P. v. Daugherity
Filed 7/3/12 P. v. Daugherity CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE
DAUGHERITY,
Defendant and Appellant.
F063016
(Super. Ct. No. F11902156)
THE COURT
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Edward Sarkisian, Jr.,
Judge.
R.
Shanti Brien, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and
Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Javier Pablo parked and locked his
car outside his apartment one evening.
His car was not there the next morning.
Later that day, he saw his car go by with a “white man†wearing a
“jersey†at the wheel. A few hours
later, he saw Daugherity drive his car into a nearby apartment building, get
out of the driver’s side, and get back into the driver’s side minutes
later. He called out to her and waved
his car key at her. The police arrived,
searched his car, and found a “shaved†key in the ignition.
After the court denied Daugherity’s motion for
guilty of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. On appeal, she challenges the court’s denial
of her motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 2, 2011, an information charged
Daugherity with, inter alia, unlawful
driving or taking of a vehicle (count 1; Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a) (10851(a)),
name="_ftnref3" title="">[2] receiving
stolen property (count 2; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (d)), and possession of
burglar’s tools (count 3; Pen. Code, § 466).
The information further alleged Daugherity had suffered two prior
section 10851(a) convictions and a prior conviction of possession of a weapon
by a prison inmate (Pen. Code, § 4502) within the meaning of Penal Code
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Daugherty admitted all three prior
convictions and moved for acquittal on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the charges.
(Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) After the
court denied her motion, the jury found her guilty of count 1 and not guilty of
counts 2 and 3. On August 2, 2011, the
court sentenced her to four years on count 1 plus one year for each prior
prison term for a total of seven years in prison. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd.
(b).)
Daugherity argues that the conviction for
vehicle theft violates her fourteenth amendment right to due process because a
“shaved†key is not so dissimilar to a normal key to create substantial
evidence that she knew the car was stolen or that she had the intent to deprive
the owner of possession. The Attorney General
argues that sufficient evidence supports Daugherity’s conviction because the
“shaved†key is circumstantial evidence of her commission of the crime. We agree.
(See, e.g., People v. Green
(1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 181 (Green).)
The basis of Daugherity’s
“shaved†key does not provide enough evidence to show her specific intent to
deprive Pablo of his car. Pablo
testified that he parked and locked his car outside his apartment and the next
morning his car was gone. Later that
afternoon, he saw a “white man†wearing a “jersey†driving his car but lost it
in traffic. He testified that, while on
a walk a few hours later, he saw Daugherity driving his car into the parking
lot of an apartment complex. She parked
his car and went into an apartment. He
stayed with his car and waited for the police to arrive.
Minutes later, Daugherity got back into
Pablo’s car and began to drive off. He
testified that he yelled that it was his car and waved his key. She stopped his car but stayed in the
driver’s seat.
Once the police arrived, an officer searched
Pablo’s car. The officer testified that
when he pulled the key out of the ignition the key appeared to have been
“shaved†and “tampered with.†A “shavedâ€
key, the officer testified, is often used in car thefts, most commonly with
cars of the same type as Pablo’s.
“‘To determine the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record
in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’†(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 118, citing
1100, 1128.) “Reversal on this ground is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatsoever there is
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’†(People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, citing People
v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
To establish guilt under section 10851(a),
the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant drove or took a vehicle
belonging to another person, without the owner’s consent, and that the
defendant had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the
owner of title or possession. (
1569, 1574 (O’Dell), citing
180.) As our Supreme Court emphasizes,
the slight corroboration that permits an inference that the possessor knew the
property at issue was stolen may consist of no explanation, an unsatisfactory
explanation, or other suspicious circumstances that would justify the inference. (O’Dell,
supra, at p. 1575, citing People
v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754.)
Daugherity’s use of a recently stolen car by way of a common car theft
tool was more than the slight corroboration necessary to permit the inference
that she knew the car was stolen and that she had the intent to deprive Pablo
of possession. The court properly denied
her motion for acquittal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Franson, J.
relevant (post).
