CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Deandre Lamont Derritt pled no contest to a single felony charge of possessing methamphetamine, and admitted five prior strikes and two prison priors. The trial court denied his motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced him to eight years in prison. Defendant appealed, and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.[1] Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the plea and in refusing his request for advisory counsel while he was representing himself in the matter. He also claims he was erroneously denied additional presentence custody credits. We reject these claims and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Epifanio Lopez Rojas was charged with one count of oral copulation of a child of 10 years of age or younger (count 1; Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14 (counts 2 & 3; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). Certain enhancement allegations were also alleged. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8), 667.61, subd. (e)(5).)

Frederick F. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders denying reunification services to him and setting a section 366.26 hearing regarding his daughter, Christina F. He contends no substantial evidence supports the finding of jurisdiction as to him, and, even if the jurisdictional findings were supported, there was no substantial evidence warranting removal of Christina from his care. He also argues the court erred by denying him reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). We deny the petition.

Justin B. appeals a placement order made at a dispositional hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] sections 361 and 361.3. Justin contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his request to place his son, J.B., with a relative. We affirm.

A.A. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, Edward C., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] A.A. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the order.

In May 2012, Henry M. Zimmeth entered guilty pleas in three cases. In case number SCE308159, he pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A)), misdemeanor battery on a cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). In case number SCE311995, he pled guilty to two counts of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d), two counts of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). In case number SCE315324, Zimmeth pled guilty to assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)) and with personal use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)), resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69), evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d). In each of the three cases, Zimmeth admitted having served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and having suffered one strike (Pen. Code, § 667 subds. (b)-(i)), and in case number SCE315324 he admitted having suffered one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). Zimmeth admitted that he committed all of the felonies in case number SCE311995 and all of the crimes in case number SCE315324 while released on bail (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b)).
In July 2012, the court dismissed two of the prison priors in case number SCE315324, the strike and all three prison priors in case numbers SCE308159 and SCE311995, the weapon enhancement in case number SCE315324 and the bail enhancements in case numbers SCE311995 and SCE315324. The court sentenced Zimmeth to 16 years in prison: six years for assault on a peace officer (twice the three-year lower term); consecutive 16-month terms (one-third the middle term) for resisting an executive officer, one count of evading an officer and one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle; concurrent terms for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, two counts of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, both burglary counts, two counts of evading an officer and the misdemeanor counts; stayed terms (Pen. Code, § 654) for the three counts of receiving a stolen vehicle; one year for the prison prior and five years for the serious felony prior. Zimmeth appeals. We affirm.

This is another step in long-running litigation in which plaintiff and respondent Webb & Carey, APC (Webb), formerly the law firm for defendants and appellants James and Judy Keenan (together, the Keenans), seeks enforcement of million dollar judgments against the Keenans for attorney fees. Now before us are the appropriateness of the trial court's May 27 and 31, 2011 orders that required the Keenans's compliance with existing receivership orders, by disclosing their finances, and the court's award of certain fees and costs to Webb, to the receiver, and to the attorney for the receiver. (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] §§ 564 et seq.; 128, subd. (a)(4).)
On appeal, the Keenans contend these orders for production of documents violated their rights to privacy as well as other statutory and attorney-client privileges, and were legally erroneous or excessive. The Keenans also challenge the fees awarded on several grounds. Pending appeal, the parties have brought numerous motions, notably Webb's request for dismissal and to supplement the record, all of which we have resolved in a separate order denying dismissal and granting augmentation in part.
To address the appellate issues, we first set forth essential background and discuss the effect of the motion filings and ruling pending appeal. We then address the merits of the Keenans's remaining appellate claims. As we will show, this record demonstrates that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the applicable statutes and receivership orders and the evidence supports the enforcement, fees and costs orders. No prejudicial legal error or abuse of discretion has been demonstrated, and we affirm.

Scott Shore appeals a judgment following a bench trial wherein the trial court found Shore entered into an enforceable option agreement to purchase real property and the $62,500 payment he made upon signing the option was nonrefundable. Shore contends the option agreement was too uncertain to be enforced. We affirm.

Defendant Roni Arlena Mulkey pled no contest to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). In exchange for her plea, the People agreed to “no immediate state prison,” and to dismiss the remaining charge, assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with a Harvey[1] waiver. Defendant was granted probation for three years, ordered to serve 90 days in jail, and ordered to pay numerous fines and fees. Defendant also was ordered to have no contact with several individuals, including her boyfriend Marcus Hume.
Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the probation condition prohibiting her from seeing Hume must be stricken because it is unreasonable, unrelated to the crime for which she was convicted, and unrelated to future criminality. Specifically, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Hume is a convicted felon. She also contends that because Hume is currently incarcerated, her contact with him would be monitored and thus it is unreasonable to prohibit such contact.
We reject both of defendant’s contentions. First, there is no requirement that the trial court identify the specific convictions for which Hume was found to be a convicted felon in order to find he is a felon. Second, under the circumstances, the probation condition prohibiting contact with Hume is a reasonable restriction of her rights. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Keith Wayne Harrell of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and deadlocked as to whether he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had burglary convictions in 1975, 1978, 1984, and 1990, each alleged as a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The jury found defendant had served prior prison terms for the 1984 and 1990 burglaries. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to state prison for 45 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for the offense plus five years each for the prior serious felonies. Sentences on the prison term enhancements were stayed pursuant to section 654.[2]
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when he vouched for prosecution witness (and former codefendant) Jaimy Martin, (2) the trial court failed to consider whether his sentence was proportionate to that of Martin, (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment, and (4) the prison term enhancements should have been stricken rather than stayed. With regard to the vouching contention, defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to object in the trial court. Anticipating this result, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object. We reject defendant’s claim because defense counsel’s summation provided a satisfactory explanation for not objecting in the trial court. As to his second claim, defendant also has forfeited this claim by failing to object in the trial court. Again anticipating this result, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude there is no reasonable probability defense counsel could have established that defendant’s sentence was excessive when compared with Martin’s sentence. Next, we reject defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment does not reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment. Finally, we conclude the prison term enhancements should have been stayed. The judgment is modified to stay execution of the one-year prison term enhancements. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

The juvenile court denied Daniel A.’s motion to suppress three pills removed from his pants pocket during a bicycle traffic stop, and found he had committed the offense of possession of vicodin in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). Daniel appeals, challenging the ruling on his motion to suppress. We hold the search of Daniel’s pants pocket exceeded the bounds of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new and different order granting Daniel’s motion to suppress.

Elizabeth F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s May 16, 2012 order placing Simon F. with Mr. and Mrs. H. under a plan of legal guardianship and terminating jurisdiction over Simon. Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not selecting a new legal guardian for Simon or, alternatively, not continuing jurisdiction over Simon. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) contends that the court acted within its discretion by ordering the termination of jurisdiction over Simon after supervising the legal guardianship for six months. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Simon placed with Mr. and Mrs. H. under a plan of legal guardianship and terminating jurisdiction over Simon. We affirm the order.

Defendant Treston Rayal Jones appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree burglary and four counts of first degree robbery, with gang findings. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of robbing a young child and the trial court abused its discretion and violated defendant’s confrontation and due process rights by excluding evidence that the victims may have misidentified his accomplice. We affirm.