Lee v. Dewane















Filed 6/21/12 Lee
v. Dewane CA4/3













NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION THREE




>

JINNY LEE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAWN NICOLE DEWANE, Defendant and Appellant.

G044475 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2010-00412842) O P I N I O N

Appeal
from an order of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Corey S. Cramin, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Ross
Law Group, Mark A. Ross and Melinda M. Ellis, for Defendant and Appellant.

Telep
Law and Desiree Telep for Plaintiff and Respondent.
>


When
a married couple’s dysfunctional relationship embroiled the University of California Irvine’s (UCI) executive MBA program, the program’s
administrator and director, and the university’s campus police, the trial court
granted an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
prohibiting one non-student spouse, Dawn Nicole Dewane, from harassing,
contacting, or coming within 100 yards of student, Jinny Lee. The order also prohibited Dewane from coming
onto the UCI campus without the school’s prior approval.

On
appeal, Dewane challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
court’s order, its interpretation of section 527.6, a few of the court’s
evidentiary rulings and the breadth and scope of the order. Only the last point has merit and we modify
the stay away order to impose the least restrictive burden on Dewane’s
livelihood. As modified, the order is
affirmed.

FACTS

The
statement of facts is derived from the pleadings, hearing testimony and
exhibits.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] In accordance with general href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">legal principles, we present the facts in
the light most favorable to the judgment.
(Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405 (Brekke).)

In
the spring of 2010, Lee and Dewane’s husband, Jeffrey Dewane, were fellow
students in UCI’s executive MBA program.
They were also study group partners with two other students, Jared
Turner and Mark Mallgrave. Lee and
Dewane met once during a May school-related dinner and social gathering. After the event, Dewane asked Lee to be a
Facebook friend and an approved party on Linked-in, two on-line social
networking sites.

In
early June, Lee received two postcards from Jeffrey.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] She was puzzled by the postcards but assumed
he had sent them because she once mentioned she enjoyed sending postcards when
she traveled.

On
June 23, Marty Bell, the director of program services for the executive MBA
program, received a telephone call from Dewane.
During a 40-45 minute call, Dewane complained about the program’s
demands on her husband’s time, and the consumption of alcohol during the
dinners. She also voiced her belief
other members of her husband’s study group, especially Lee, engaged in academic
dishonesty by claiming his work as their own.
The capper to the conversation was what Bell described as a “kind of odd or weird” accusation that
bordered on a rant about an affair between Lee and Jeffrey.

Bell talked to the dean of the executive MBA program,
Imran Currim, about the academic dishonesty allegation, after which he called
Jeffrey. According to Bell, Jeffrey said he and Dewane were going to get
divorced and the accusations of academic dishonesty were false. Later that day, Bell received a telephone call from Currim. Currim had just spoken to Dewane. According to Currim, Dewane said, “If I see
that woman, I will kill her.” He
instructed Bell to come up with a plan to ensure Lee’s safety and the
safety of the other students.

The
following morning, Bell called Lee and the campus police. Although Bell said he thought Dewane’s death
threat was “just a statement,” Lee reacted more “visceral[ly]” and he developed
a sense of urgency. Campus police
decided to have officers conduct patrol checks during the program’s
twice-monthly dinners. Further, either
the campus police or the university’s legal counsel suggested Bell advised Lee
to get a restraining order. Lee told
Jeffrey, Turner, and Mallgrave about what had happened and about Bell’s
suggestion to get a restraining order.
Jeffery replied the restraining order was a good idea because “his wife
has done things like this before.”

Within
days, the class met at a multi-purpose academic and administration building
where the executive MBA program held its twice-monthly dinner meetings and
social hour. Officer Benny Green went to
the dinner and talked to Bell about his report.
Bell told him about his conversation with Dewane. Currim arrived while Green was there and told
him about Dewane’s threat to kill Lee.
He also mentioned he was unsure if Dewane “would carry out her statement
but felt it necessary to convey.” After
speaking to Bell, Lee and Currim, Green escorted Lee to the campus police
department where another officer told her how to obtain a restraining order.

Green
returned to the dinner and spoke to Dewane and Jeffrey. Jeffrey said he and his wife were
experiencing marital problems and he wanted a divorce, but he also told Green
he did not think Dewane would hurt Lee.
Dewane said she did not want a divorce, but she did believe her husband
and Lee were having an affair. She also
admitted overreacting and denied she had any intention to hurt Lee. She complained about her husband’s
indiscretion in discussing details about their relationship with Lee. Dewane also said she had become somewhat
emotional due to extended traveling, her mother’s recent death, her husband’s
demanding schedule, and their marital problems.
But she maintained she would never hurt Lee and offered to apologize
over the telephone. Green told her “that
would not be necessary.”

Despite
Green’s assurance no further communication was necessary, Jeffrey called Lee
and put Dewane on the phone. Dewane told
Lee the whole incident had been a “misunderstanding” and “grossly exaggerated.”


On
June 28, Jeffrey sent the following e-mail to Currim and Bell: “The situation has come to an end”
. . . . “Molly and Jinny spoke on Saturday at approximately six
p.m. and the matter was resolved from Molly and my perspective. Furthermore, Molly indicated there would be
no further follow-up with U.C.I. Thank
you, Jeff.” He sent another e-mail on
July 15, which read, “ I would appreciate if I could have a few minutes to
clear up some academic concerns. I would
like to schedule a brief meeting [and] wanted to know the person who kept your
schedule. Thank you, Jeff.”

Ultimately,
Lee decided against getting a restraining order, opting instead to get out of
the study group and limit her contact with Jeffrey. She “hoped [] the issue was over.” Unfortunately, her hoping did not make it
so.

At
the end of August, Turner forwarded an e-mail to Lee and Mallgrave that he
received from one of Dewane’s friends.
The e-mail originally sent by Dewane read, ““I never forget. No one should underestimate me. I have a way of getting to know people I need
to know. I asked colleagues about ____,
I know someone who knew her as an undergrad.
I feel angry, and that feeling grows every day. Jeff decided to do this program without my
consent. He’s hidden things from me and
may very well be[] doing that now. He sent
the blank postcard even after I told him it upsets me. I told him I need a comfort level and that a
conversation had to occur with all concerned.
He humiliated me with his inappropriate sharing. Is it any wonder I am still very angry?”

Turner
told Lee he thought the e-mail referred to her, and it rekindled Lee’s
fears. Lee found the lengths to which
Dewane would go to send a threatening e-mail and her continued fixation on her
“of great concern.”

Shortly
thereafter, Mallgrave forwarded a Facebook posting by Dewane. While again not mentioning Lee by name,
Dewane posed the following hypothetical question: “A husband and wife are out with husband’s
colleagues. It’s mixed company. One of husband’s colleagues goes out of her
way to socialize with everyone except wife.
Is wife justified in feeling snubbed?
Is wife justified telling husband she does not want him to socialize
with female colleague? Or is wife being
paranoid?” What followed were comments
from Dewane’s friends, which ranged from rude to frightening.

On
August 21, Dewane walked into Jeffrey’s class.
Someone called the campus police and officers immediately
responded. There was quite a commotion,
and although Lee was not in school that night she heard about the
incident. She thought a planned class
trip abroad may have prompted Dewane’s appearance. She also planned to continue the program when
it restarted in the fall and her fear of Dewane prompted her to get a
restraining order.

On
September 30, Lee filed a request for a temporary restraining order and
injunction to stop Dewane’s harassment.
She requested Dewane be prohibited from coming within 100 yards of her
person, home, job, and the UCI campus.

In
Dewane’s opposition, she denied “making any credible threat of violence or
acting in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at . . . Lee . . . that would seriously
alarm, annoy or harass [Lee].” She
denied making the death threat and asserted Lee’s delay in filing the request
was evidence “there is no ‘credible threat’ of violence.”

Dewane
attached declarations from Roger Finefrock, Ann Beauchamp, and Ericka Porter,
who claimed to have overheard her end of the June 24 telephone call between
Dewane and Bell. They asserted the call
lasted about 45 minutes and while it appeared Dewane was on the verge of tears,
she did not raise her voice or make any threats. Finefrock also averred he had overheard
Dewane’s telephone conversation with Currim.
He maintained Dewane made no threats, nor did she raise her voice.

The
court granted a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on an order to
show cause. On October 20, after a
failed attempt at mediation, the court conducted a hearing, taking testimony
from Currim; Bell; Mallgrave; Turner; Alison Brown, a fellow student who
testified she heard Jeffrey say he was seeking a divorce; another classmate,
Alice Tutunjian, who overheard Lee’s telephone conversation with Dewane;
Officer Lori Teves, who had been assigned to provide on campus security for the
executive MBA program; and Dewane and Jeffrey.

Currim
recounted the events described above. He
was certain about the death threat, although under cross-examination he
admitted he was not known for his memory.
Bell testified about the June 24 telephone call to Dewane, his follow-up
conversation with Jeffrey, and his discussion with campus police. He testified Lee was “very concerned and
scared” when she learned of Dewane’s threat, which is what prompted him to
arrange for the UCI police to patrol the area where the program held their
Saturday socials. Bell also said he
talked to Jeffrey, and Jeffrey said there was nothing he could do about the
situation. Bell became very concerned in
light of Jeffrey’s attitude, a concern Dewane’s June 28 e-mail did nothing to
dispel.

Turner
authenticated the e-mail he received through his Facebook account from one of
Dewane’s friends. He found the e-mail
disturbing, which was why he forwarded it to Lee and Mallgrave and mentioned it
to Jeffrey, and he was surprised to get the e-mail because months had passed
and it seemed things had calmed down.

Brown,
a member of another study group with Lee and Jeffrey, testified Lee was visibly
afraid after she learned of the death threat.
Tutunjian walked Lee to her car that night and overheard Lee’s
conversation with Dewane. She heard
Dewane say she understood Lee’s concern for her safety, but that “the whole
issue was exaggerated [and] taken out of context by the U.C.I. staff.”

Lee
recounted the telephone call she received from Currim regarding the death
threat and Dewane’s accusations of academic dishonesty. When she mentioned the death threat to
Jeffrey, he told her “it’s my wife. She
does things like this . . . .” Lee explained, “not knowing Mrs. Dewane, only
having met her once, and a month later from when I met her – and I didn’t think
there was any issues because right after that meeting, I got a friend request
from her to be friends on Facebook, I got a Linked-in connection from her, so
all I know, it’s the wife of [a] student and that’s it. [¶] So when I heard [about the death threat,
e-mails, and Facebook posting], it alarmed me.
I had no idea where that came from.
And then in discussions with our teammates Jeff indicated that his wife
for many months had thought that he and I were having an
affair . . . which was very surprising to us because, one,
I have not had an affair and, two, that conversation never came up.”

She
explained her attempts to resolve the situation and her apprehension about the
new semester, testifying “A couple months went by, we switched groups, I
thought things were okay until I was informed she had once again showed up in
our classroom, and knowing it’s caused so much emotion and commotion, I would
expect that was to incite a reaction and then shortly thereafter, I received
the e-mail from Mr. Turner indicating some pretty alarming words that cause my
fears, my same fears of the initial, ‘I will kill you’ to come right
back.” She summarized the situation by
stating, “So I’ve have absolutely no contact, no contact with her husband, no
contact, yet this persists. The erratic
nature of this how it started is so, I can’t understand it and so that’s just
disturbing by all means and having the threat made to me and the continuation
of it causes me to seek a restraining order.”

Dewane
testified she met Lee at the MBA program’s May social event. She became angry after she “watched [her]
husband do a group paper” and the others claimed credit. She asked him why he prepared the whole
paper. When he gave her a “nonsensical
answer,” she became angry, “reminded him it was cheating,” and “reported them
all because Jeff shouldn’t have done that.”

She
admitted coming to Jeffrey’s class on August 21, but said the visit was for the
sole purpose of collecting him for the ride home. She denied making the death threat, but
admitted talking to Lee after hearing from Bell. She testified Jeffrey put her on the
telephone and she “wasn’t too thrilled about Jeff, you know, calling her, but
Jeff had promised to reassure her.” She
denied ever accusing Jeffrey and Lee of having an affair and described the
problems in her marriage as “boundary issues.”


Dewane
testified she felt indignant when Green questioned her about the death threat,
but she recognized Green “was doing his job.”
She admitted authoring the July 18 e-mail Turner received, but
maintained she was just venting to a friend about her “very stressful
year.” She explained the “I have a way
of getting to know people I need to know” statement as a reflection of her
“habit of meeting people in the oddest places and people just tell[ing her]
their life stories.” She claimed the
e-mail did not have anything to do with Lee, and she asserted the anger in the
e-mail had been directed toward her husband because he was not with her when
her mother died.

Jeffrey
testified he and his wife had been together for approximately 17 years and had
two weddings that accounted for about 10 and one-half years of marriage,
collectively. He initially denied
threatening divorce, but later admitted telling his classmates he thought a
divorce likely. He explained the
statement about his wife having “done things similar” in the past as meaning
Dewane is “a very principled person” and “if she suspected academic dishonesty,
she would absolutely react on those.”
However, under cross-examination, he admitted telling other students he
did not believe anyone guilty of academic dishonesty. He pointed to “ongoing personal problems”
with Bell as a possible explanation for the entire contretemps although he
admitted sending Lee postcards. Jeffrey
believed he was a victim of the events because “70 percent [of the program’s
attendees] won’t talk to me or will talk to me in a very guarded fashion” and
“there seemed to be [] a mob mentality” in the class.

On
November 10, the court granted a three-year protective order, prohibiting
Dewane from harassing, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of Lee and
excluding her from the UCI campus unless she receives prior authorization from
the school. She filed a timely notice of
appeal.





DISCUSSION

>Sufficiency
of the Evidence

name="SDU_3">Relying
primarily on Scripps Health v. Marin (1999)> 72 Cal.App.4th 324 (>Scripps Marin) and Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399 (>Russell), Dewane argues the court
improperly relied on past acts rather than evidence of the need to prevent
future harm. Her reliance is misplaced
and we disagree with her conclusion.

Section
527.6, subdivision (a) provides, “[a] person who has suffered harassment as
defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an
injunction prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” The section defines harassment as “unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).)

A
“course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose,
including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls
to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any
means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails,
interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail.”
(§ 527.6, subd.
(b)(1).) An actionable course of conduct
must be one which “would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and [those acts] must actually cause substantial emotional
distress to the petitioner.” (>Id., subd. (b)(3); see also >Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1413.) The trial court must find
clear and convincing evidence of harassment.
(§ 527.6, subd. (d).) However,
an appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision under the substantial
evidence rule. (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) Therefore, “‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions
for those of the trial court.’
[Citation.]” (Shapiro v. San
Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) We find the standard of review dispositive of
Dewane’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

As
noted, a “course of conduct” is a series of acts over time, which demonstrate a
continuity of purpose and reasonably cause actual and substantial emotional
distress. Under the customary rules of
appellate review, we “resolve all factual conflicts and questions of name=SearchTerm>credibility
in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court” when supported by
substantial evidence. (Schild v. Rubin, supra, 232
Cal.App.3d at p. 762.) That means the
court was free to accept Lee’s testimony and the testimony of witnesses
favorable to her position and to reject Dewane and Jeffrey’s contrary
testimony. Despite what they said in
court and argue on appeal, the trial court could have reasonably concluded
Dewane did in fact threaten Lee’s life, contact her against the abjurations of
official instruction and common sense, jeopardize her efforts to succeed in the
MBA program, threaten her through electronic means she had no reason to presume
would remain private, and personally appear at Jeffrey’s class with the
intention of causing disruption to the class and harassing Lee. Even if we did not agree with the trial
court’s implied findings, we cannot say they are completely without merit or
based on suspect evidence. Consequently,
we find reasonable, solid, credible evidence Dewane harassed Lee by threatening
her, accusing her of academic dishonesty and moral bankruptcy, and continuing
this harassment when school officers advised her to leave Lee alone. In short, there is sufficient evidence of
harassment as defined in section 527.6 to support the court’s order.

Furthermore,
we are not inclined to treat the June death threat differently than all the
other threatening e-mails just because it occurred three months before Lee
filed her request for a restraining order.
We consider the facts in totality when assessing whether the record
contains substantial evidence. (>Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 330, 335.) And
Dewane’s continued activities are what distinguish her case from the cases on
which she attempts to rely. (>Scripps, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at
p. 336; Russell, supra, 112
Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-404.)

Section
527.6 is the Legislature’s attempt to protect “‘“the individual’s right to
pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California
Constitution.”’ [Citation.] Its purpose is ‘to provide expedited
injunctive relief to victims of “harassment.”’”
(Kobey v. Morton (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1059.) Although the judicial system is not the best
place to resolve interpersonal problems, Dewane’s death threat compelled the
UCI staff to act and notify Lee. Dewane
and Jeffrey’s reaction to this official intervention merely reinforced UCI’s
responsibility to protect Lee and the other students, and reaffirmed Lee’s
worst fears. Substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s implied finding that Dewane’s inability to let go
and move on provided a continuing source of fear
and harassment. Nothing Dewane or
Jeffrey said or did actually remedied the situation. Dewane failed to acknowledge the fact her
actions were threatening and Lee had a reasonable fear for her safety. Although she and her husband repeatedly
posited other possible explanations for the alarm exhibited by Lee and >everyone else at UCI who had knowledge
of the events, they also refused to address the interpersonal problems that
fomented the events. Under the
circumstances, it was entirely reasonable and proper for the court to enter a
three-year restraining order.

The
court correctly summarized the pertinent issues as follows: “The questions really
were . . . we had a serious threat, the circumstances were
somewhat unusual. The question becomes,
is there really a potential in the future because of a one time threat?” In other words, the court realized a one-time
death threat was not enough. It looked
at all the circumstances attendant to
the case. The court’s ruling is an
effort to prevent future harm to Lee’s life and well-being. To her credit, she tried to handle the
situation without judicial intervention, but when that failed and the prospect
of returning to school loomed on the horizon, she properly sought and obtained
a restraining order to protect herself.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]

Dewane
also complains the court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence that is
either irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay, or admitted without a proper
foundation. Specifically, she claims the
court erroneously overruled a relevancy objection to a question regarding
whether Bell advised Lee to obtain a restraining order and questions posed to
Turner about the e-mail he received from Dewane’s friend, exactly how the
police were advised Dewane entered their classroom on August 21, and the nature
of his concerns for his own safety. She also
complains about rulings on questions posed to Tutunjian, one about the reason
she escorted Lee to her car (relevance), another about whether other students
joined them (foundation), and a third regarding a statement she heard from Bell
(hearsay). The last question called for
evidence that was expressly admitted for a nonhearsay purpose. She also claims the court improperly allowed
Lee to testify Bell advised her to obtain a restraining order, the fact a UCI
police officer advised Dewane to not contact her, and to the content of
Dewane’s Facebook posting (hearsay). She
faults the court for overruling counsel’s relevancy objections to an officer’s
testimony she did in fact tell Lee how to obtain a restraining order and to a
question posed to Jeffery about a 2007 divorce proceeding. We find no reason to reverse the judgment
based on the asserted evidentiary errors.

Evidence
Code section 353 provides no verdict, finding, judgment, or decision shall
be set aside unless there was a timely and specific objection at trial, and
“The court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground
stated and that the error or errors
complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Id., subd.
(b), italics added.) “In civil cases, a
miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error. [Citation.]”
(Huffman v. Interstate Brands
Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 692.) Here, the court’s rulings were
well-founded. But even assuming error,
there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable result absent the errors
and nothing which suggests any errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Nor
do we agree with Dewane’s reliance on the First Amendment as a shield against
the judgment. As noted in >Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1409, “The United States Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance.
It is speech on “‘matters of public concern’” that is “at the heart of
the First Amendment’s protection.”
[Citations].’ [Citation.]” Here, as in Brekke, we have a case “‘“wholly without [] First Amendment
concerns . . . .”’”
(Ibid.) Even if the case presented such concerns,
“threatening behavior, however communicated is proscribed under the First
Amendment.” (Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 773.)

>Overbreath of
the Order

Finally,
Dewane argues the court erroneously granted an “order that is overly broad, and
unjustly interferes with [Dewane’s] legitimate business interests” and her
constitutional right of association.
Relying on Califano v. Yamasaki (1979)
442 U.S. 682 and Madsen, supra, 512
U.S. 753, Dewane argues the order is more burdensome than necessary to provide
for Lee’s security. We take her point,
but believe a simple modification cures the problem.

The
trial court ordered Dewane to stay 100 feet away from Lee and to obtain prior
authorization from the school before coming to the UCI campus. In December 2010, she filed a petition for
writ of supersedeas and request for immediate stay in this court. She claimed insufficient evidence supported
the court’s order, and she argued she would suffer irreparable harm to her
reputation and employment without relief.
On January 28, 2011, this court denied the writ, but directed the
superior court to modify its restraining order to add the following
language: “This stay-away order does not
prevent Dawn Dewane from going to the UCI Medical Center.”

According
to Dewane’s declaration in the writ proceeding she provides project management
services and audits clinical human drug and device trials. UCI sponsors many such drug and device trials
and they are conducted at the UCI Medical Center and on the UCI campus. Consequently, Dewane has a legitimate need to
have ready access to the UCI main campus in addition to the medical center to
perform work-related tasks. Furthermore,
no one has explained exactly how Dewane was supposed to obtain permission, nor
are there any assurances she would receive permission in a timely fashion. The blanket prohibition from the UCI campus
unless she somehow obtains prior approval is unnecessarily burdensome to
Dewane’s livelihood. (See >Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 702; >Balboa Island Village, Inc. v. Lemen (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1141, 1160.) The problem, however, is not difficult to
remedy.

Lee
asked for an order prohibiting Dewane from coming within 100 yards of her
person, home, job, and car. Under a box
labeled “other,” she wrote “school, University of California, Irvine.” According to the clerk’s transcript, the
court ordered the “[r]estraining order as requested” following the hearing, but
failed to check the boxes for home, job, or car and added “unless prior
authorization from school” under the other box.
Nothing in the record clarifies how Dewane was to receive prior
authorization had it been requested. It
seems cumbersome at best and impossible at worst to force her to call some
unidentified person in the UCI administration for permission to come on to any
area of the campus. The best solution is
to modify the stay away order by limiting the restrictions having to do with
Lee personally.





DISPOSITION

We
order the trial court to modify its order to comply with the following
restrictions: Dewane must stay 100 yards
away from Lee and her car and not knowingly approach closer than that to either
and she must stay 100 yards away from Lee’s home and worksite. As modified, the order is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal.











BEDSWORTH,
ACTING P. J.



WE CONCUR:







MOORE, J.







ARONSON, J.