of
the prevailing party, indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences
from the record." (
San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374.) "When a finding is attacked as being
unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a
determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence in the record,
contradicted or uncontradicted, that will support the finding. When two or more inferences can be reasonably
deduced from those facts, the reviewing
has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder. ([Western States Petroleum Assn. v.
Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559,] 571
. . . .)" (
"We do not
inquire whether, if we had the power to do so, we would have taken the action
taken by the agency. (Western States
Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 573–574
. . . ; Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd.
of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786 . . . .)" (Associated
Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 361.) We do not
judgment, reweigh the evidence, or review the wisdom of a quasi-legislative
decision. (See Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690,
702; Manjares v. Newton (1966) 64
Cal.2d 365, 371; Pitts v. Perluss
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 832-833; see also Western
States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, 579.)
"Evidence
is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
of solid value. [Citation.]" (Plastic
Pipe and Fittings Ass'n v. California Building Standards Com'n (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 1390, 1407.)
C.
the Evidence
Appellant first
insists that LAFCO knew its resolution was not supported by substantial
evidence. LAFCO's belief or disbelief
that the evidence would satisfy the appellate standard for reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence is irrelevant.
D.
The
administrative record shows that County Fire/CSA 48 would have lost the revenue
stream from the Bonny Doon area if LAFCO approved the proposal. The Executive Officer's Report indicates that
specific financial information came from the Santa Cruz Director of Emergency
Services, who calculated a potential net loss to County Fire of approximately
$360,000 ($427,000 [estimated revenue from Bonny Doon] minus about $65,000
[estimated cost savings]). The
administrative record also reflects that the Santa Cruz County
Auditor-Controller's Office, the Emergency Services Administrator, and General
Services Director provided information to LAFCO's Executive Officer regarding
likely revenue losses to CSA 48 under the proposal.
The Act
provides: "The officers and employees of a city, county, or special
district, including any local agency, . . . shall furnish the executive officer
with any records or information in their possession as may be necessary to assist
the commission and the executive officer in their duties, including but limited
to the preparation of reports pursuant to Sections 56665 [report on application
for change of organization or reorganization] and 56800 [comprehensive fiscal
analysis regarding proposed incorporation of city]." (§ 56386; see § 56043 [definition
of "incorporation"].) The
record does not show that the information provided by public officers and
employees to Executive Officer McCormick was not within their expertise and knowledge.
As stated, the
Act requires a commission's executive officer to prepare a report on each
application proposing a change of organization or reorganization. (§ 56665.) A commission conducting a hearing on such a
proposal application must, by law, consider the executive officer's
report. (§56666, subd. (b).) Appellant has failed to establish that
information contained in an executive officer's report is not substantial evidence. In this case, LAFCO had before it evidence
sufficient to believe that County Fire/CSA 48 would lose at least approximately
$427,000 if the proposed reorganization, which included the Bonny Doon
detachment, was approved.
The
administrative record contains a Comparative Cost Analysis chart for 2006-2007
estimating that Bonny Doon contributed a total of $427,683 to County Fire's
revenues, made up of property tax revenue of $277,085 and assessments of
$150,598. Appellant acknowledges that
the administrative record also contains a 2006 Bonny Doon parcel list showing
CSA 48 fees assessed on each parcel totaling $150,655.44. These numbers are roughly consistent with the
revenue figures originally advanced by County officials.
Revenue
information, which was provided by the Executive Officer's Report, indicated
the property tax and assessment revenues for fire protection contributed by
Bonny Doon increased after 2006.
Attachment I to the Executive Officer's Report states that Bonny Doon
contributed $287,471 property tax revenues to County Fire during 2007-2008.
determined that assessment revenues of $156,019 were generated from the Bonny
Doon area in 2007-2008 based upon an assessment of $117 for a typical house and
estimated assessment revenues from Bonny Doon in 2008-2009 would be $161,140
based upon an assessment of $120.84 for a typical house.
Manager of the Santa Cruz County Auditor-Controller's Office, dated July 28,
2008, which is contained in the administrative record, provides data for 2007-2008
showing that the proposed reorganization would result in a "tax
shift" of $287,471.
name="_ftnref10" title="">[10] The originally forecasted revenue loss of
$427,000 upon detachment was not updated to include the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009
increases in property tax and assessment revenues.
The estimated
$65,000 cost savings to be realized by County Fire from detachment of the Bonny
Doon area was admittedly a ballpark figure.
A September 2008 email from Executive Officer McCormick explained that
the number could not be extracted from any budget. His report indicated that the estimate was
based on a February 20, 2007 letter from the Director of Emergency Services,
who presumably would be familiar with County Fire's finances. (See ante, fn. 7.)
Proponents and
supporters of the proposed reorganization did not present any evidence that the
cost savings would be greater than $65,000.
the detachment would cause a net loss of revenues from the Bonny Doon area of
less than $360,000.
The Executive
Officer's Report explained that the revenue collected by CSA 48 supported
County Fire and paid for its contracts with CAL FIRE, whose services were
augmented by the five volunteer companies that were trained, supervised, and
supported by CAL FIRE. Bonny Doon was
one of those volunteer companies. LAFCO
could reasonably infer that any reduction in County Fire expenses from the
proposed detachment of the Bonny Doon area would be marginal since County Fire
would continue to carry the cost of contracting with CAL FIRE to provide
year-round service from certain stations operated by CAL FIRE and to train,
supervise, and support the remaining volunteer companies.
Appellant
complains that the evidence of the 2006 CSA 48 assessment revenues was not
current information and the forecast revenue losses were speculative. But there was no evidence that, if LAFCO
approved the proposed reorganization, the loss of assessments or property tax
revenues would be less than the amounts actually collected from Bonny Doon in
recent years. Even though the projected
amount of those probable revenue losses was necessarily an estimate, the
estimate was not based on mere speculation.
Moreover, LAFCO's mandate included consideration of the "probable
effect" of the proposed reorganization "on the cost and adequacy of
services and controls in the area and adjacent areas." (§ 56668, subd. (b); see American
Heritage College Dict. (3d ed. 1997) p. 1090 ["probable" means "[l]ikely
to happen or be true" or [l]ikely but uncertain; plausible"].) Appellant has failed to show that the
estimates could not constitute substantial evidence.
Moreover, in its
resolution, LAFCO did not find a specific amount of revenue would be lost, only
that such loss was likely to be significant.
Substantial evidence supports this determination.
The Executive
Officer's Report also informed LAFCO:
"Notwithstanding the outcome of the Bonny Doon application to
LAFCO, County Service Area 48 (County Fire) is short of revenues to continue
the level of service provided in the previous five years. The main reason for the shortfall is that
increased costs of State firefighter salaries and benefits have increased
faster than revenues. In order to pay
the higher contract costs, County Fire chose to maintain staffed stations and
staffing levels, and deferred replacing apparatus." It further related: "The property taxes have not been
sufficient to fund the County Fire program, and County Service Area 48 has
passed a fire suppression assessment that has an annual inflation factor. . . .
[¶] Foreseeing a need to increase the level of assessments to maintain the
County Service Area's five volunteer companies, four off-season contracts with
CAL FIRE, and to restore its engine replacement program, the County Service
Area proposed an assessment increase to $215.80 per house. In the fall 2007, via a mail ballot process,
this higher assessment failed . . . . Subsequent to the assessment's failure,
County Fire has reduced staffing on the off-season paid companies." The report advised that the net loss of
revenues was "approximately the cost of keeping one of the four paid
stations open outside fire season."
Based on the
report, LAFCO could reasonably conclude that a significant net loss of revenues
would likely adversely impact the adequacy of services provided by County Fire.
We uphold as
supported by substantial evidence LAFCO's determination that approval of the
proposed reorganization would "likely result in [CSA] 48 losing
significant revenues and potentially causing a degradation of services in one
or more of the four off-season paid stations . . . ."
E. Efficient Provision of Government Services
The legal issue
was whether existing agencies could "feasibly provide the needed service
or services in a more efficient and accountable manner."
"capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable
period of time, taking into account economic, legal, social, and technological
factors." (§ 56038.5.) Appellant asserts that substantial evidence
does not support LAFCO's conclusions regarding comparative cost
effectiveness. We disagree.
LAFCO staff
calculated that, if the seasonal CAL FIRE station in Felton were moved to Bonny
Doon (which appeared to be a viable option since Felton FPD operated its own
nearby station), it would cost approximately $250,000 per year to operate the
CAL FIRE station year round. In an email
dated August 29, 2008, Chief John Ferriera responded to Executive Officer McCormick's
inquiry whether $250,000 was an accurate estimate of the cost to operate a
seasonal CAL FIRE station, relocated to Bonny Doon, year round under an
"Amador contract."
name="_ftnref14" title="">[14] Chief Ferreira replied by email: "[T]he $250K estimate for an 'Amador'
engine is accurate. The contracting
agency pays the cost of the Firefighters (2 per day) and the State provides the
company officer at no additional charge (the Fire Captain is already on the
State payroll for its wildland mission, the firefighters, which are normally
layed [sic] off at the end of fire season, are the 'additional' cost borne by
the contracting agency) see Public Resources Code 4142-46."
estimated cost of $250,000 was "questionable" and "completely
unsubstantiated," there is no reason to think that this information was
not within the expertise or knowledge of Chief Ferreira, who was the Chief of
CAL FIRE in San Mateo and Santa Cruz Counties and effectively Chief of County
Fire under the County's cooperative agreement with the state.
The proponents'
updated pro forma budget for an independent Boony Doon FPD was approximately
$660,000 per year; it was set forth in an attachment to the Executive Officer's
Report. The administrative record
contains a spreadsheet comparing a Bonny Doon FPD's proposed budget of $689,979
(reduced to $660,564 in handwriting) to the budgets of other local FPDs.
by an unknown author do not establish that the Bonny Doon FPD could operate on
less than $660,564. A notation on the
pro forma budget (Attachment N to the Executive Officer's Report) stated: "Proponents have adjusted the pro forma
budget amounts slightly between the 2006 application and August 2008" and
"[o]nly the updated amounts are shown." Proponents did not present evidence that the
proposed district could function on a smaller budget.
Appellant also
suggests that LAFCO's determinations concerning the "relative
efficiencies" were not supported by substantial evidence because Bonny
Doon taxpayers would pay more under the existing system than under the proposed
district. Appellant points to Attachment
"I" to the Executive Officer's Report, which stated that (1) the cost
of a CSA 48 assessment on a "typical house" would be $120.84 in
2008-2009 and (2) an additional Bonny Doon assessment of $187.48 on a
"typical house" in 2008-2009 would be sufficient to fund the
approximate $250,000 needed to staff a County Fire/CAL FIRE station in Bonny
Doon during non-fire season. Appellant
argues that, when these assessments are added together, "it is evident
that Bonny Doon area property owners would pay a total of $698,611 under the
revised Amador Plan instead of the $660,000 proposed for the Proposed
District" and a typical house "would in fact pay $308.32 in CSA
assessments instead of $248.00 proposed for the Proposed District." Appellant's reasoning is flawed because fire
suppression assessments or fees are revenues, not expenditures or costs, from
the point of view of the proposed district or a relocated CAL FIRE station
operating year-round in Bonny Doon. The
issue of the source of funding is separate from the question of the projected
annual cost of operation.
In addition,
there was concern that the proponent's proposed Bonny Doon fire protection tax
was not sufficient to support the proposed 24/7 levels of service. The proposal application indicated that the
proposed Bonny Doon fire tax rate "assumes the County will transfer
ownership of the two Bonny Doon fire stations and the four County-owned
vehicles at a cost of no more than $1.00 each." Impliedly, the proposed annual fire
protection tax of about $248 per house to support the proposed Bonny Doon FPD
would need to be increased if LAFCO approved the proposal but this transfer at
nominal cost did not occur.
The Executive
Officer's Report indicated that the proposed district intended to staff the
McDermott station around the clock and would accomplish this level of staffing
by using part-time staff and paying significantly below market rates and by
using volunteers and sleepers (interns with fire training). The report stated: "The success of the Bonny Doon service
plan would likely require expansion of the number of trained volunteers on the
Bonny Doon Roster, the commitment of many volunteers to sleep at the station
several nights each month, and the sustained commitment to continue this effort
permanently . . . . If the available
revenues don't support the staffing costs, or if the volunteer corps becomes
subject to a high attrition rate, a likely operating adjustment would be for
the district to reduce night and weekend staffing during low activity
periods. During those periods, the
district would then have a volunteer response similar to the response currently
provided under CAL FIRE/County Fire."
The County's
General Services Director noted, in a February 2007 letter to LAFCO's Executive
Director (attachment G to the Executive Officer's Report), that "the
expenditures appear to be understated, or at least well below market conditions
for qualified personnel, insurances, services and supplies." The Director was concerned that "the
proposed budget does not appear sufficient to support the operational levels
and improvements put forth by the applicant." He stated that "[t]he applicant's
supplementary information outlines a paid staffing pattern that does not appear
robust enough to deliver the service improvements put forth."
Under either
scenario, continuation of the existing system or the proposed reorganization,
volunteers were expected to play an important role in the delivery of
services. But an independent Bonny Doon
FPD would necessarily duplicate some of the County Fire/CAL FIRE management and
infrastructure, which would continue to operate, regardless of the proposed
detachment. The proposed district would
have been responsible for the full costs of its management and staffing while a
year-round CAL FIRE station in Bonny Doon, under a cooperative agreement with
the State of California, would take advantage of the state funding for wildland
fire suppression.
As indicated by
the Executive Officer's Report and relevant attachments, proponents of the
proposed reorganization also assumed that the County would transfer
county-owned volunteer stations in Bonny Doon, vehicles and apparatus to the
new district at no or nominal cost. But
the report disclosed that the County estimated that the apparatus and equipment
had a value of $446,151 and the two volunteer stations had a value of
$3,700,000 and the County wanted to be compensated for any transfer of
assets. LAFCO could reasonably infer
that appellant's assumption regarding the start-up costs of the proposed FPD
were invalid.
The annual cost
of approximately $250,000 to operate a year round County Fire/CAL FIRE station
in Bonny Doon was far less that the projected cost of over $650,000 to run an
autonomous fire protection district in Bonny Doon. In addition, the Executive Officer's report
set forth the alternative of CSA 48 being divided into zones, which would allow
a Bonny Doon zone to obtain different or a higher level of services by the
passage of a zone-wide assessment or tax.
Substantial evidence supported LAFCO's determination that the existing
agencies could "feasibly provide" needed fire protection and
emergency services in "a more efficient and accountable manner"
(§§ 56301, 56886.5, subd. (a)) than the proposed Bonny Doon FPD.
Administrative Action Must Be Rational
It is the
courts' role "in reviewing certain quasi-legislative administrative
decisions in mandamus proceedings" to " 'ensure that an agency
has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational
connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the
enabling statute.' (California Hotel
& Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com., supra, 25 Cal.3d 200, 212
. . . , fn. omitted.)"
(Western States Petroleum Assn. v.
Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 577.) If the stated basis for a commission's
decision does not have a rational connection to the purposes of the
determination by the administrative agency will not withstand the scrutiny of
judicial review regardless of the substantiality of the evidence" to
suppor
| Description | An application proposing the formation of the Bonny Doon Fire Protection District ("FPD") and detachment of the Bonny Doon area from the County Service Area 48 ("CSA 48") came before the Local Agency Formation Commission of Santa Cruz County ("LAFCO"), which disapproved it by formal resolution. Bonny Doon Volunteer Fire/Rescue, Inc., a California non-profit public benefit corporation and the proponent of the application, unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate compelling LAFCO to (1) set aside Resolution No. 913 disapproving the proposal, (2) comply with the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000 ("the Act") (Gov. Code, § 56000 et seq.)[1] and the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 ("Fire Protection District Law") (Health & Saf. Code, § 13800 et seq.), and (3) adopt a new resolution supported by substantial evidence. It now appeals the superior court's denial of its writ petition. Appellant argues that LAFCO's Resolution No. 913 is not supported by substantial evidence and LAFCO prejudicially abused its discretion by failing proceed in the manner required by the Act and applicable law. Our thorough review of the record does not show that appellant is entitled to writ relief. Accordingly, we affirm. |
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