CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Justin David Johnson pleaded no contest to vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a) & (b)) and resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. Defendant contends: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the reasonableness of the medication probation condition, and (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by imposing a probation condition that was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree that the probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and limit its application to medication prescribed for treatment of any diagnosed mental disorder. As modified, the order is affirmed.

Appellant Mark T. Maynard and respondent Julia S. Maynard were married for over 20 years and had two children.[1] In 2008, the parties separated and Julia filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At issue in the present appeal is the trial court’s May 28, 2010 “Order After Trial On Real Estate Issues,” which divided five pieces of real property acquired by the parties during their marriage, ruled on the valuation of the properties and the parties’ reimbursement claims, and ordered Mark to pay Julia “a net equalizing payment of $127,126.00, payable upon completion of the division of the parties’ remaining property.”
We understand Mark to contend that the May 28, 2010 order should be reversed because the trial court erred in its rulings on property valuation and the reimbursement claims. We also understand Mark to seek review of two additional trial court rulings: the May 15, 2009 denial of his request for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; ADA) and the February 3, 2010 order awarding discovery sanctions against him in the amount of $5,000.
For the reasons stated below, we determine that the orders are either nonappealable or not immediately appealable. We will therefore dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits. We will also deny Julia’s motion for sanctions.

In Global Connector Research Group, Inc. v. Fischer (June 27, 2011, G042673) (nonpub. opn.), we affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment in favor of Global Connector Research Group, Inc. (Global) and against Apex Equity Partners, Inc. (Apex), Belgravia Capital Corporation (Belgravia), and Frank Fischer. We refer to our prior unpublished opinion as Global Connector I. The disposition in Global Connector I was set forth in detail. After remand, the trial court carried out that disposition in a second amended judgment.
In this matter, Fischer alone appeals from the second amended judgment. While he argues at length that the second amended judgment is contrary to the jury verdict, he is really challenging Global Connector I, which long ago became final. Fischer’s appeal borders on the frivolous. We affirm.

Mother appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her two sons, G.C. (born in 2006) and J.C. (born in 2008). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in rejecting the beneficial parent relationship exception to adoption under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).[1] Mother also asserts that the juvenile court violated her substantive due process rights and right to equal protection by refusing to allow her sons to visit her while locally incarcerated. Mother further contends she was deprived of competent representation because her trial attorney did not request in-custody visitation or object to the custody orders.[2] Without filing a separate appellate brief, father joins in and adopts mother’s contentions on appeal to the extent mother’s arguments benefit his interests. We reject mother’s contentions and father’s joinder, and affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendant and appellant R.D. (Father) regarding his son, B.D., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26. On appeal, Father contends: (1) the trial court abdicated its authority under section 366.26, subdivision (n), when it failed to make a decision on B.D’s removal from the paternal grandparents’ home; (2) the relative placement preference in section 361.3 was violated; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to apply the sibling relationship exception. We reject these contentions and affirm.

Defendant Vanesa Michelle Mihajson appeals from her conviction of being an accessory to murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 32.) She contends the trial court erred in (1) denying her motions to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop because the time and scope of the detention exceeded the ostensible basis for the stop; and (2) admitting evidence of her brother’s statements to the police because they were hearsay, they were testimonial, and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause and the principles set forth in People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 (Aranda) and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 (Bruton). We find no error, and we affirm.

Glenn David O’Neal, defendant and appellant (defendant), appeals from the judgment entered when the trial court sentenced him to serve a term of 17 years eight months in state prison after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] and the trial court found true various alleged sentence enhancements.
Defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court violated the due process and double jeopardy clauses in the California Constitution because defendant successfully appealed his first conviction, and the trial court punished defendant more harshly on remand by sentencing him to serve 17 years eight months in prison and by imposing larger restitution and parole revocation fines. Defendant also contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied his request at sentencing to have counsel reappointed to represent him at that hearing.

The district attorney filed a petition in the juvenile court accusing Quincy A. (Minor) of two counts of unlawfully entering a residence of another with the intent to commit theft at a time when the residence was occupied by another (Pen. Code, §§ 460 & 667.5, subd. (c);[1] counts 1 & 2). It was further alleged the Minor committed three counts of petty theft (§ 484; counts 3, 5 & 7) and two counts of entering a building with the intent to commit theft (§ 459; counts 4 & 6).
Following a contested hearing, the court found the allegations contained in counts 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 to be true. The Minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation.
The Minor appeals, contending (1) all counts must be reversed because the videotape evidence was not properly authenticated at trial; (2) the court erred in permitting the introduction of his interview with police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (3) the court failed to make a section 26 finding the Minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct; and (4) the case must be remanded because the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to declare the offenses to be felonies or misdemeanors. We affirm the true findings of the juvenile court, but agree with the Minor's final point and remand this matter with directions to the juvenile court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A jury convicted Nicholas DelReal III of transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possession of 28.5 grams or more of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Pen. Code, § 1203.073, subd. (b)(2)),[1] possession of a short-barreled shotgun (former § 12020, subd. (a)(1)),[2] possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),[3] and possession of Oxycodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). As to the possession of methamphetamine for sale conviction, the jury also found true an allegation DelReal was personally armed with a handgun (§ 12022, subd. (c)). DelReal subsequently admitted having a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced him to 11 years in prison.
DelReal appeals, contending we must reverse his conviction because the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence against him. He further requests we independently review the search warrant to determine whether the affidavit supporting it was properly sealed and whether the affidavit contained information that should have been disclosed to DelReal to ensure he had a fair trial.
We conclude the trial court properly denied DelReal's suppression motion. We further conclude the affidavit supporting the search warrant was properly sealed and nothing in it required disclosure for DelReal to have a fair trial. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Keshawn Lynell Price of carrying a loaded firearm (Pen. Code,[1] § 12031,[2] subd. (a)(1)). In addition, the jury found true the enhancement allegations that Price was not the registered owner of the firearm under section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(F), and that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(C).
The court sentenced Price in the present case along with another unrelated case, No. SCD233723. The court chose case No. SCD233723 to constitute the principal term, imposed the middle term of three years, and increased the term to five years to reflect the street gang enhancement. In the present case, the court imposed one-third the middle term of two years (eight months) to run consecutively with the principal term for a total of five years eight months.
Price appeals the jury's findings regarding his active participation in a criminal street gang, contending there was insufficient evidence to show he had knowledge that members of Skyline Piru (Skyline) and O'Farrell Park (O'Farrell) engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. Additionally, Price appeals his conviction of carrying a loaded firearm, contending there was insufficient evidence that he carried the gun. We conclude there was sufficient evidence of Price's knowledge that Skyline and O'Farrell engaged in a pattern of criminal activity and that he carried the gun on the night in question. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The juvenile dependency court made jurisdictional findings that I.P. (Mother) and E.I. (Father) were abusing narcotics, rendering them incapable of caring for their infant son, E.I. The court entered dispositional orders that included removing E.I. from the family home. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Robert Eric Larson (defendant) appeals from his assault conviction. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues and requesting a court review of the record. On November 21, 2012, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record and finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was charged with one count of assault on Richard Altvater (Altvater) by means likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4).[1] The information also alleged that in the commission of the offense, defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). In addition, the information alleged for purposes of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and the “Three Strikes” law,[2] that defendant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony.
The prosecution’s evidence showed that defendant approached Altvater as he sat on a curb, and then punched him in the face and kicked him, causing multiple fractures of the nose and cheekbones, as well as minor bruises and lacerations on his face and body. A witness saw the attack and called 911.[3] When the police detained defendant shortly afterward he had blood on his hands and clothing.

Plaintiff Carlos M. Rosario, a former physician specialist at Martin Luther King-Drew Medical Center, was discharged in 2009 by his employer, defendant County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services (Department). Plaintiff appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles (Commission). The Commission upheld the Department’s termination decision. Plaintiff sought a peremptory writ of mandate in the superior court for reinstatement and backpay. The trial court denied plaintiff’s writ petition.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the Department denied him a fair hearing under Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly). Plaintiff claims he received inadequate notice of the basis for his termination, and the Department did not consider his written response to its Notice of Intent to Discharge when it made its final termination decision. He also contends his termination was based on protected activity, such as his right to petition for a redress of grievances and his assertion of his constitutional right to remain silent. Additionally, he contends the evidence on which his termination was based was protected by the litigation privilege. Lastly, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding evidence that was favorable to plaintiff.
We affirm, finding that the majority of plaintiff’s claims were never raised either before the Commission or in the trial court, or were inadequately (and sometimes incomprehensibly) addressed on appeal, and therefore cannot be reviewed by this court. Plaintiff’s Skelly claims are cognizable on appeal, but they fail on their merits.

A modification decision.