CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Joseph Sigona appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction of two counts of pandering Hannah B. and Bessie R. (counts 1, 2) and one count each of pimping (count 3) and attempted pimping (count 4). Sigona contends his pandering convictions must be overturned because the trial court improperly instructed the jury. He also asserts that the pandering conviction regarding Bessie must be overturned because the trial court improperly excluded evidence. We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.
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This action arises out of a loan to a real estate development property company, Pergola, a Nevada LLC controlled by plaintiff Robert W. Wilson. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on undeveloped land owned by Wilson's company and a deed of trust on a residence owned by Wilson and his wife, plaintiff Sharon Wilson (together, the Wilsons). Defendant Coast Capital Mortgage Company (Coast), a licensed real estate broker, and Coast Capital Income Fund, LLC (together, Coast defendants) arranged for a $1.6 million loan (the Pergola loan) from defendant Polo Investment Fund No. 1, LLC (Polo 1) and Polo Investment Funds, LLC (together, Polo Fund). Thereafter, Pergola borrowed an additional $1.25 million from Aztec Financial (the Aztec loan), also secured by a deed of trust on the undeveloped land. Subsequently, Pergola borrowed an additional $500,000 from Brian and Gayl Hynek (the Hyneks), secured by a third deed of trust on the undeveloped land.
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This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.[1] Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) On August 26, 2011, defendant Mitchell Ross Hall drove up to the victim and his wife, who were sitting on a curb. Defendant started accusing the victim of talking to his family and then punched the victim in the face. The victim sustained a facial fracture as a result of the assault. |
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Petitioner N.A. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief (Welf. & Inst. Code, §366.26, subd. (l);[1] Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s order, made at the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of permanent plans for three of her four dependent children: then 16-year-old I.A., 14-year-old C.C. and 13-year-old J.C.[2] We deny the petition on the merits.
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Darrin H. (Father) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights to his child, Zoey H. Father failed to show good cause to continue the hearing, and therefore the juvenile court’s denial of Father’s request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Although the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to provide Father with its assessment 10 days before the hearing on the termination of Father’s parental rights, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c), Father’s failure to object to this failure in juvenile court forfeits his claim of error on appeal. Because Father’s offer of proof provided no evidence that Father could satisfy the requirements of the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i),[1] we find no error in the juvenile court’s denial of Father’s request for a contested hearing. We affirm the order terminating parental rights.
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While under the influence of methamphetamines, a mother abandoned her four-year-old, and the child was detained and placed in foster care. The mother had a history of substance abuse and mental and emotional problems. At the six-month review hearing, the dependency court found a substantial risk of detriment preventing the child’s return to her mother at that time, but noted the mother’s efforts to comply with her case plan and ordered continued reunification services as well as an evaluation of the mother and her home in Mexico through the Mexican social services agency known as DIF (Desarrollo Integral del la Familia). The mother appeals, asserting there was insufficient evidence supporting the dependency court’s orders at the six-month review hearing. We affirm.
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Angel C., Sr. (Father), appeals the juvenile court’s order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4[1] terminating its jurisdiction and granting sole legal and physical custody of the couple’s eight-year-old son, Angel C., Jr. (Angel), to Rosa D. (Mother), limiting Father to monitored visitation. Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting Mother sole legal custody of Angel. We affirm.
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Sabrina S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the six-month review hearing denying her request for unmonitored visitation with her daughter, Paris S., who had been declared a dependent child of the court based in part on Sabrina’s unresolved history of substance abuse and her mental and emotional problems that left her unable to provide regular care for Paris. We affirm.
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David Hunter appeals an order recommitting him to the California Department of Mental Health as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.)[1] Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that his severe mental disorder was not in remission as of the date of Board of Prison Terms (BPT) hearing (§ 2962, subd. (a).) We affirm.
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Defendant Lee M. Bateman appeals from the judgment following his conviction by a jury of possession of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350.) He contends that he is entitled to an additional 138 days of presentence custody credit under an amendment to Penal Code section 4019[1] that took effect after the imposition of sentence but before the resolution of this appeal. He also requests that we review the transcript of the Pitchess[2] hearing to determine whether any discoverable material was improperly withheld. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
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Jeff and Adele Schneidereit appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court granted respondent Rabobank, N.A.'s motion to enforce a settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.[1] Substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual finding that the settlement placed on the record by respondent's counsel at the January 11, 2011 hearing was based on the forbearance-workout agreement drafted by respondent, not the version drafted by appellants. Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's factual findings that appellants understood this at the hearing, accepted the agreement drafted by respondent with the modifications placed on the record by respondent's counsel, and knowingly and voluntarily agreed to dismiss their complaint at that time. Nevertheless, the record is clear that appellants dismissed their complaint before a written settlement agreement was executed, and that the parties did not request the trial court retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing their settlement. As a consequence, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear respondents' section 664.6 motion. We are compelled to reverse. |
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Luis Villalvazo and Victor Mancia were tried together before a jury. The jury found Villalvazo and Mancia guilty of two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),[1] shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c)), and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246), with findings that the offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and (4). In addition, as to counts 1, 3, and 4, the jury found the following allegations true as to Villalvazo: (1) he personally used a firearm; (2) he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury; and (3) a principal personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (d) & (e)(1).) As to count 2, the jury found the same allegations true, with the exception of the infliction of great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). Inexplicably, the jury determined that all of the personal discharge allegations (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) were not true. As to counts 1, 3, and 4, the jury concluded as to Mancia that a principal used and personally discharged a weapon, proximately causing great bodily injury. As to count 2, the jury found the great bodily injury allegation (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)) not true and the remaining two allegations (§12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(1)) true.
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Juan Gutierrez Rodriguez appeals the order revoking his probation and sentencing him to 11 years in state prison following his guilty plea conviction on five counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a)). Appellant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he willfully violated the terms of his probation; and (2) the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to state prison instead of reinstating him on probation. We affirm.
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Appellant Claude Edward Foulk, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on two counts of forcible lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 1 & 2), 13 counts of forcible oral copulation (former Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c); counts 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19 & 21), seven counts of forcible oral copulation (former Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2); counts 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30 & 31), seven counts of forcible sodomy (former Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c); counts 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20 & 23), and two counts of forcible sodomy (former Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2); counts 26 & 29), with, as to each of counts 1 through 26, a true finding as to a Penal Code section 803, subdivision (f)(1) statute of limitations allegation. The court sentenced appellant to prison for 248 years. We affirm the judgment.
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