CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

A jury found Kent James guilty of three counts each of burglary (counts 1, 3 & 5) and petty theft with a prior (counts 2, 4 & 6) related to three separate shoplifting incidents that occurred in early February 2012. James later admitted various enhancement allegations related to earlier crimes. James appeals, claiming the evidence did not support his convictions on counts 1 and 2 in connection with the first shoplifting incident. We disagree.

Luis F. Perea Carrillo pleaded no contest to transportation of marijuana, in exchange for a grant of probation. The trial court denied his motion to vacate the judgment. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issue and affirm.

Baulknight's sole appellate contention is that the court erred in calculating his presentence conduct credits. (Pen. Code,[1] § 4019.) Specifically, he argues the trial court erred in failing to award him enhanced presentence conduct credits under the current version of section 4019. The contention is without merit and we affirm the judgment.

At the time originally set for sentencing, defense counsel indicated that Villareal may wish to withdraw his plea. Counsel requested, with apparent agreement of the defendant, that the court appoint an additional attorney to investigate possible grounds for a motion to withdraw the plea. Over the prosecutor's objection, the court appointed an additional attorney for the limited purpose of exploring a motion to withdraw Villareal's plea.

Marc Stein brought suit against the City of San Diego (the City) after he tripped over a median while crossing the street and was injured. The City brought a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
Stein appeals, contending the superior court erred in granting summary judgment because the court should have found the City had a duty to provide adequate lighting. We affirm.

A jury convicted Anthony Moats of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)[1] and possession of a forged check (§ 475, subd. (c)). The court sentenced him to eight years in prison. On appeal, Moats contends the court erred by imposing a two-year sentence for an enhancement based on committing the current offense while out on bail on a case that was subsequently dismissed. He also contends the statutory construction of section 4019 and principles of equal protection entitle him to additional presentence custody credits. We conclude the court improperly imposed an additional two-year sentence for an out-on-bail enhancement on a case that was subsequently dismissed, and remand for resentencing. We also conclude that under the rules of statutory construction, the enhanced conduct credit provision of section 4019 applies only to defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011, and section 4019 does not violate principals of equal protection. (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.

Courtney Jean Hood[1] pleaded no contest to three counts of using personal identifying information of another (Pen. Code,[2] § 530.5, subd. (a)) and one count each of burglary (§ 459), grand theft (§ 484g, subd. (a)), acquiring access cards of four or more people (§ 484e, subd. (b)), possessing forged items (§ 475, subd. (a)), possessing completed paper (§ 475, subd. (c)), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Hood probation, conditioned upon her serving 365 days in custody.
Hood appeals, contending we must reverse her conviction and allow her to withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court erroneously denied her pretrial motion to suppress the evidence against her. She additionally requests we independently review the
the transcript of an in camera proceeding conducted by the trial court under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)[3] to determine whether the trial court erred in finding certain police officers' personnel records contained no discoverable information.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Hood's suppression motion. In addition, we have reviewed the transcript of the Pitchess proceeding and conclude the trial court did not err in finding the officers' personnel records contained no discoverable information. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

Defendant Sephora USA, Inc. (Sephora) entered into a contract with plaintiff W2007 La Costa Resort Co., LLC (La Costa) that provided Sephora would hold its 2009 store director conference (SDC) at La Costa's hotel, the La Costa Resort & Spa (the hotel). The contract also provided that, subject to Sephora's right to cancel under a contractual clause (the performance clause), which is the focus of this action, Sephora would also hold its 2010 SDC at the hotel. However, after the 2009 SDC, Sephora canceled the contract for the 2010 SDC at the hotel, citing its right to do so under the performance clause, and La Costa filed this action alleging Sephora breached its contract with La Costa.
The trial court, after hearing conflicting evidence of the etiology of the performance clause, ruled the intent of the clause was to give Sephora the right to cancel the 2010 SDC if it, in the exercise of its sole judgment, was not satisfied with La Costa's performance in connection with the 2009 SDC and believed the deficient performance materially impacted the SDC. However, the court recognized there was evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude Sephora canceled the contract for the 2010 SDC for reasons unrelated to Sephora's judgment as to La Costa's performance in connection with the 2009 SDC. Because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing required that Sephora base its decision to cancel on its dissatisfaction with La Costa's performance at the 2009 SDC, and barred Sephora from using the performance clause as a pretext for canceling the 2010 SDC for reasons unrelated to its judgment as to La Costa's performance at the 2009 SDC, the court adopted a special verdict form that tendered to the jury whether Sephora's cancellation breached the contract with La Costa. The jury found in Sephora's favor, and La Costa appeals.
La Costa contends we must reverse the judgment because the special verdict form deprived the jury of the opportunity to adjudicate La Costa's claim alleging Sephora breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it canceled the 2010 contract. La Costa also appears to contend the trial court's foundational determination--that the intent of the clause was to give Sephora the right to cancel if in the exercise of its sole judgment it was not satisfied with La Costa's performance in connection with the 2009 SDC and believed the deficient performance materially impacted the SDC--is without substantial evidentiary support.

Patricia S., the mother of two-year-old Rolando B., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Patricia contends the court erred when it refused her request for a hearing to demonstrate her bond with Rolando warranted application of the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.

In a prior appeal (Jan. 28, 2013, B238290), we affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant-attorneys’ special motions to strike brought under the statute prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; undesignated section references are to that code.) By way of the present appeal, plaintiff Shumin Zhang challenges the trial court’s subsequent orders awarding defendants their costs and attorney fees. More specifically, she contends that defendants’ memorandum of costs and one of the motions for attorney fees were untimely filed and that the trial court erred in awarding costs to one of the defendants because the costs were not incurred in connection with bringing his anti-SLAPP motion. We conclude that plaintiff’s contentions lack merit and affirm.

Minor J.V. appeals from an order sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] and placing him home on probation. He argues the juvenile court erred in admitting his statements to police. We find no prejudicial error. We strike the maximum period of incarceration and affirm the order as modified.

The trial court dismissed without leave to amend Juliana Olson’s first amended complaint alleging medical malpractice, sustaining a demurrer on the ground that that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Olson appeals, and we affirm.

Michelle B. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s orders denying her petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights as to her son, C.D.[1] We reverse and direct the trial court to grant Mother’s petition and return C.D. to her custody.