CA Unpub Decisions

In this action for specific performance of a stock purchase agreement, defendant and appellant Steve Edelson appeals from the judgment and orders after a court trial awarding specific performance, damages in the amount of $171,567.10, and attorney fees of $252,926.33 in favor of plaintiff and respondent Scott Milano. Edelson contends substantial evidence does not support the order of specific performance and the damages and attorney fees awards were an abuse of discretion. We conclude substantial evidence supports the order of specific performance and the attorney fees award was not an abuse of discretion. We further conclude the damages award was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the damages award and, in all other respects, affirm the judgment and orders.

Defendant and appellant, Sammy Lozano, appeals the denial of his post-judgment motion seeking to reinstate a plea bargain, following his conviction by jury trial for premeditated attempted murder (2 counts), assault with a firearm (2 counts), shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon, with firearm enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, 245, subd. (a)(2), 246, 12021 (former), 12022.53, 12022.5),[1] He was sentenced to life.
The judgment is affirmed with directions.

After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that M.S. (appellant) committed first degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (a).) Based on this finding, appellant was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation with a maximum term of confinement of six years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).) On appeal, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the commission of the robbery.[1] We affirm.

Omar Gonzalez (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a),[1] count 1), attempted murder (§ 187/664, count 3), and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), counts 4, 5), and the trial court sentenced him to 77 years to life in prison. He contends: (1) the court violated his due process rights when it had a deputy stationed by him while he testified in his own defense; (2) the evidence was insufficient to show premeditation and deliberation; and (3) the court erred in refusing to entertain his request to replace his attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We affirm the judgment.

Janet Anderson appeals from a judgment after a court trial in favor of her former employer, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) doing business as Mercy Medical Center (Mercy). Anderson, a registered nurse, sued Mercy for failing to make a reasonable accommodation to allow her to continue working after she developed a serious latex allergy. Mercy contended no reasonable accommodation was possible due to Anderson’s medical restrictions. On appeal, Anderson contends (1) the trial court erred in ruling on pretrial discovery and summary adjudication issues, and (2) the judgment after trial is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Appellant B.C. appeals from an order adjudging his son A.C. a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect] and (j) [abuse of sibling]. He contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction, and (2) the juvenile court erred in considering hearsay evidence.[1] We affirm.

Defendant Mark James Salinas appeals from an order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m) to suppress controlled substances seized from his person during a detention for a possible bicycle light infraction. Defendant contends that his detention was unduly prolonged, resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that the detention was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from an order denying arbitration. The appellants are defendants Abdul Sultan Walji, individually and as trustee of the Stone Lamm Trust, Arista LLC, Calpension, Inc., Reniero Francisco, Cynthia Francisco and Bendisyon, Inc. Other defendants, who did not join in the appeal, are LPL Financial Corporation, Milagros Investments, LLC, and Investment Resource Partners, Inc. The respondents are plaintiffs John R. Carter and Carmen Carter. We affirm the court’s denial of the motions to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c).

Defendant Beatrice Gutierrez and two others were charged with numerous crimes. The trial court severed defendant’s case from that of her co-defendants and, after trial, a jury found her guilty of one count of attempted grand theft and two counts of grand theft, each based on a theory of theft by false pretenses, plus one count of grand theft from an elder. The jury also found the crimes resulted in losses exceeding $100,000. The court sentenced defendant to a five-year, eight-month prison term and ordered her to pay restitution. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence defendant had previously acquired her elderly aunt’s home, property used in the investment schemes underlying some of the charged crimes, by fraudulent means. (Evid. Code, §§ 1101 & 352; all further statutory references are to this code.) We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Cynthia M. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her five children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Mother contends the juvenile court’s finding that the children were likely to be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm the court’s order.

Plaintiffs and appellants Mario Leon, Cesar Culqui, MSC Restaurants, Inc., dba Rumba, Robin Kraemer, David Fansler, Yosemite Ranch Investors, LLC, Michelle Maxwell and William Maxwell (collectively appellants) appeal from an order denying their motion to disqualify opposing counsel. Appellants contend the trial court erred by not recognizing that disqualification was required because opposing counsel improperly communicated with plaintiff Michelle Maxwell (Maxwell) without her attorney’s consent, and in doing so, threatened and intimidated her. We conclude that appellants lacked standing to bring a disqualification motion and affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, on November 7, 2011, appellant, Jose A. Perez, pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count I) and possession of oxycodone for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count II), and admitted allegations that he had suffered a “strike”[1] and that he had served a prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). On December 5, 2011, the court imposed the stipulated sentence of eight years four months, consisting of three years on count II and eight months on count I, each term doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), for a total of seven years four months on the substantive offenses, plus one year on the prior prison term enhancement.
On February 8, 2012, appellant filed a notice of appeal. By its order of July 6, 2012, this court deemed the notice of appeal timely filed. Insofar as the record reveals, appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant, apparently in response to this court’s invitation to submit supplemental briefing, has submitted a brief in which he argues that the court erred by not advising him of the direct consequences of his plea. We affirm.

The People appeal from the grant of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner Julian Barera.[1] In October 1992, Barera was arrested and charged with multiple counts of possession for sale of a controlled substance and faced a possible sentence of over 11 years in prison. On October 22, 1992, Barera pled guilty to one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a maximum possible sentence of 16 months. Barera was represented by counsel at the time of his plea and the trial court advised Barera of his constitutional rights and immigration consequences before accepting the plea. Barera was placed on probation, which included a condition that he be incarcerated for 12 months in the county jail.
On January 26, 2011, Barera filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus that alleged defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) adequately advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, and (2) move to suppress the evidence. The People opposed the writ on substantive and jurisdictional grounds. After an evidentiary hearing at which Barera did not testify, the trial court granted the writ. We will reverse.

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., foreclosed on a trust deed after plaintiff allegedly defaulted on payment of a promissory note. Plaintiff Wilehado T. Cabanilla sued for wrongful foreclosure and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court entered an order granting defendant’s demurrer to a second amended complaint. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the demurrer was sustained.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred because (1) the original promissory note was extinguished by a modified loan agreement; (2) the notice of default on the original promissory note was void; (3) the trustee had no authority to foreclose the trust deed for nonpayment of the original note; (4) the notice of default was in violation of Civil Code section 2923.5[1]; and (5) the foreclosure sale was void, and the court therefore lacked authority to require plaintiff to tender past due payments and to post a bond.
In addition, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to a second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We reverse the judgment from the order granting the demurrer on the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the demurrer on the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.