CA Unpub Decisions

Mollie W.’s four daughters, ranging in age from four to 15 years old, were declared dependent children of the juvenile court in February 2012 based on sustained allegations that Mollie and the father of the three youngest children had a history of engaging in violent altercations and that Mollie had a history of alcohol abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol. They were released to Mollie with an order for family maintenance services. On May 23, 2012, after Mollie missed another alcohol test, the court sustained a petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387,[1] changed its previous disposition order, removed the children from Mollie’s custody and ordered them suitably placed. Mollie appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence the children’s previous placement (that is, remaining in Mollie’s care and custody) was no longer effective in protecting them. We affirm.

This appeal challenges a summary judgment in a wrongful death action based on alleged medical malpractice in treating a gunshot victim at Long Beach Memorial Medical Center (“the hospital”). The trial court found the hospital immunized itself against respondeat superior liability for any malpractice by the treating physicians by having the patient’s mother sign a printed admission form which included an express acknowledgement that the medical providers were independent contractors and not employees or agents of the hospital. The trial court found no triable issue of fact as to an emergency room nurse because a declaration submitted in opposition to the hospital’s on the standard of care was ruled inadmissible.
The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment accordingly. Though the trial court properly found no triable issue of fact as to the emergency room nurse, we find there are unresolved factual issues in determining whether the admission form was binding so that it terminates the hospital’s liability. For that reason, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Thomas Jonathan Loftin was convicted by a jury of attempted grand theft by false pretense. On appeal Loftin contends the prosecutor improperly excluded African Americans from the jury when exercising peremptory challenges. We affirm.

Defendant Lataz Gray appeals from his conviction of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211[1]), committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).[2] The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of 13 years. Defendant contends the gang enhancement is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree and reverse the enhancement finding.

Cyrus M. Sanai originally sued The U.D. Registry, Inc. (UDR)[1] and its owner, Harvey A. Saltz, in September 2000 for several torts and for violation of statutes regulating consumer credit reporting agencies based on UDR’s negative credit reports following a dispute between Mr. Sanai and his landlord over the amount of rent due for a Newport Beach apartment Mr. Sanai had leased. Notwithstanding more than 12 years of extremely contentious litigation, the case remains unresolved in the trial court.[2] In the most recent episode of this ongoing saga, on April 28, 2011 the trial court declared Mr. Sanai a vexatious litigant and prohibited him, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, from filing in propria persona any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge or justice of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.[3] We reverse that order.

Renee M. Bazar (formerly Shorr) appeals from the judgment entered by the superior court following trial of the property issues remaining after the June 2008 status-only dissolution of her marriage to Alan Shorr. Renee[1] contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in ordering her to reimburse Alan for the cost of her health insurance after April 2010 and in finding she had breached her fiduciary duty to Alan by failing to consent in 2008 to a sale of their community interest in Alan’s investment company that subsequently failed in the economic downturn. In addition, Renee contends the court abused its discretion by failing to order Alan to produce further documents relating to the parties’ assets and Alan’s income and by refusing to continue the trial to allow Renee more time to ensure Alan was not hiding community assets. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Floyd Lockett, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for selling cocaine, with prior prison term, prior serious felony conviction, and prior drug conviction enhancements (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11370.1; Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, 667, subd. (b)-(i)).[1] He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 17 years.
The judgment is affirmed.

Representing herself, as she did during much of the dissolution proceedings in the trial court, Rugenia F. Taylor appeals from the judgment entered after the court struck her response to Clarance Taylor’s petition for dissolution and entered her default. Rugenia[1] contends the court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions, failing to postpone the trial after being advised of her mental health problems and continuing to exercise jurisdiction after the case had been removed to federal court. We affirm.

E.M. (Mother) challenges dispositional orders entered November 27, 2011, in which the juvenile court set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] to select a permanent plan for R.F. (born December 2011). Mother claims the court erroneously denied her reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (b)(6), and failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).[2] We deny the petition.

Defendant Travis Ryan Bonson was charged with committing a lewd and lascivious act upon his daughter, a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)[1] He entered a no contest plea pursuant to an agreement that his sentence would not exceed three years in state prison. The court ordered a diagnosis pursuant to section 1203.03 to aid its assessment of whether defendant, who is a veteran with posttraumatic stress disorder, should be granted probation. (§§ 1170.9, 1203.03.) The court reviewed the psychological report, denied probation, and sentenced defendant to three years in prison. Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court wrongly failed to order a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to section 288.1 and to properly consider his request for probation as a veteran and improperly imposed a fine and fee without determining his ability to pay the charges. We find no error and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lacedric W. Johnson appeals from an order, dated June 11, 2012, which denied his motion to correct an unauthorized sentence. His appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and asks us to independently review the record. Defendant has also submitted a supplemental letter brief asking us to consider two issues. We have examined the entire record in accordance with People v. Wende. For reasons set forth below, we agree with appellate counsel that no arguable issues exist on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

A modification decision.

D.C. appeals from an order continuing him as a ward of the juvenile court and placing him outside his mother’s home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602.) His court-appointed counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), a procedure that is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings (In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 99). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

In this consolidated proceeding, appellant appeals in pro per from the judgment following the trial court’s order sustaining, without leave to amend, respondents’ demurrer to appellant’s second amended complaint. The complaint alleged legal malpractice regarding respondent Hall’s representation of appellant in parole revocation proceedings. Appellant also appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to strike respondent’s memorandum of costs. We affirm both the judgment and the order denying appellant’s motion to strike costs.