CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs[1] appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion for class certification in this wage-and-hour dispute. The court ruled, inter alia, that common questions of fact or law did not predominate. This stated reason for the court’s denial was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

In April 2011, judgment was entered dissolving the marriage of Daniel Golka and Doreen Golka.[1] Pursuant to Daniel and Doreen’s stipulation, the judgment resolved all issues between them, including issues related to support, custody, and visitation, except for one—whether the trial court should award to either party attorney fees, costs, or sanctions. Following trial on the issue of attorney fees, costs, and sanctions, the court entered a judgment ordering Daniel to pay sanctions “related to his conduct,” in the total amount of $45,000 (the judgment on the reserved issue). The judgment on the reserved issue further directed that the sanctions be paid directly from the escrow account containing Daniel’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the family residence. The trial court denied Daniel’s motion for a new trial.
We affirm the judgment on the reserved issue. For the reasons we will explain, we reject each of Daniel’s contentions of error and hold that (1) sufficient evidence supported the sanctions award; (2) the sanctions award did not impose an unreasonable financial burden on Daniel; (3) the trial court did not deprive Daniel of a fair trial by denying him the rights to present evidence, cross‑examine witnesses, and testify on his own behalf; and (4) the trial judge did not demonstrate “bias and prejudice” against self‑employed businessmen in general or against Daniel specifically.

This is an appeal by Kern County from the trial court’s judgment, which rejected the decision of the Kern County Assessment Appeals Board (board) upholding the county tax assessor’s increased valuation of plaintiffs’ business property and the resulting increased property tax. The county contends the trial court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the administrative decision; it contends application of the correct standard would have resulted in a judgment upholding the administrative decision because it was supported by substantial evidence. The county further asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted new evidence that was not presented to the board and when it determined the tax assessor used incorrect revenue figures in calculating the income stream on which the property value was based in one of the appraisals. We conclude the trial court applied the correct standard of review, properly admitted evidence at trial, and correctly rejected the county’s revenue figures. Contrary to the trial court’s judgment, however, the matter must be remanded to the board for further proceedings because factual questions remain.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), appellant, William Porter, pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The court placed appellant on Proposition 36 probation, i.e., probation under the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, enacted by the voters as Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1210 et seq.).
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the court erred in denying his suppression motion. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Anetrise Evans appeals from an order denying her[1] motion to dismiss all charges after her assertedly successful completion of probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4, subdivision (a)(1).[2] We find no error and affirm the judgment/order.

Defendant and appellant Theresa Camille Mordaunt appeals from a judgment of conviction of burglary and attempted robbery, both in the first degree. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 459.)[1] She asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support these convictions.[2] We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Demetrius Gibson molested his two nieces between 2005 and 2010. A jury convicted defendant of 17 sex offenses against children: one count of forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); six counts of sexual intercourse/sodomy with a child 10 years or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); eight counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child [forcible sodomy] (§ 269, subd. (a)(3)); one count of aggravated sexual assault on a child [rape] (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)); and one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault (§§ 664/288.7, subd. (a)) involving two complaining witnesses (Jane Doe 1 [counts 1-2] and Jane Doe 2 [counts 3-17]). The jury found true the multiple victim allegations attached to each count.

Defendant Gurshinder Bains Singh entered a negotiated plea of no contest to resisting an officer by the use of force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69; count 2) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. Count 1 (battery on an officer; Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)) was dismissed with a Harvey waiver.[1] The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to county jail for the upper term of three years.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation and in imposing the upper term. We will affirm.

Calvin Ward was arrested on a warrant intended for another person after the Sacramento County Superior Court (Court) mistakenly merged Ward’s personal information with an individual who has the same first name. Ward sued the Court (among others), alleging he was wrongfully arrested because the Court negligently failed to maintain accurate records.
Ward now appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained the Court’s demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. He asserts, among other things, that the trial court erred in transferring the matter to the Nevada County Superior Court, and erred in concluding Ward alleged that an error in ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s BILAIN000009 county, rather than court, records was responsible for his wrongful arrest. Moreover, Ward contends, because “the complaint could easily be amended to fix this deficiency[,] . . . it was error for the court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend . . . .”
We shall affirm the judgment, as Ward’s contentions lack merit, and he has not shown he can amend to state a viable cause of action.

Petitioner He. G. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s September 2012 order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing to terminate parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father contends the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not provide reasonable services. We conclude the court’s determination that reasonable services were provided, but that Father did not make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the removal of his child or demonstrate the capacity to complete the objectives of his treatment plan, was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

Appellant Cornell Mitchell contends his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused to grant his request to enter respondent Bridgitte Hamilton’s default, and permitted Hamilton belatedly to file an answer to the complaint over Mitchell’s objections. We affirm due to Mitchell’s failure to provide an adequate record to permit appellate review.

Appellant Co.C. (Mother) has three children subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court: Ashanti (born in June 2002), C. (born in Aug. 2003) and S. (born in April 2006). Each child has a different father, none of whom is party to this appeal.
Mother’s appeal arises from the contested 12-month review hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court found that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) had provided her with reasonable reunification services and that she had made significant progress in complying with the case plan. The court ordered Department to continue to provide reunification services and granted Department (which had conceded that it was responsible for Mother missing visits with her children) discretion to liberalize Mother’s visitation with her children.
In this appeal, Mother contests the trial court’s finding that Department had provided reasonable services to her. Relying upon Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147 (Melinda K.)—an opinion from our colleagues in Division Two—we dismiss the appeal. We conclude that the finding does not constitute an appealable order because, notwithstanding Mother’s disagreement with it, she has suffered no adverse consequence as a result of it.

Yvonne G. (Mother), and her daughters Destiny M., St. M., Jeannie M., and S. M., appeal from the juvenile court’s order denying Mother’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388. We affirm.

On January 20, 2011, appellant waived her constitutional rights and pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to transport methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378. She was sentenced to the mid-term of three years in state prison. On February 21, 2012, appellant filed a motion to vacate her plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5, contending that the trial judge did not advise her of the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by that statute. On April 13, 2012, the trial court denied the motion.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, specifically appealing the denial of her motion to vacate her plea. After examining the record, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues, but asking this court to independently review the record on appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442. (See Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 264.) On October 9, 2012, we sent a letter to appellant’s last known address (Eloy Detention Center), advising appellant she had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any contentions or argument she wished this court to consider. The letter was returned with the annotation “Unclaimed/Not in Custody.”
Appellant does not dispute that the prosecutor informed her of the immigration consequences of her plea in open court, with the trial judge present. This was sufficient to satisfy the court’s obligations under Penal Code section 1016.5. (People v. Quesada (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 525, 535-536.) This court has examined the entire record in accordance with People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pages 441-442, and is satisfied appellant’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel, and no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.