CA Unpub Decisions

Edgar F. appeals from the juvenile court’s order continuing wardship and directing him into a six-month camp community placement program. He contends the award of predisposition custody credit was miscalculated. We affirm the order as modified.

Defendant and appellant Robert Rubbock (defendant) was convicted of counterfeit seal (Pen. Code, § 472[1]). On appeal, defendant contends, without argument, that the trial court erred in denying his motion made pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), but because the reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the motion is “unavailable,” we should reverse his judgment of conviction. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in revoking his pro. per. status, denying four of his motions made pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), and denying his numerous other requests for Marsden hearings. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant and defendant Relius Thomas appeals from the judgment following his conviction for stalking and making criminal threats against his ex-girlfriend. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for stalking, that the trial court committed prejudicial misconduct in instructing the jury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant David G. Moore of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).[1] In both counts, it found true additional allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), and (d)) and two special circumstance allegations: multiple murder and gang murder (§§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3) and (a)(22)). Also, the jury convicted him of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)), and found the gang enhancement allegation true in all counts (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate term of seven years. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support the gang murder special circumstance allegation and the gang enhancement allegation, and that the trial court erred in not staying the sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to section 654. We disagree with both contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellants are successors-in-interest to owners of commercial property in Beverly Hills who sought legal advice from respondents, the Law Firm of Tilles, Webb, Kulla & Grant (TWKG) and one of their individual partners, in connection with a lease of that property.[1] Appellants filed a complaint containing several causes of action against respondents with respect to a contingency fee agreement for this legal representation and respondents cross-complained.
The trial court granted summary judgment/summary adjudication in favor of respondents on the complaint and denied appellants’ motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication on respondents’ cross-complaint. We affirm the judgment (orders granting and denying summary judgment and summary adjudication).

A modification decision.

Fabian L. (Father) challenges the termination of reunification services at the six-month review hearing, regarding his three-year-old daughter A.L. He asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that as an incarcerated parent he failed to make substantive progress in his court-ordered treatment plan and the court abused its discretion in terminating reunification services. Finding his arguments lack merit, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Bradford D. Lund appeals from the order dismissing his lawsuit against his half-sisters and their husbands, defendants Kristen Lund Olson, Timothy Olson, Karen Lund Page, and James Page (non-attorney defendants), based on the forum non conveniens doctrine, contending the court erred in granting the motion and dismissing, rather than staying, the action. We affirm the court’s finding of forum non conveniens but reverse the order to dismiss and remand with directions to either (1) deny non-attorney defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay the action, or (2) grant the motion to stay the action subject to non-attorney defendants’ agreement to toll applicable Arizona statute limitations from the filing of the California action until 90 days after the remittitur in this case issues.
Although the opening brief also refers to Burch & Cracchiolo, Daniel Cracchiolo and Bryan F. Murphy (attorney defendants), plaintiff did not separately appeal from the subsequent order dismissing them for the same reason and we dismissed them from the appeal. We thus do not consider any argument on appeal with respect to attorney defendants.

On December 15, 2010, appellant, Bruce David Faux, was charged in a first amended complaint with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1),[1] gross vehicular manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 191.5, subd. (a), count 2), driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior conviction for the same offense (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count 3), and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or greater with a prior conviction for being under the influence of alcohol while driving (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 4). There were also two great bodily injury enhancements alleged pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and a multiple victim bodily injury allegation pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23558.
On August 19, 2011, appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit counts 2 and 3, as well as one great bodily injury allegation. In exchange for appellant’s plea, he would receive a stipulated sentence of 13 years 8 months and the remaining allegations would be dismissed.[2] The court determined from appellant that he had initialed and executed a felony advisement of rights and change of plea form, that he had discussed his rights with his counsel, and that he understood his rights. The court advised appellant of, and appellant waived, his Miranda[3] rights.
The trial court advised appellant of the consequences of his plea and the parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the highway patrol report. Appellant pled no contest to counts 2 and 3 and admitted one great bodily injury enhancement. On September 30, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to prison for the previously stipulated term of 13 years 8 months. The court granted total custody credits of 336 days and imposed various fines and fees. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal but did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

On June 20, 2011, appellant, Larry Darnell Thomas, was charged in an information with assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to cause great bodily injury on a correctional officer by an inmate undergoing a life sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500, count 1),[1] assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to cause great bodily injury by an inmate on an officer (§ 4501, count 2), committing a battery by an inmate on a non-inmate (§ 4501.5, count 3), resisting an executive officer by means of force (§ 69, count 4), and making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 5). Counts 1, 2, and 3 alleged a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The information alleged appellant had four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)).[2]
On October 3, 2011, the trial court denied a motion brought by appellant pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. A discovery motion and a motion for nonstatutory dismissal of the allegations were also denied.

In Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF238446, a jury convicted defendant Aeron Wesley Grenfell of three counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act against C.C. when she was under 14 years old (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a); counts 1-3); nine counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act against M.T. when she was under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 4-12); two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act against M.T. when she was 14 years old and at least 10 years younger than defendant (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 13-14); and one count of attempting to forcibly rape M.T. (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 664; count 15). With respect to counts 1 through 7 and 9 through 11, the jury found there were multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (b)); and, with respect to counts 3, 6 through 9, and 11 through 12, that defendant had substantial sexual conduct with the victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)). As to counts 1 through 14, the court found defendant was previously convicted of an enumerated sex offense (§ 667.51, subd. (a)).
As a result of his conviction in Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF238446, defendant was found to have violated the terms and conditions of his probation in Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF187242. In that case, defendant pleaded no contest in 2007 to committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child 14 years old and at least 10 years younger than him (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)) and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (§ 272, subd. (a)(1)). A two-year prison term was imposed and suspended, and he was placed on five years’ probation on condition, inter alia, that he obey all laws.
On May 12, 2011, defendant was sentenced in both cases to an aggregate term of 18 years plus 120 years to life, and he was ordered to pay restitution and various fees, fines, and assessments. In addition, he was prohibited from visiting any victim under the age of 18 (§ 1202.05), and was ordered to have no contact of any sort with the victims. He now appeals, raising claims of trial and sentencing error.[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for partial resentencing.

Tanya K. (hereafter mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son, T.K., and placing the child for adoption. She contends that, in light of several failings by San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that T.K. is generally adoptable. She contends that it is not sufficient to find that the child is likely to be adopted by his foster parents, because, if that adoption falls through, T.K. may become a legal orphan because his late-discovered developmental delays and the sudden onset of emotional problems render him not generally adoptable.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that it is likely that T.K. will be adopted by his foster parents within a reasonable time. Moreover, even if that adoption falls through and no other adoptive parent can be found, parental rights can be reinstated. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (i)(3).)[1] Accordingly, any error in the juvenile court’s finding that T.K. is generally adoptable does not require reversal of the order appealed from.

Defendants and appellants A.L. and S.L. are the parents (individually Mother and Father) of twins A. and S., a girl and boy, and their younger sister D. The parents appeal from the July 11, 2012, order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights and placing the children for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1]
Mother claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition seeking the return of the children to her care pursuant to a family maintenance plan or for additional reunification services. Father joins this claim. Both parents claim that the court erroneously refused to apply the parental benefit exception to the adoption preference (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), and on that basis select guardianship over adoption as the children’s permanent plan. We find no error and affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Joe John Esparza guilty of multiple counts, including assault with a firearm, second degree robbery, and possession of methamphetamine (counts 14, 15, 18, 29-32, 35, & 37). In a bifurcated trial, the court made true findings as to certain sentence enhancement allegations. Defendant was sentenced to 21 years 4 months in prison.
On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of possession of methamphetamine (count 37). He contends there is no evidence to support any of the elements of possession of methamphetamine in that the baggie containing the drug was found on the ground in a parking lot 5 to 10 feet from where defendant and his accomplices were arrested.
He further argues that the minute order as to the sentence on count 29 should be corrected to properly reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.
The People concede both points. We agree with the parties on both arguments. We reverse the conviction for possession of methamphetamine and vacate the sentence. The convictions on all other counts are affirmed. We will also direct the trial court to make a new minute order to properly reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment as to count 29.