CA Unpub Decisions

David J. Pasternak, a court-appointed receiver in this marital dissolution action, appeals from the court’s order denying him the full amount of receivership fees he requested. We reverse the order to the extent it denies Pasternak any fees for successfully defending a prior appeal in this action and for finalizing a court-ordered sale of property. In all other respects, we affirm.

Jose C. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court for resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer and unlawfully possessing marijuana. He contends the evidence against him should have been suppressed because it was discovered as a result of an unlawful detention. We affirm.

Appellant Isidro L. appeals from the judgment entered following the juvenile court’s finding he was a minor in possession of a firearm and ordering him home on probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 29610). Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed a firearm. We affirm.

Defendants and appellants City of Torrance (hereafter City), John Neu and Ross Bartlett appeal from the judgment of the trial court entered January 27, 2012, granting plaintiff and respondent John Brumbaugh’s second petition for writ of mandate and ordering the City, his former employer, to provide him a further hearing on his request for reinstatement as a police officer. This is the third appeal plaintiff has filed in his effort to obtain reinstatement. The two previous appeals were decided in unpublished opinions issued by Division Two of this court. Those related appeals, both titled John Brumbaugh v. City of Torrance et al. (Sept. 16, 2008, B202117) and (Sept. 15, 2009, B210529), arose from writ proceedings in superior court case No. BS097255. We take judicial notice of those unpublished decisions. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 37, fn. 2.)[1] This appeal arose from a supplemental writ petition and related claims in superior court case No. BS116891, by which plaintiff sought to enforce the mandamus judgment entered in the earlier filed case, which we shall refer to as the 2007 Judgment.

Defendant Alexei Fajardo appeals from the judgment entered following the jury verdict finding him guilty of making a criminal threat.[1] (Pen. Code, § 422.)[2] He was sentenced to 16 months in state prison. His sole contention is the conviction is not supported by the evidence. He urges that, at best, he is guilty of attempting to make a criminal threat and the judgment must be amended accordingly. We conclude the conviction is supported by substantial evidence and affirm the judgment.

The Cassady family has been mired in strife over the distribution of Dorothea Cassady’s estate for 24 years.[1] Complicating matters, Dorothea’s oldest son, Ralph, the trustee of the Dorothea J. Cassady Trust, lent money to his two brothers Michael and Peter. Those loans had not been repaid when Michael died in 2001, leaving his wife Constance as successor to his interest in the trust, or before Peter declared bankruptcy in 2009. The probate court denied Ralph’s petition for repayment of these loans from sums that were part of the final distribution of Dorothea’s estate to Constance and the bankruptcy trustee for Peter’s estate on grounds including the trust contained a spendthrift provision. We affirm.

Samuel Lee Persons was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and torture and sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 61 years to life. On appeal Persons contends the trial court misstated the People’s burden of proof in response to an objection during closing argument and improperly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and torture. He also contends the prosecutor misstated the law of provocation in closing argument. We affirm.

Darrell Rucker, Sr. was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing Malcolm Youngblood. He appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed and that the trial court erred in finding that he had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication. He also seeks review of the court’s ruling in response to his request to discover personnel records of various police officers. We find that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he had suffered a prior juvenile adjudication but otherwise affirm.

Defendant and appellant Edwin Omar Garcia (defendant) was convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. (Pen. Code, former § 12020, subd. (a)(4)[1]). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, failing to instruct the jury on intent to conceal, ordering that he be restrained during trial, imposing a prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), failing to instruct the jury about lawful, transitory or momentary possession of the dirk or dagger, admitting into evidence defendant’s three prior convictions for impeachment purposes, and instructing the jury under CALCRIM 226, as modified. Defendant also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the knife recovered on his person was a dirk or dagger, the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct by presenting false and misleading information and argument, and he is entitled to additional days of custody credit. In addition, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Pitchess motion as to one law enforcement officer, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the in camera hearing regarding a second law enforcement officer to determine whether it discloses error by the trial court.
We order that defendant’s abstract of judgment be corrected to provide that he is entitled to additional custody credits. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

Joe Tamas was injured when his car collided with a parked motor grader owned by T.L. Pavlich Construction, Inc. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Pavlich Construction, Tamas moved for a new trial on the ground jurors had engaged in misconduct by using toy cars to reenact the accident. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

Dorian Carter, daughter of decedent Eugenia Ringgold, appeals the denial of her ex parte application to vacate a series of orders made in the probate case involving Ringgold’s will. We dismiss the appeal because Carter, as a disinherited child, lacks standing to appeal issues relating to the administration of the estate.

Defendants Demoria Randolph Jackson and Devin Caress Murphy appeal from the judgments entered following their convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, with findings that each defendant and a principal personally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death to the victims and that the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.[1] (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)[2] After a court trial, each defendant was found to have suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d) (collectively, the “Three Strikes” law), and 667, subdivision (a). Each defendant was sentenced to 119 years to life.
Defendants contend their speedy trial rights were violated, heavy police presence in the courtroom denied them a fair trial, and they are entitled to additional presentence custody credits. Jackson also alleges the prosecutor’s excessive use of his gang moniker and the admission of Murphy’s out-of-court statements denied him a fair trial, the trial court’s failure to admit exculpatory hearsay statements denied him a right to present a defense, and cumulative error warrants a new trial. Murphy urges that if the judgments are affirmed, liability under the court’s direct restitution order must be made joint and several.[3]
We will direct the superior court to amend each defendant’s abstract of judgment and, as modified, affirm.

R., a child fathered by appellant N.H. (Father), is one of two siblings who were the subject of a July 2010 dependency petition, alleging neglect due to their mother’s drug abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] § 300, subds. (b) & (g).) R. was found to be a dependent of the court, and her mother’s parental rights were terminated by order of April 22, 2011. Father’s whereabouts were initially unknown, but in August 2011, he was located overseas by the Solano County Health and Social Services Department (Agency) and granted six months of reunification services by the court. After a status hearing at which Father was present and testified, the juvenile court issued a detailed written order finding the services provided to Father were reasonable, denying him additional services, concluding R.’s return to Father would be detrimental to her, and scheduling a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
On April 8, 2013, Father filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in this court seeking an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order and restore reunification services. Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding he was provided reasonable reunification services and in terminating those services after six months. The factual circumstances underlying Father’s claims of error are known to the parties and are summarized in Father’s “Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ and Stay of Proceedings.”

S. M., the father of I. M., age 4, and M. P. II, age 3, (collectively, the children) petitions this court to set aside the juvenile court’s order setting a permanent plan hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. He contends that the court erred in terminating reunification services. We deny the petition.