CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Ade Oyeyemi (Pastor Oyeyemi) challenges a judgment for conversion and negligent interference with prospective economic relations in favor of respondent Mountain of Fire and Miracles Ministries, Hayward Branch. He contends that respondent lacked standing to assert claims against him, and that it had no property interest in the assets underlying the claims; in addition, he maintains that respondent did not establish certain elements of the claims. We conclude that the interference claim fails as a matter of law on the evidence presented at trial, and that the conversion claim is similarly defective insofar as it targeted assets in which respondent had no property interests. We thus reverse the judgment, and remand for a new trial on the conversion claim.

T.C, mother of N.J.,[1] seeks extraordinary writ review of the respondent court’s order terminating her reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26.[2] She also seeks a temporary stay of the dependency proceedings pending a ruling on her petition. She argues there was no substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings that the return of the minor would pose a substantial risk of detriment to him and she could not successfully reunify with the minor if the court extended services until June 18, 2012. She also contends she did not receive reasonable reunification services. The Solano County Health & Social Services Department (the Department) opposes the petition. We conclude T.C.’s challenges have no merit. Accordingly, we deny the petition on its merits and deny the stay request as moot.

Minors Elizabeth M. and K.R. were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j),[1] and removed from the custody of their mother, Linda R. Mother argues that the allegations of the dependency petition failed to state a cause of action and that substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings. We conclude that mother has forfeited her challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading and that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

A jury convicted appellants Jesus Ramirez and Zane Molina Hubbard of multiple offenses. In this appeal they both contend the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for making criminal threats pursuant to Penal Code section 422[1] and to support the findings that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. They further maintain the trial court erred when it failed to instruct sua sponte on attempted criminal threats and violated section 654 in sentencing. Lastly, Hubbard contends the photo lineup used to identify him was flawed and requires reversal of all his convictions.
We reject their contentions, with the exception of one conviction for solicitation and certain claims of error regarding imposition of terms of imprisonment on the enhancements. We therefore affirm the remaining convictions and remand for resentencing.

Scott Perry (Perry) appeals from two 2011 orders of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a stipulated order regarding spousal support and a separate motion for spousal support. Diana Chandler (Chandler), formerly Diana Perry, cross-appeals raising various issues arising from the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees. In addition, Chandler has moved to dismiss a portion of Perry’s appeal and has requested imposition of sanctions. For reasons to be stated, we conclude the July 8, 2010, order was an appealable order after judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2)), that a final judgment on the issue of spousal support was entered on July 8, 2010, and that the trial court was correct in treating Perry’s subsequent motion as a request for modification of spousal support, and not as an original motion for permanent spousal support. We have determined that none of the other issues raised by the parties establish reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm all of the orders from which the parties have appealed. In addition, we deny the motion to dismiss and decline to impose sanctions.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Roland Howard pled no contest to misdemeanor criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422.)[1] In exchange, defendant was placed on probation for a period of two years on various terms and conditions. Approximately two years later, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea and request to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 1203.4. Defendant appeals from the denial of the section 1203.4 motion. We find no error and affirm.

Rogelio Villanueva appeals from a judgment sentencing him to life in prison for committing multiple sex crimes against multiple children. He contends: 1) his convictions on six of the counts must be reversed under the lesser included offense doctrine; 2) some of the charges were time-barred; and 3) his sentence is cruel and unusual. As the Attorney General concedes, the first contention has merit. We will therefore reverse appellant’s convictions on six of the counts. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Raheem Abdul Edwards appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder and found true special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery and during the commission of a burglary within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A) and (G), respectively. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole.
Defendant does not challenge his conviction for first degree murder. He argues the trial court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury on the special circumstance allegations on the ground the court did not expressly instruct the jury to separately consider those two allegations. Defendant argues this court should reverse the findings on the special circumstance allegations and remand the matter to the trial court with directions that he be sentenced to 25 years to life. Defendant also contends section 190.2 is unconstitutional.
We affirm. Even assuming the trial court erred by failing to expressly instruct the jury that it must separately consider the two special circumstance allegations, for the reasons we will explain, any such error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the California Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), we must reject defendant’s constitutional challenge to that statute. (See People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 225.)

A jury convicted defendant Quang Van Quan of three counts of first degree murder and found true two special circumstance allegations that the murder took place during the commission of burglary and robbery or attempted robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) [robbery], (a)(17)(G) [burglary]; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless noted.) Quan contends the trial court erred by failing to find a prima facie case of prosecutorial race discrimination during jury selection, the prosecution’s introduction of “surprise evidence” violated his right to a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel, and the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM Nos. 337 and 359. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

When a married couple’s dysfunctional relationship embroiled the University of California Irvine’s (UCI) executive MBA program, the program’s administrator and director, and the university’s campus police, the trial court granted an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6[1] prohibiting one non-student spouse, Dawn Nicole Dewane, from harassing, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of student, Jinny Lee. The order also prohibited Dewane from coming onto the UCI campus without the school’s prior approval.
On appeal, Dewane challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s order, its interpretation of section 527.6, a few of the court’s evidentiary rulings and the breadth and scope of the order. Only the last point has merit and we modify the stay away order to impose the least restrictive burden on Dewane’s livelihood. As modified, the order is affirmed.

Luis Manuel Bautista is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder of Jesus Torres. This is his second appeal to this court. In the first appeal (People v. Bautista (Feb. 4, 2011, F058176) [nonpub. opn.], we affirmed the convictions for murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and robbery (§ 211). We reversed the conviction for arson causing great bodily injury (§ 451, subd. (a)) because it was not supported by substantial evidence. However, we ordered the trial court to enter a conviction for the lesser included offense of arson of property (the arson count) (§ 451, subd. (d)). We remanded the matter for resentencing on the arson count.
The trial court imposed an aggravated term of three years to run consecutively for the arson count. Bautista argues the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. We affirm the judgment. We will, however, remand the matter to the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Rodney Lance Zayas of second degree murder and made true findings on gang and weapons enhancements. He challenges his conviction on the grounds that the trial court committed error in (1) denying his motion to bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancement from the substantive offense, (2) failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into juror bias, and (3) admitting inflammatory evidence. He also claims there was prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error. We reject Zayas’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

It was alleged in an information filed June 23, 2010, that appellant, Gary Lee Kerper, committed possession of methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378;[1] count 1), a felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia (§ 11364; count 2), a misdemeanor. A jury convicted appellant on count 1 and acquitted him on count 2. In the midst of the trial, appellant moved to dismiss the charges on grounds of the prosecution’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence. The court denied the motion. In a separate proceeding, the court found true an enhancement allegation that appellant had suffered a prior section 11378 conviction (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)). The court imposed a prison sentence of four years four months, consisting of 16 months on the substantive offense and three years on the enhancement.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant, apparently in response to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing, has submitted a brief in which he argues, as best we can determine, as follows: The court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges; the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the evidence during closing argument; appellant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; the court committed instructional error; and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Land Lot 1, LLC (Land Lot), appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant, City of Bakersfield (the city), which was made on the first day of trial. The motion was granted on the ground Land Lot had assigned its interest in the litigation to certain individuals in violation of a provision in the contract between Land Lot and the city that prohibited assignment of the agreement or any interest in it without the consent of the other party. We conclude that the assignment of Land Lot’s causes of action alleged in the complaint was not an assignment of an interest in the contract and was not barred by the nonassignment clause. Therefore, there was no defect on the face of the complaint and no ground on which to grant judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we reverse.