In re S.P.





















Filed 3/26/13 In re S.P. CA3















NOT TO BE PUBLISHED









California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.







IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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>

In re S. P. , a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G. B., Defendant and Appellant.	C071955 (Super. Ct. No. JD231991)

Appellant
G. B., the mother of the minor S. P., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code,href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
§§ 395, 366.26.) She contends the
trial court’s denial of her request for a continuance of the selection and
implementation hearing was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A
protective custody warrant for the minor was issued in November 2011, 18 days
after she was born. Mother was diagnosed
with schizoaffective disorder, tested positive for marijuana during a prenatal
visit, lost her parental rights of the minor’s half sibling due to domestic
violence with the half sibling’s father, and her mental health problems
prevented her from caring for the minor.
The Sacramento County Department of
Health and Human Services (department) filed a dependency petition later
that month pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), and
the minor was detained soon thereafter.
In December 2011, the department filed an amended petition alleging
mother’s mental health and substance abuse problems, as well as her child
welfare history regarding the minor’s half sibling.

In December
2011, mother was extradited to Las Vegas, Nevada, on an outstanding warrant for
pandering. Mother previously pled guilty
to felony pandering in Nevada, and had been released on her own recognizance
pending sentencing.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"
title="">[2] She was sentenced to prison for a term of 19
to 48 months in March 2012.

The
juvenile court sustained the amended petition and bypassed services pursuant to
section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) in March 2012. The minor was placed with the maternal
cousin.

The July
2012 selection and implementation report noted the minor appeared to be
thriving in the maternal cousin’s care.
The maternal cousin was cleared for criminal record and child welfare
history and was willing to adopt. The
social worker was concerned over whether the maternal cousin, a single mother
of a one and six year old, and a full-time student receiving assistance from
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and one of her children’s fathers,
would be able to meet the financial requirements of the home study. The minor was developmentally on track, and
there were no concerns regarding her emotional or behavioral functioning.

At the
selection and implementation hearing, mother’s counsel said his only concern
was if the maternal cousin “didn’t pass an adoption home study it might be more
appropriate to do guardianship with her since she’s had the child since birth,
so that would be my concern with going forward today.” Counsel stated he would enter general
objections if the juvenile court was prepared to go forward that day.

Regarding
mother’s “suggestion that we should continue or proceed with a goal of legal
guardianship instead of adoption,” the juvenile court found the minor was “very
young” and “imminently adoptable,” rejected the request for a continuance, and
terminated parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Mother’s
sole contention is the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her
request for a continuance.href="#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] We disagree.

The
juvenile court is accorded broad discretion in determining whether to grant a
continuance. (In re Gerald J.
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.) A
continuance may not be granted if it is contrary to the interests of the
minor. (§ 352, subd. (a).) “In considering the minor’s interests, the
court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of
his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable
environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary
placements.” (§ 352, subd.
(a).) “The intent of the Legislature,
especially with regard to young children, is that the dependency process
proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay. [Citations.]”
(Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1151.) “Continuances are discouraged
[citation] and we reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of
an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Ninfa S. (1998)
62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811.)

Mother
asserts good cause for the continuance can be found in the relative caregiver
exception to adoption, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] According to mother, the minor was thriving
in the maternal cousin’s care, and, having lived with her since she was four
and one-half months old, was forming her “primary bonds” with the maternal
cousin. Asserting there was “a very real
possibility that [the maternal cousin] would be unable to adopt” the minor,
mother claims a continuance was necessary to see if the relative caregiver
exception could apply and thus prevent the minor from “being taken from the
only home and only caregiver she had really known and placed with
strangers.”

Mother
overlooks the fact that adoption is the legislatively preferred plan at this
stage of dependency proceedings. (In re
Lorenzo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344.) Where, as here, the minor, a healthy,
developmentally on track infant, is generally adoptable, it was well within the
juvenile court’s discretion to deny a continuance and terminate parental
rights. Mother did not raise the
relative caregiver exception to adoption at the selection and implementation
hearing. She was not entitled to a continuance
attempt to develop an exception to adoption.



DISPOSITION

The
juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.







ROBIE , Acting P.
J.







We concur:







MURRAY , J.







DUARTE , J.