CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Steven Anthony Denton pled no contest to arson in exchange for dismissal of an on-bail/own recognizance allegation as well as dismissal of case No. CR02911X (felony vandalism). The court granted probation for a term of five years and ordered defendant to register as an arson offender.
Defendant appeals. A certificate of probable cause was obtained. Defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea and enter judgment because there was a doubt as to his competence. We disagree and affirm.

A jury found defendant Robert Lars Farmer guilty of burning an inhabited structure or property. (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b).)[1] A count of attempted arson of a structure (§ 455) was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to prison for the upper term of eight years.
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence of burning, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. We affirm.

Appellant Ar.J., father of the minors A.J. and An.J., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395.)[1] He contends the juvenile court improperly denied reunification services based on a flawed finding of severe sexual abuse. Ample evidence of severe sexual abuse was presented at the jurisdictional hearing and the juvenile court correctly relied on this evidence in making its dispositional findings and orders. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Gerardo Duenas guilty of corporal injury upon a child and felony child abuse of his three-year-old daughter, B. In a trial to the court, defendant was found to have two prior strike convictions. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 25 years to life on each count.[1]
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) admitting evidence of two uncharged acts of domestic violence by him against his wife, I.; and (2) admitting expert testimony regarding victim abuse. We reject both contentions.

Plaintiffs Jean-Marc and Jennifer Landau sued several defendants involved in the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Landaus’ property. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. On appeal from the resulting judgment, we find no error and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Carlos Ojeda of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found that he used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years to life in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 [defendant’s flight], because defendant did not hide, but merely left the scene of the shooting and went home; (2) the trial court failed in its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 358 [evidence of defendant’s statements]; and (3) defendant is entitled to an additional day of presentence custody credit.
Defendant’s contentions lack merit. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Barbara Jean Moore guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, battery on a peace officer, resisting an officer, and public intoxication, but found not true the allegation that she personally inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court placed defendant on probation for three years, ordering her to serve 90 days in county jail.
Defendant appeals, claiming her conviction for assault with a deadly weapon must be reversed due to instructional error. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Cody James Roush guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a); counts one and two)[1] and found true allegations defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the assaults (§12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison, consisting of 4 years on count one, a consecutive 1 year (one-third the middle term) on count two, and a consecutive 3 years on each of the great bodily injury enhancements. Immediately thereafter, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69) in an unrelated matter in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges, and the trial court sentenced him to 8 months in state prison on each count to run consecutive to the term imposed on the assaults, for an aggregate prison term of 12 years and 4 months.
Defendant, who represented himself at trial and sentencing, appeals, contending the trial court erred in failing to conduct a second competency hearing to determine his competence to stand trial, allowing him to represent himself without considering whether he was competent to do so, and imposing a full three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement on the second assault. He also asserts the prosecutor prejudicially erred by appealing to the jury’s passions and asking the jury to draw inferences based on defendant’s self-representation.
We shall conclude the trial court erred in imposing a full three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement appended to count two, modify the judgment to reflect defendant was sentenced to one year (one-third the middle term) for that enhancement, for an aggregate term of 10 years and 4 months in state prison and affirm the judgment as modified.

Plaintiff Shari Dugodansby appeals from the order dismissing her personal injury complaint against Team Islander, LLC and its owners, Bruce Hopper, Derrol Elliott and Daniel Boyle (collectively, defendants). Defendants’ demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on the ground Business and Professions Code section 25602[1] precludes plaintiff’s claim against them for injuries caused when an intoxicated guest drove away from their premises and subsequently injured plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in applying Business and Professions Code section 25602, because she styled her complaint against defendants solely as a claim for damages arising from defendants’ operation of a “disorderly house”[2] in violation of sections 25601 and 24200, subdivisions (e) and (f), and Penal Code section 316. (See fns. 4, 5 and 6, post.)
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jaudohn Ansar Pinkney of first degree residential burglary in concert, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, battery causing serious bodily injury, and robbery. The jury found that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, Roberto Hernandez. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate of 12 years in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) in connection with the robbery conviction, the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aider and abettor liability, because the prosecution did not rely on that theory; (2) defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object when the trial court made a dual use of Hernandez’s great bodily injury to impose upper terms and sentence enhancements; and (3) there was insufficient evidence of defendant’s ability to pay the jail booking and classification fees, and no evidence of the actual administrative costs associated with his arrest and booking to support the imposition of a fee for those costs.
We conclude (1) although the trial court should not have included a sentence pertaining to the natural and probable consequences doctrine in its instructions, it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result had that sentence not been included; (2) defendant has not shown that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (3) defendant forfeited his fee claims by failing to object in the trial court.
We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant George Lee Jones of driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)[1]; count one), driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or more and causing bodily injury (§ 23153, subd. (b); count two), driving without a valid driver’s license, a misdemeanor (§ 12500, subd. (a); count three), driving while his driver’s license was suspended or revoked, a misdemeanor (§ 14601.2, subd. (a); count four), and leaving the scene of an injury accident (§ 20001, subd. (a); count five). The jury found defendant’s blood alcohol content was .15 percent or more (§ 23578) and he caused personal injury to four people (§ 23558).
In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found defendant had previously been convicted on three separate occasions of driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and/or with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or more, had previously been convicted four times of driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, and had previously served five separate prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 12 years 8 months.

A jury found defendant Tuan Huy Tran guilty on one count of sexual penetration by a foreign object of an unconscious victim. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred by denying the defense motion to dismiss or to impose sanctions against the prosecution for destroying material evidence; (2) the trial court erred by dismissing Juror No. 2 and Juror No. 8 for misconduct; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying the first and second motions for mistrial based on the jury’s failure to reach a verdict. As none of the contentions has merit, we affirm.

Petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) petitions for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate orders compelling the Department to produce 16 documents from the confidential prison files of certain inmates subpoenaed by Real Party in Interest William Nathan Austin (Austin). As explained below, we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Defendant and appellant Isam Smith challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Defendant pled no contest to a charge of possession for sale of cocaine base following the denial of his motion, and argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the recovery of the cocaine because it was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion and therefore affirm.