CA Unpub Decisions

In this real estate dispute, respondent Ellin Beltz (Beltz) filed a complaint against appellant Justin Hobart Brown (Brown) for specific performance of a contract for sale of real property. Brown answered and filed a cross-complaint against Beltz alleging numerous causes of action, including one to recover the fair rental value of the real property which he claimed Beltz “wrongfully occupied.” Brown appeals from a judgment following a court trial in which the court declined to rule in favor of either party, and concluded that each party should bear his or her own attorney fees and costs.
On appeal, Brown makes numerous contentions, challenging both the trial court’s procedural and substantive rulings. We conclude Brown has waived his contentions on appeal because he has: (1) not provided an adequate record for us to review his contentions; (2) not provided required citations to the record on appeal in support of his assertions of fact and procedure; and (3) made insufficient substantive legal analysis in support of his contentions. Consequently we affirm the judgment.

Christian Perez (Perez) appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of murder, torture, and other crimes upon two young children. Perez contends: (1) the charges that he assaulted one young child in his care should not have been joined with charges that he scalded to death another young child in his care; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by mentioning Perez’s refusal to give a follow-up statement to police, misrepresenting evidence, and comparing abortion to murder or child abuse; and (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move for severance of the charges, failing to recall a witness to testify, and failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Arliton Johnson shot and killed Tyrone Lyles and wounded Daryl Mitchell with a .9-milimeter gun on June 8, 2007. Four days later, while still in the hospital, Mitchell gave police a statement and identified defendant as the shooter. When police went to arrest defendant on June 14, 2007, he ran. The police gave chase and caught him. A loaded 45-caliber pistol dropped out of defendant’s pants while he fought with a police officer. A loaded 9-milimeter semiautomatic pistol was found in defendant’s left front pants pocket after he was subdued. At trial in 2010, Mitchell recanted his identification. A jury convicted defendant of murder and illegal possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, but deadlocked on the attempted murder of Mitchell.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court should have bifurcated or severed trial on the gun possession charge from trial on the murder and attempted murder charges. He also argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights by limiting his cross-examination of the ballistics expert, and erroneously instructed and failed to instruct the jury in several respects. He argues prejudice from cumulative error warrants reversal. We find that bifurcation of the gun charge was not an option and severance was not required, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defendant’s voir dire of the ballistics expert. We also find no instructional or cumulative error. Therefore, we shall affirm.

Mariah A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply in this case. We reject mother’s contention and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

The court adjudged appellant, Miguel G., a ward of the court after it sustained allegations in a petition charging him with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and a gang enhancement (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we affirm.

A modification decision.

Defendants Andre Dee Scott and Larry Douglas were convicted by jury trial of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664) and two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true allegations that both defendants acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in the commission of the attempted murders (Pen. Code, § 189, 664), personally used a firearm in the commission of the assaults and the attempted murders (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of one of the attempted murders (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)), and that Douglas had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the other attempted murder. The jury also convicted Douglas of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h) and pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(1)), and Scott of misdemeanor destroying or concealing evidence (Pen. Code, § 135). The court found true allegations that Douglas had suffered a prior serious felony strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a) & (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Scott admitted that he had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication, and the court found that the juvenile adjudication qualified both as a prior serious felony conviction under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and as a strike under Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) to (i) and 1170.12. Scott was committed to state prison for a life term consecutive to a determinate term of 40 years, and Douglas was committed to state prison for a life term consecutive to a determinate term of 58 years. Both sentences included consecutive terms for the two attempted murder counts.

E.H., also known as E.R., the out-of-state father in this dependency case (father), petitions this court for a writ of mandate to overturn the juvenile court’s order at the 18-month review denying him further reunification services. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision that he was offered reasonable reunification services and that placement of his two preteen daughters with him would have been detrimental to them. Accordingly, we deny his petition.

The court found that appellant, F.L., was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after he admitted committing a second degree burglary offense (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b))[1] and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Following independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we remand the matter to the juvenile court so that it may declare the character of appellant’s offense. In all other respects we affirm.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that Jayden M. (appellant) unlawfully purchased and possessed tobacco and tobacco paraphernalia (Pen. Code, § 308, subd. (b))[1] (count 1); resisted and obstructed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2); and violated probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3). The court ordered that appellant continue on probation with a placement at Camp Owen, after which he would be released to the custody of his mother.
On appeal, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he obstructed or delayed a peace officer because the officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when he detained appellant. He also contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied his motions to suppress and dismiss. We disagree and affirm.

The court found that 15-year-old appellant, Paige J., was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] after appellant admitted allegations charging her with felony vehicular manslaughter (count 1/Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)), felony vehicle theft (count 2/Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), driving without a license (count 7/Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), violating a previous grant of probation (count 8.041/102Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777), and four counts of misdemeanor unlawfully driving a vehicle causing injury (counts 3, 4, 5 & 6/Veh. Code, § 23104, subd. (a)).
On June 28, 2011, the court ordered appellant placed at the Forrest Ridge Youth and Family Services (Forrest Ridge) facility in Iowa.
On appeal, appellant contends the court exceeded its jurisdiction in placing her in an out-of-state group home because it did not comply with certain statutory requirements. We affirm.

On May 4, 2011, appellant, Willie Smith, pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)[1] (now § 29800, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)) and admitted a “strike” allegation, after the court stated an indicated sentence of 32 months.[2] On June 3, 2011, appellant requested that the court strike his strike. The court denied the request and imposed a 32-month prison term, consisting of the 16-month lower term on the instant offense, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). Appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing.

In July 2007, appellant, Larry J., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the court, based on adjudications of committing a lewd or lascivious act against a minor (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and committing a lewd or lascivious act against a minor by force (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The court placed appellant on probation. Thereafter, on two occasions in 2007 and one occasion in 2008, appellant was found to be in violation of probation. In each instance he was continued on probation.
On April 23, 2010, a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) was filed in which it was alleged appellant committed sodomy by force (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2); count 1) and forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 2). On April 19, 2011, appellant admitted count 1 as a probation violation and the court dismissed the petition. At the disposition hearing, on August 3, 2011, the court ordered appellant committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, and set appellant’s maximum period of physical confinement at eight years, with credit of 923 days for time served. On August 30, 2011, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the August 3, 2011, judgment.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

Appellant, Ruben Valdez, appeals following a modification of his sentence pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002 (Lopez). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 426 (Wende), we affirm.