CA Unpub Decisions

C.W., mother of the minors, appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 360, 395 [undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code].) Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order to bypass her services and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to find that providing services would be in the best interests of the minors. She also argues that the exit orders for C.H. and J.H., granting custody to the minors’ father, Jose H. was not in the minors’ best interests. We affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal by defendant Timothy D. Crosby from an order of the Yolo County Superior Court finding him in violation of a condition of his probation and ordering him to serve 60 days in jail. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s finding and, therefore, reversal is required.[1] We agree and shall reverse the court’s order.

In June 2009, a jury convicted defendant Joseph Patrick Griesa of annoying or molesting his 17-year-old employee and contributing to her delinquency, acquitted him of sexually battering her, and was unable to reach verdicts on five other counts involving her. The jury also found him guilty of concealing a pair of 14-year-old runaways from their parents, and of contributing to their delinquency. The jury acquitted him of two counts of sexual offenses against two other victims. In addition to these crimes against the person, the jury convicted him of two counts each of failing to file returns under the Unemployment Insurance Code (UIC) or making required UIC payments.

A jury found defendant Kenneth Lynn Smith, Jr., guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and misdemeanor false representation of identity to a peace officer (id., § 148.9, subd. (a)). A prior prison term allegation was found true. (Id., former § 667.5, subd. (b).) Sentenced to a six-year state prison term, defendant appeals, contending the trial court was not impartial, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Concluding that the trial court acted impartially and without misconduct, we shall affirm the judgment.

Following an 18-day trial, during which defendant represented himself, a jury found defendant guilty of 11 counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and five counts of second degree attempted robbery (§§ 664/211). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true an allegation defendant had a prior serious felony conviction that also qualified as a strike. (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1) and (b)-(i); 1170.12.) Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 41 years and 8 months in state prison.[2]
Represented by appellate counsel, defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in (1) denying his motions to suppress all or at least part of his post-arrest statements to law enforcement, (2) allowing him to represent himself and failing to appoint standby counsel, and (3) calculating his aggregate prison term. Having reviewed the entire record, we shall affirm the judgment.

Brian Andrew Smith appeals an order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis to vacate a 1984 robbery conviction by plea which resulted in a three-year state prison sentence. (Pen. Code, § 211.)
In 2011, appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis while serving a 25-year-to-life Three Strikes sentence in Case No. A087800. The writ petition alleged that the 1984 conviction was illegally used as a strike in Case No. A087800 because appellant was not advised of his right to court trial or of the consequences of his plea (mandatory parole) when the change of plea was entered in 1984, and because the trial judge who took the plea (Honorable Judge Lawrence J. Rittenband) did not have an oath of office on file with the Secretary of State in 1984 (Gov. Code § 1363, subd. (a)(3)).

Karen D. (Mother) appeals from the November 9, 2011 order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights over minor A.S. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Lance S. (Father) is not a party to this appeal. Mother contends that the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights applies. We disagree because Mother failed to show that A.S. would suffer detriment from the severance of the parent-child relationship such that it would outweigh the benefits she would receive from the stability and permanence of adoption by paternal grandparents. We conclude that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for A.S. and affirm the order of the court.

Jaime Weinberg (Weinberg) sued appellant Heaven Massage and Wellness Center (HMWC), alleging that she was sexually assaulted by an HMWC employee during a massage. HMWC tendered Weinberg’s claim to its comprehensive general liability insurer, respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), which asserted there was no coverage for Weinberg’s claim under the policy’s “professional services” exclusion. HMWC then cross-claimed against Continental for breach of insurance contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Continental, concluding that there was no coverage and no duty to defend as a matter of law. We reverse.

A jury found appellant Akop Vardazaryan guilty of first degree murder and of an assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life; the sentence on the assault charge was stayed under Penal Code section 654. The appeal is from the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Patricia A. Chappelle appeals from the judgment entered following the trial court’s order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer filed by defendant and respondent Alliance United Insurance Company. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, finding true the felony charge that minor Jose X. (Appellant) committed the crime of robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. The court declared Appellant to be a ward of the court and ordered him to be placed at home on probation. Appellant appeals from the adjudication/disposition order, contending that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the petition. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Howard Jay Swensen purports to appeal from the judgment following his no contest plea to one count of assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court placed him on unsupervised probation. According to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the victim of the assault, Kevin Arias, was on a ladder at the AMC theater at the Third Street Promenade in Santa Monica when defendant shook the ladder, causing him to fall. Defendant then got on top of Arias and attacked him using chopsticks and his fists.
Defendant’s court appointed attorney filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting that we independently review the record. By letter dated January 9, 2012, we informed defendant of his right to submit by brief or letter within 30 days any contentions he wished us to consider. We have received no response.
Defendant’s failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause bars him from raising any issues challenging the validity of his plea (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; see People v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173, 177-178), and our independent review discloses no cognizable issues from proceedings arising after the plea.

Defendant Fidencio Hernandez was convicted of possession of cocaine base in case No. BA353604. He was placed on Proposition 36 probation,[1] requiring him to obey all laws, among other conditions. On January 8, 2010, defendant’s probation was revoked and reinstated after he admitted a violation, and his Proposition 36 program was terminated. On February 23, 2010, defendant was charged by information with the crime at issue in this appeal, second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), with gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Defendant’s probation was again revoked, and the matter was set for a probation violation hearing to follow this case, with the evidence from this case to be considered for the probation violation. The jury found defendant guilty of robbery, and deadlocked on the gang allegations. The gang allegations were dismissed under section 1385 after the trial court declared a mistrial. Defendant was sentenced to the upper term of five years, and found to be in violation of his probation. His probation was revoked, reinstated, and terminated.
On appeal, defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports his robbery conviction and resulting probation violation, reasoning the testimony of the two key witnesses was “inherently improbable” due to the inconsistencies between their testimony at trial and their previous statements to police. We find no merit in defendant’s contentions, and therefore affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Oscar Ellis brought an action against his former employer, defendant and respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), seeking recovery of unpaid overtime compensation, penalties for missed meal and rest periods and other related claims.[1] UPS moved for summary adjudication of its 17th affirmative defense based on the federal Motor Carrier Act, contending the federal law barred Ellis’s first cause of action for overtime compensation. Ellis concurrently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking to dispose of UPS’s 17th affirmative defense. The trial court denied Ellis’s motion and granted UPS’s motion. UPS then moved for summary judgment on Ellis’s complaint. UPS’s primary contention was that, under state law, Ellis was a management-level employee, exempt from the overtime provisions and other benefits afforded nonexempt employees. The trial court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in its favor.
Ellis contends the court erred in concluding the federal Motor Carrier Act applied to bar his overtime claim, and that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether he was misclassified as an exempt executive or administrative employee under California law. We conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of UPS on the grounds Ellis was an exempt executive employee under state law and affirm on that basis. Therefore, we need not consider here, or add to, the considerable authority that Ellis’s overtime claims were barred by the federal Motor Carrier Act, nor do we consider his other claims of error. (Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 513; Coalition for L.A. County Planning etc. Interest v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 246.)