CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Eron Lewis Welcome appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree burglary with a person present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, former 667.5, subd. (c)(21)) with admissions he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)), a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and a prior felony conviction for which he served a separate prison term (former Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and a finding he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (former Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for 24 years. We affirm the judgment, except we reverse it in part, vacate appellant’s sentence, and remand the matter for resentencing with directions.

Defendant and appellant, Anthony Cajas, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, with prior serious felony and prior prison term findings (former Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (b)-(i), 667.5).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of six years.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

This is another chapter in prolonged litigation between Shirley A. Windsor, Frank Prior, and Prior’s attorney, Joel Tamraz (we refer to Prior and Tamraz collectively as “respondents”). In this action, Windsor alleges contract and tort causes of action arising from a settlement in an underlying action which was not finalized at the time this action was filed. The trial court sustained a demurrer by respondents on statute of limitations grounds and dismissed this action. During the pendency of this appeal, the underlying judgment was finalized and satisfied as part of a global settlement.
Windsor argues the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Respondents contend that this appeal is moot and that no issues remain to be decided in light of the resolution of the underlying case. We affirm dismissal of the contract and covenant of good faith causes of action on the grounds that they are barred by the resolution of the underlying action and are moot because there is no effective relief which may be provided through this appeal. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the first amended complaint as to the remaining causes of action. We deny respondents’ request for sanctions on appeal.

Appellant Tyisha Hampton-Mitchell appeals from the trial court’s order granting the motion filed by respondents Steven Kenilvort, Nick Vanos, Inc., Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, and Consuelo Olmos (collectively, Respondents) to enforce a written settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.[1] On appeal, Hampton-Mitchell asserts that the settlement agreement entered into by the parties at a private mediation is unenforceable under section 664.6 because Coldwell and Olmos did not sign the agreement until a week after the mediation, and Kenilvort and Vanos did not sign the agreement at all. She also argues that the settlement agreement is unenforceable under general contract principles because it is fatally uncertain in its material terms. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement as to Coldwell Banker and Olmos, but reverse the order granting the motion as to Kenilvort and Vanos.

In this boundary dispute case, Paul Anstey appeals from the summary judgment in favor of respondents Dion Beebe and Unjoo Moon. He asks that we reverse the judgment because: his wife, Denise Anstey, is an indispensable party to the boundary dispute; he is entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473[1]; respondents’ unopposed motion for summary judgment did not satisfy their initial burden of production; and the trial court failed to adequately balance the equities.
We conclude the judgment is not infirm for lack of a necessary or indispensable party, that appellant has not shown entitlement to relief under either the mandatory or discretionary provisions of section 473, and that, on the merits, respondents were entitled to summary judgment. We therefore shall affirm the judgment.

Georges Marciano (Marciano) and his various entitles (Marciano entities)[1] (sometimes collectively referred to as Marciano), appeal a judgment in favor of Marciano’s former accountants, Gary Iskowitz (Gary), Gary’s accounting firm Gary Iskowitz & Co., LLP (the Iskowitz firm), Gary’s accounting partner, Carolyn Malkus (Carolyn), and Gary’s spouse, Theresa Iskowitz (Theresa), also an accountant with the firm (sometimes collectively referred to as Iskowitz).[2] [3]
In these consolidated cross-actions (L.A. Super. Court, case Nos. BC384493 & BC385790), the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against Marciano for discovery abuse. The trial court dismissed Marciano’s complaint against Iskowitz and struck Marciano’s answer and entered his default on the Iskowitz cross-complaint, which resulted in a $55 million judgment against Marciano pursuant to a default proveup.
The essential issues presented include whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions against Marciano for noncompliance with discovery, and whether the trial court awarded excessive damages on the default proveup.
Based on our review of the record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the imposition of terminating sanctions, which resulted in the dismissal of Marciano’s complaint against Iskowitz and the entry of Marciano’s default on the Iskowitz cross-complaint. However, on the record presented, the amount of the damages which were awarded on the default proveup is excessive. Therefore, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant Leobardo Carrillo-Robles appeals a December 13, 2011 order reinstating his probation and ordering him to serve a year in county jail after he was found to have violated his probation. His counsel has advised that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has informed defendant in writing that a Wende brief was being filed and that defendant had the right to personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days. No supplemental brief has been filed. No arguable error is shown.

After defendant’s motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) was denied, he entered an admission to one count of disturbing the peace (Pen. Code, § 415). In this appeal he renews his claim that he was unlawfully detained and searched. We find that defendant gave consent to the search before any unlawful detention occurred, and affirm the judgment.

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after he admitted allegations that he violated his probation. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

On September 20, 2011, appellant, Donald Michael Conway, pled guilty to elder abuse (count II/Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1))[1] and making criminal threats (count III/Pen. Code, § 422) and admitted a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in count II.
On October 24, 2011, the court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of seven years eight months, the middle term of three years on the elder abuse count, the middle term of four years on the arming enhancement in that count, and an eight-month term (one-third the middle term of two years) on the criminal threats count.
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Plaintiff Marta Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant Thomas Brill, asserting the trial court erred when it dismissed her complaint as a sanction for her failure to respond to discovery requests and to comply with a prior trial court order compelling her to do so. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion and affirm the judgment.
Rodriguez also attempts to appeal from the constructive denial of her motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).[1] The trial court ruled on this motion after the notice of appeal had been filed. Since the matter was stayed pursuant to section 916, subdivision (a), the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and its order denying the motion is void. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court to permit it to reconsider the motion.

Shannon T. is the biological mother of three-year-old Aaron T. and was designated the de facto mother of eleven-year-old Matthew T. Steven T. is the presumed father of both children. (We will refer to them hereafter as the parents or, separately, as the mother and the father.) The parents appeal from juvenile court orders terminating their parental rights to the two children. We will affirm the orders.

Petitioner, the mother, L.A., requests this court issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders it made on March 20, 2012, remand the matter for a retrial of the combined 6-, 12-, and 18-month review, order Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) to supplement its reports, reinstate family reuinifaction services and vacate the hearing under section Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26 presently scheduled for July 18, 2012. (All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
Petitioner’s argument that she was denied her due process rights when she was not permitted to cross-examine a social worker who worked on the case at an earlier time, and whose notes and observations were included in the social worker’s reports, fails. Her other arguments lack merit as well and her petition is denied.

Alex Tapia was convicted of first degree attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping, and was sentenced to 26 years to life, with the possibility of parole. After serving more than 15 years in prison, Tapia appeared before the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) for his first parole hearing. The Board concluded that Tapia was not suitable for parole because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Tapia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court granted.
Under the relevant legal standards for reviewing the Board’s decisions, we conclude there was some evidence supporting the Board’s decision that Tapia was not suitable for parole, and we therefore reverse the trial court’s order.