CA Unpub Decisions

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that Jayden M. (appellant) unlawfully purchased and possessed tobacco and tobacco paraphernalia (Pen. Code, § 308, subd. (b))[1] (count 1); resisted and obstructed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2); and violated probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3). The court ordered that appellant continue on probation with a placement at Camp Owen, after which he would be released to the custody of his mother.
On appeal, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he obstructed or delayed a peace officer because the officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when he detained appellant. He also contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied his motions to suppress and dismiss. We disagree and affirm.

The court found that 15-year-old appellant, Paige J., was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] after appellant admitted allegations charging her with felony vehicular manslaughter (count 1/Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)), felony vehicle theft (count 2/Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), driving without a license (count 7/Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), violating a previous grant of probation (count 8.041/102Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777), and four counts of misdemeanor unlawfully driving a vehicle causing injury (counts 3, 4, 5 & 6/Veh. Code, § 23104, subd. (a)).
On June 28, 2011, the court ordered appellant placed at the Forrest Ridge Youth and Family Services (Forrest Ridge) facility in Iowa.
On appeal, appellant contends the court exceeded its jurisdiction in placing her in an out-of-state group home because it did not comply with certain statutory requirements. We affirm.

On May 4, 2011, appellant, Willie Smith, pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)[1] (now § 29800, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)) and admitted a “strike” allegation, after the court stated an indicated sentence of 32 months.[2] On June 3, 2011, appellant requested that the court strike his strike. The court denied the request and imposed a 32-month prison term, consisting of the 16-month lower term on the instant offense, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). Appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing.

In July 2007, appellant, Larry J., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the court, based on adjudications of committing a lewd or lascivious act against a minor (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and committing a lewd or lascivious act against a minor by force (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The court placed appellant on probation. Thereafter, on two occasions in 2007 and one occasion in 2008, appellant was found to be in violation of probation. In each instance he was continued on probation.
On April 23, 2010, a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) was filed in which it was alleged appellant committed sodomy by force (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2); count 1) and forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 2). On April 19, 2011, appellant admitted count 1 as a probation violation and the court dismissed the petition. At the disposition hearing, on August 3, 2011, the court ordered appellant committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, and set appellant’s maximum period of physical confinement at eight years, with credit of 923 days for time served. On August 30, 2011, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the August 3, 2011, judgment.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

Appellant, Ruben Valdez, appeals following a modification of his sentence pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002 (Lopez). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 426 (Wende), we affirm.

Appellant Dale Juan McMillan stabbed Kenneth Hansen in the lower abdomen, liver, chest, and back. A series of minor altercations over the course of several hours between the two men led up to this incident. Appellant now appeals from his convictions for attempted premeditated murder and assault with a deadly weapon and their related allegations. He challenges the attempted murder conviction on three grounds: 1) insufficient evidence of premeditation and intent to kill; 2) erroneous jury instruction on the voluntary intoxication defense; and 3) prejudicial improper admission of bad character evidence. Appellant also challenges his assault conviction on this third ground. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

On March 22, 2009, appellant Joshua Profit fatally shot fellow Westside Crips gang member Clarence Bagsby. He was charged with first degree murder and the matter proceeded to jury trial. The jury rejected appellant’s testimony that he shot the victim in self-defense and convicted him of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder (count 1). It also found him guilty of being a felon while carrying a concealed firearm (count 2). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12021.)[1] The jury found firearm use allegations to be true. (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).) The jury found a gang special circumstance allegation and a gang enhancement allegation to be not true. (§§ 190.2, 186.22.) The court found true one prior serious felony conviction allegation and two prior prison term allegations. (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(e), 667.5, subd. (b).) Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate unstayed term of 55 years to life plus 15 years.

Appellant Cheri Williams (Mother) filed an order to show cause seeking modification of the existing child custody and visitation order. The parties met in mediation and the family court mediator prepared a proposed order. However, following a contested hearing, the court left the existing order in place.
Mother challenges the trial court’s refusal to adopt the proposed order. According to Mother, the trial court denied her a fair trial by: failing to enforce a local rule requiring that any objections to the mediator’s proposed order be filed in writing; failing to consider the mediator’s report and notes in support of the proposed order; and making erroneous evidentiary rulings.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to adopt the proposed order. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order setting support for the adult disabled son of the parties to this dissolution proceeding. Appellant has not demonstrated any error, and we affirm.

Father B.B. (Father) appeals after the termination of his parental rights to N.J. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] He claims the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).

This action arose out of a dispute between property owners in La Jolla Shores Heights (Heights). The superior court granted the motion of defendants and cross-complainants James Skeen, Lorena Skeen and Skeen Family Trust (together, the Skeens) for summary adjudication on the cause of action of plaintiffs and cross-defendants Louis J. Alpinieri and Brenda L. Alpinieri (together, the Alpinieris) for breach of contract. The court also granted summary adjudication in the Skeens' favor on their cause of action for declaratory relief against the Alpinieris and other Heights property owners.
On October 28, 2011, the court granted in part the Skeens' motion for attorneys' fees. The court awarded the Skeens $415,219.48 as prevailing parties (Civ. Code, § 1717), representing the fees they incurred in defending the Alpinieris' breach of contract cause of action and in prosecuting their own cause of action for declaratory relief. On the same date, the court granted in part the Alpinieris' motion to tax costs and awarded the Skeens $16,944 in costs. On October 31, the Alpinieris filed a notice of appeal of the October 28 orders.
On March 8, 2012, while the appeal was pending, this court reversed the summary adjudication on the Alpinieris' breach of contract cause of action and the Skeens' declaratory relief cause of action.
The Alpinieris and the Skeens have filed a "stipulation for reversal of orders awarding respondents attorney fees and costs." They stipulate to the reversal of the October 28, 2011 orders, the Alpinieris' recovery of $682 in costs on appeal from the Skeens, due when the remittitur issues, and immediate issuance of the remittitur. The reason for the stipulation is this court's reversal of the summary adjudication on which the October 28, 2011 orders were based. (Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1053.) We accept the stipulation.

On September 11, 2006, the San Diego County District Attorney charged Igor Smirnov with grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code,[1] § 487, subd. (a); count 1); burglary (§ 459; counts 2, 4, 20, 24, 30, 58 and 59); and forgery of documents and items (§ 470, subd. (d); counts 3, 5, 21, 25 and 31). As to count 1, it was further alleged that the loss to the victims exceeded $50,000 (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)).
On January 11, 2007, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Smirnov pled guilty to three counts of second degree burglary (counts 2, 20 and 24) and the People dismissed the balance of the charges. The trial court sentenced Smirnov to 379 days in custody and granted felony probation for a period of three years.
On June 20, 2011, after Smirnov's probation expired, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea pursuant to section 1016.5. On July 6, 2011, the People filed their opposition to the motion to withdraw the plea. On July 13, 2011, after a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied Smirnov's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
On appeal, Smirnov claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to vacate his guilty plea pursuant to section 1016.5. As we explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Judgment affirmed.

Aziz Habib Hanna was convicted of burglary for breaking into a neighbor's laundry room while under the influence of methamphetamine. Hanna had prior convictions, including a serious felony prior, which were alleged in the information. Due to these convictions plus the fact that Hanna was on probation at the time of the immediate offense, the court found he was automatically ineligible for probation pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 1203, subdivision (k). However, while Hanna's prior convictions were pled and conceded, Hanna's probation status was neither pled nor proved in his trial. Hanna now appeals, claiming section 1203, subdivision (k) contains an implied statutory requirement to plead and prove a defendant's probation status before imposing automatic ineligibility for probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

In July 2007 the San Diego County District Attorney filed a wardship petition alleging that O.H. fell within the court's jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based upon his battery of a police officer causing injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(1) [all further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code]) and resisting a police officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The court made a true finding on the battery count, dismissed the remaining count, and placed O.H. on probation.