CA Unpub Decisions

The minor’s appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. In accordance with Kelly, we will provide a summary of the offenses and the proceedings in the trial court.
In July 2011 law enforcement responded to a security alarm at Hamilton Elementary School. When they arrived, officers found a classroom window shattered and two people inside. As the officers approached the classroom, J.S. fled, dropping a hammer and flashlight, and shoving one of the officers. One of the officers ran after J.S. and ordered him to stop; J.S. stopped and “took a fighting stance with the officer.” The officer took out his Taser and ordered J.S. to the ground. J.S. complied. The officers inspected the classroom. The room was “ransacked,” and there was graffiti spray-painted on the walls.
J.S. was detained and charged with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)), possession of tools to commit vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594.2, subd. (a)), resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466). J.S. later admitted the truth of the allegations and was granted deferred entry of judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790.) J.S. was released into his mother’s custody.

A jury convicted Howard Jamison of the first degree murder of 83-year-old Ewing Scroggs in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified). The jury found true an allegation that Jamison personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (d), and also found true a special circumstance allegation that he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a burglary (§ 460) within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
At trial, the court denied a mistrial motion Jamison brought after a witness—Jim Rapuano, Jamison's former probation officer in Connecticut—twice volunteered the statement, in the presence of the jury, that Jamison had "an extensive criminal record."
After denying Jamison's new trial motion, which was also based on the probation officer's volunteered statements about Jamison's criminal history, the court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus a one-year prison term enhancement for the true finding on the personal use of a knife allegation.
Jamison appeals, contending the court's denial of his mistrial motion "irreparably damaged" his federal constitutional right to a fair trial and constituted reversible error because Rapuano's improper disclosure that Jamison had an extensive criminal history was "incurably prejudicial" as it was "too dramatic for jurors to ignore." We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion or violate Jamison's federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Joel Foscalina, husband, appeals from a trial court judgment dividing community property, ordering husband to pay to Bridgett Foscalina, wife, $2,268 in order to equalize the division of community property, and reserving jurisdiction over the issues of support and marital status. Husband’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial.
We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Donald Lee Daman of perjury by declaration (Pen. Code, § 118a -- count 1) and obtaining aid in an amount over $400 by misrepresentation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, former subd. (c)(2) -- count 2). Defendant was ordered to serve a “terminal sentence” of 180 days in county jail and pay fines, fees, and restitution.
On appeal, defendant contends both convictions must be reversed because the trial court prevented him from presenting the defense that he lacked the specific intent to defraud, which is an element of each offense. The People agree with defendant. We accept the People’s concession and reverse both convictions.

On June 20, 2012, defendant and appellant John Craft Crumwell entered a no contest plea to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), and admitted suffering a prior conviction under the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Pursuant to a case settlement agreement between defendant and the prosecution, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence, consisting of the midterm of four years, doubled under the three strikes law.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal without obtaining a certificate of probable cause. His notice of appeal states the appeal is “exclusively based on grounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity.”

Defendant and appellant Brian Gilbert Barnes (defendant) pleaded no contest to a
charge of vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)[1]). On appeal, appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any issues which if resolved in defendant’s favor would require reversal or modification of the judgment. On October 30, 2012, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. We provided defendant with several extensions of time, through and including February 15, 2013, within which to submit his brief or letter. Defendant did not file a response brief or letter. After independently reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.

J.C. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her children, S.J., Jo.J. and Ja.J. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 366.26.) We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS) gave proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.) to the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians (JBCI), the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (CNO), the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (MBCI), and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); and 2) the court's finding that ICWA does not apply is supported by the documentary evidence in the record and in the recently augmented record on appeal. We affirm.

K.H. (“mother”) appeals from the dependency court’s orders made at a six-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e)[1] denying her request that her son, T.J. (son), a dependent of the court, be returned to her custody. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the finding that returning son to her custody created a substantial risk of detriment to the child. We conclude substantial evidence supports the finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

L.L. (mother), the mother of minor J.V. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition orders removing custody of minor from mother and requiring monitored visitation with the minor to take place in a therapeutic setting. According to mother, there was insufficient evidence to warrant removal and the order requiring a therapeutic setting for visitation was an abuse of discretion.
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s removal order and that the order requiring a therapeutic setting for visitation was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the disposition orders from which mother appeals.

Kelsey R. (mother) appeals the juvenile court order terminating parental rights to her three-year-old daughter, Darlene O. Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred in concluding that she had failed to establish that the so-called "beneficial-relationship" exception to termination of parental rights applied to the circumstances of this dependency proceeding. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

J.T. appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) seeking to overturn decisions to expel him from school by the San Luis Obispo County Board of Education (the County Board) and the San Luis Obispo Coastal Unified School District (the District). We conclude, among other things: 1) the trial court did not err by finding J.T. committed sexual acts against a female student, which authorized the County Board and the District to expel him; 2) admissions J.T. made to school authorities about the incident were admissible and Miranda advisements were not received; 3) the victim's declaration was admissible; and 4) J.T. was not entitled to a reversal because of alleged notice deficiencies. We affirm.

Christine M. (Mother) and Pablo R. (Father) appeal the dependency court’s dispositional orders. They contend that the trial court should have ordered their respective children returned to their care. We find the parents’ contentions unavailing, and affirm.

Following trial, a jury found defendant and appellant Maik Kaufmann (defendant) guilty of possession for sale of a controlled substance and maintaining a place for the sale or use of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed testimony concerning a text message. Defendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request limiting instructions as to evidence admitted against a codefendant who pleaded no contest prior to the close of evidence. And defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the elements of one of the charged crimes. In a supplemental brief, defendant maintains that he is entitled to additional conduct credits and that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect his aggregate sentence pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.452.
Given the strength of the evidence in support of the findings of guilt on the two charged crimes, we hold that defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any of the three claimed errors on appeal. We further hold that defendant is entitled to the additional custody credits he claims and that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect accurately his conduct credits and aggregate sentence. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction, but remand with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the additional conduct credits to which defendant is entitled and to reflect defendant’s aggregate sentence.

A modification decision.