CA Unpub Decisions

These consolidated appeals arise from defendant Maurice P. Hurth’s conviction of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)).[1] In appeal No. A135072, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial after the victim, Hanif Adisa, in violation of an in limine ruling, briefly alluded in his testimony to defendant’s alleged commission of an unrelated “home invasion.” In appeal No. A137357, Hurth contends the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of restitution ordered following revocation of his probation and sentencing. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion and affirm defendant’s conviction and the restitution order.

Defendant David Tobey appeals from his conviction, following jury trial, of cutting a utility line (Pen. Code, § 591)[1] and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). The court placed defendant on formal probation subject to various terms and conditions, including that he “seek and maintain full-time gainful employment and/or vocational training or a combination of those.” He contends the felony vandalism conviction must be reversed because there is no evidence he caused $400 or more of damage. He also contends the employment/training probation condition is unreasonable under the circumstances. We affirm both the conviction and probation condition.

Appellant Mario Alfredo Pacheco was convicted after a jury trial of multiple counts relating to his practice of dentistry without a license. He argues (1) his convictions and sentence violate double jeopardy; (2) his sentence violates Penal Code section 654; (3) the trial court failed to sua sponte deliver a unanimity instruction; and (4) an order of restitution was improper. We affirm.

Defendants Pacific Bay Investments, Inc. (Pacific Bay) and Adam Sparks appeal orders of the trial court denying their petition to compel arbitration and appointing a discovery referee. We shall affirm the order denying defendants’ petition to compel arbitration, and dismiss the appeal from the order appointing a discovery referee.

Yusuf Bey V (Fifth) and Joshua Bey (Joshua), members of Your Black Muslim Bakery in Oakland, admitted involvement with others in crimes against Jane Doe One and Jane Doe Two, including carjacking, kidnapping, and torture, on the night of May 17, 2007. Fifth and Joshua identified defendant Richard Lewis, a short-term Bakery member, as a participant in the crimes, and they were the principal prosecution witnesses against Lewis at his jury trial.
Lewis was convicted by the jury of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) and kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)) Doe Two, and of the following offenses against Doe One: carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)); kidnapping for extortion with bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)); kidnapping for robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)); and torture (Pen. Code, § 206). The jury found true allegations that Lewis committed all of the offenses while armed with a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1).) He was sentenced to: life without the possibility of parole, plus one year for the firearm allegation, for kidnapping Doe One for extortion; a consecutive term of life, plus one year, for torturing Doe One; and a consecutive term of eight years for kidnapping Doe Two.

Appellant Martin M., a minor, contends the juvenile court imposed an unreasonable condition on his probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment against him.

Yvette Trejo appeals from the trial court’s order altering the custody and visitation arrangements for her six-year-old daughter, B., in favor of B.’s father, Omar Raygoza. Trejo contends the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of its own records without specifying which, if any, of those records it relied upon for its ruling. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s conclusion a change in circumstances justified revisiting the existing custody and visitation arrangement and whether the court’s new order was in B.’s best interests. Given the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Plaintiff Mireille Robinson lost $450,000 in a 2006 transaction facilitated by her then attorney, plaintiff John M. Boyko. Mireille passed away on July 31, 2010, but this case proceeded to trial to address the question of who, if anyone, should be held to account to Mireille’s estate for her financial loss.[1]
Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the operative complaint in favor of Boyko and against defendant Patrick R. Millican in the amount of $765,543.99, which represented the initial $450,000 plus interest as specified in a promissory note signed by Millican in favor of Boyko (even though Mireille was the source of the funds). The court stated in a subsequent order that the “[d]amages awarded to Boyko shall be paid to” Mireille. Although the jury found defendant Sailor J. Kennedy took part in tortious wrongdoing that harmed plaintiffs, the judgment does not include an award of damages against Kennedy. With regard to Millican’s cross-complaint against Boyko and Mireille, the court entered judgment in favor of cross-defendants Boyko and Mireille. Millican and Kennedy separately raise numerous contentions of error, but we affirm the judgment as well as various postjudgment orders.

Laguna Terrace Park LLC (Laguna Terrace) appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for a writ of mandate and damages and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (the petition) against the California Coastal Commission (the Commission). The trial court rejected Laguna Terrace’s challenge to the Commission’s determination that it had jurisdiction, under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.; hereafter, the Coastal Act), over Laguna Terrace’s proposed conversion of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership.
Laguna Terrace argues (1) the proposed conversion did not constitute a development within the meaning of the Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106), and was otherwise exempt from the Coastal Act’s requirements under the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, §§ 66410‑66499.37); (2) the Commission wrongfully asserted jurisdiction by considering property beyond the boundaries of the mobilehome park itself; (3) the trial court erroneously failed to grant Laguna Terrace’s requests to augment the record with or take judicial notice of the City of Laguna Beach’s (the City) administrative record; and (4) the court wrongfully denied Laguna Terrace’s request for a statement of decision.
We affirm. After initial briefing had concluded in this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 792 (Pacific Palisades). The Supreme Court rejected the primary argument asserted by Laguna Terrace, here, and held the conversion of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership is a development for purposes of the Coastal Act. The Supreme Court further held that Government Code section 66427.5 of the Subdivision Map Act does not provide an exemption for such a development. (Pacific Palisades, supra, at p. 792.)

In May 2009, appellant, Louie Paul Luera, Jr., pled guilty to unlawful possession of a dagger (Pen. Code,[1] § 12020, subd. (a)(4)), being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364), and giving a false identity to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)), and admitted allegations that he had suffered a “strike”[2] and that he had served three separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In June 2009, the court imposed a prison term of seven years and awarded appellant presentence credits of 164 days, consisting of 110 days of actual time credits and 54 days of custody credits. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and in April 2010, this court, in case No. F058170, affirmed the judgment.[3]
In January 2012, appellant filed a “MOTION TO CORRECT ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT” (credits motion) in which he argued that he was entitled to additional presentence credits. The court denied the motion. The instant appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the court erred in denying his credits motion. Specifically, he argues that the court’s failure to award him presentence conduct credits under the one-for-one credit scheme of the current iteration of section 4019 violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code,[1] § 1538.5), appellant, Steven Ralph Cosovich, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court imposed a prison term of four years eight months.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the court erred in denying the suppression motion. We affirm.

Appellant, Elaine Cory, and respondent, Colleen M. Toscano, are beneficiaries of the Louie Friguglietti Trust (Trust). Louie Friguglietti (Trustor) amended the Trust several times, including handwritten interlineations that reduced Cory’s share of an asset from 100 percent to 25 percent. Following the Trustor’s death, James Wagner, the trustee of the Trust, sent the notice required by Probate Code[1] section 16061.7 to Cory as a Trust beneficiary. Cory was also provided with a copy of the Trust that included the handwritten modification.
Cory filed a petition for construction of the Trust challenging the handwritten interlineations on the grounds that the amendment was invalid and that the Trustor was subjected to undue influence. The trial court ruled that Cory’s petition was barred by the section 16061.8 statute of limitations. The trial court further found that the handwritten interlineations constituted a valid amendment to the Trust and that this amendment was not a product of undue influence.

Petitioner S.W. (mother) asks this court to direct the juvenile court to vacate its order of February 7, 2013, denying her reunification services for her daughter D.W. (child) and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26[1] at which it will determine whether to terminate mother’s parental rights. Mother contends the juvenile court’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below, substantial evidence supports the court’s order based on mother’s mental disability that makes her incapable of benefitting from reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)). Given this conclusion, we need not address mother’s argument that substantial evidence does not support the court’s order based on mother’s failure to address the problems that led to the removal of seven previous children (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11)). We therefore deny mother’s petition.

On July 6, 2011, an information was filed against defendant and appellant Ruben Avalos[1] involving three victims. As to Jane Doe 1, defendant was charged with five counts of engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse or sodomy with a person 10 years of age or younger. (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a), counts 1-5.) As to Jane Doe 2, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in oral copulation or sexual penetration (§ 288.7, subd. (b), count 6), and two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act (§ 288, subd. (a), counts 7 & 8). As to Jane Doe 3, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse or sodomy with a person 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a), count 9), and two counts of engaging in oral copulation or sexual penetration (§ 288.7, subd. (b), counts 10 & 11).
On August 2, 2012, jury voir dire commenced. However, on August 7, 2012, prior to the completion of jury selection, a negotiated disposition was reached. By stipulation of the parties, six counts of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), (committing a lewd act on a child using force or violence), were added: counts 12 and 13 as to Jane Doe 1; counts 14 and 15 as to Jane Doe 2; and counts 16 and 17 as to Jane Doe 3. Defendant pled guilty to counts 12 through 17, in exchange for stipulated sentence of 46 years in state prison and the dismissal of the balance of the charges.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied probation. The trial court then sentenced defendant to the agreed term of 46 years in state prison. Count 12 was deemed the principal count, and defendant was sentenced to the upper term of eight years on that count. Consecutive upper terms of eight years were imposed on counts 13 through 16, and a consecutive midterm of six years was imposed on count 17. The trial court awarded defendant 676 days of custody credits under section 2933.1. The court imposed a $200 restitution fine under section 1202.4, and a $200 parole revocation fine under section 1202.45, suspended pending successful completion of parole. The court also ordered defendant to register under section 290.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and Appellate Defendants, Inc., filed a timely amended notice.