CA Unpub Decisions

Joshua C. appeals from a dispositional order in proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Joshua C. did not respond to our invitation to file a supplemental brief. After having independently reviewed the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

Richard Schulman appeals from a judgment dissolving his marriage to Lynn Schulman. He raises numerous contentions relevant to the court's rulings on child custody, attorney fees, and spousal support. Relevant to child custody, he argues the trial court erroneously (1) granted Lynn's motion to quash subpoenas he issued to the parties' marriage counselor and (2) excluded testimony on hearsay grounds. Concerning attorney fees, he contends the court erred at the conclusion of trial by (1) ordering him to pay an additional $20,000 to Lynn for her attorney fees, and (2) declining to order Lynn to refund $4,500 he had paid to her under an earlier attorney fees award. With respect to spousal support, he asserts the court (1) failed to consider the required statutory factors, (2) violated a stipulation between the parties not to consider Lynn's debt, and (3) used an incorrect separation date.
We conclude there was no reversible error and affirm the judgment.

Roderick Johnson pleaded guilty to corporal injury on his girlfriend resulting in a traumatic condition. The trial court sentenced him to the middle term of three years in prison. He appeals, contending his sentence should be reversed because: (1) the trial court improperly relied on the victim's unsworn statements at the sentencing hearing and to the probation officer; and (2) the trial court denied him his right to allocution and to present evidence on his own behalf. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Dwayne Coleman Carter was charged with 13 counts of various theft and conspiracy offenses, and was represented by appointed counsel, when he entered into a plea agreement in July 2012. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.) In exchange for an indicated sentence of six years four months, Carter pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree residential burglary (counts 2 & 3), and to unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle with an enhancement for a prior conviction (count 4). (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 459/460 & 667.5(c)(21); 459; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); § 666.5, subd. (a).)
At the next two hearings, Carter's requests to withdraw his guilty plea, for a continuance to retain private counsel, or alternatively, to replace appointed counsel[2] or to allow him to represent himself at sentencing, were denied. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) Carter was sentenced according to the plea bargain. He requested and received a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. (§ 1237.5.)

Eighteen individuals (plaintiffs) filed a superior court complaint against Darbun Enterprises, Inc. (Darbun) seeking recognition of a 2004 Mexican judgment that was renewed in July 2008. The court sustained Darbun's demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the Mexican judgment is a "penalty" and thus not enforceable under California's Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act ("Foreign-Country Judgments Act" or "Act"). (Code Civ. Proc., § 1713 et seq.)[1]
The Foreign-Country Judgments Act does not permit enforcement of a foreign judgment "to the extent" the judgment is a "fine or other penalty." (§ 1715, subd. (b)(2).) We determine the court erred in ruling at the pleadings stage that the entire Mexican judgment is a "penalty" as a matter of law and thus unenforceable in California. Although a substantial portion of the Mexican judgment constitutes a penalty, plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to overcome the Act's enforcement bar with respect to the remaining portions of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse.[2]
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In reviewing the court's ruling sustaining the demurrer, we are limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint and the attached incorporated documents. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) In its respondent's brief, Darbun discusses numerous facts that are beyond the scope of the complaint and are unsupported by any citation to the appellate record. Under settled rules, we disregard these unsupported factual assertions. (See Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)

Mariana R. obtained a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) against her stepsister, Sandy A., after Sandy and one of Sandy's friends confronted Mariana at Mariana's school and threatened Mariana with bodily harm. Sandy appeals, contending we must reverse the order because the court erroneously excluded recorded remarks of a percipient witness stating she and Mariana lied about the incident. More particularly, Sandy contends the remarks were admissible as statements against interest under Evidence Code section 1230 and were not more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. We conclude the court did not err in excluding the recorded remarks and affirm the order.

The Costa Del Sol at Carmel Valley Homeowners Association (Association) brought an action against homeowners Scott and Mary Mitchell, alleging their dogs created a dangerous situation in and near the residential development. The Association asserted claims for breach of equitable servitude, public and private nuisance, and violation of a statute providing remedies when a dog has bitten a human being (Civ. Code, § 3342.5). The Mitchells filed a cross-complaint, but the court dismissed this pleading after granting the Association's anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The Mitchells did not appeal from the anti-SLAPP order.

After defendant Jennifer Michelle Trayers[1] suspected her husband, Frederick Trayers (Dr. Trayers), was having an extramarital affair and then confirmed her suspicion by reading his e-mail correspondence with his girlfriend, Jennifer killed him with a knife as they lay in bed by stabbing him numerous times. When the police forcibly entered the Trayers' home, they found Dr. Trayers dead on the bedroom floor on one side of the bed, and Jennifer, who was close to death with numerous lacerations later determined to be self-inflicted, on the floor on the other side of the bed near a military-style knife.
A jury convicted Jennifer of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[2] § 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation that she personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) in committing the murder within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The court sentenced her to an aggregate prison term of 16 years to life.
Jennifer appeals her conviction based on three contentions. First, she contends the court deprived her of her federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by erroneously admitting evidence of her own extramarital affair, which she asserts was irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence the court should have excluded under Evidence Code sections 1101, 1102, and 352. Second, Jennifer contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of second degree murder because no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that she killed her husband with malice rather than in the heat of passion, and thus there is no substantial evidence she committed any crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. Last, she contends the prosecutor misstated the law and committed prosecutorial misconduct during her closing arguments by arguing that the degree of provocation required to reduce the unlawful killing of her husband to voluntary manslaughter was provocation that would cause a reasonable person to kill, thereby lowering the People's burden of proof in violation of her due process right to a fair trial. We affirm Jennifer's conviction of second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we note defendant Richard Lee Spoonmore[1] is entitled to presentence credit and shall affirm the judgment as modified. We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A.H., the mother of four-year-old N.H. and one-year-old I.H., appeals from a juvenile court order denying her request to change court order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (388 petition), and also appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. In addition, D.J., the biological father of I.H., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.)[1] E.G., the alleged father of N.H. and the uncle of D.J., is not a party to this appeal.
As a threshold matter, respondent Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) contends A.H. (mother) and D.J. (father) failed to appeal the order denying their 388 petition, because they did not check the pertinent box on the notice of appeal. We conclude, however, that because mother and father submitted a letter with their notices of appeal providing additional information, and notices of appeal are entitled to liberal construction in favor of sufficiency, the letter and notices of appeal are sufficient.
Turning to the contentions of mother and father, mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her 388 petition. Father joins mother’s arguments, arguing that if mother is successful, the order against father must be reversed too. Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the juvenile court orders.[2]

D.H., Sr. (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] He contends insufficient evidence supports the predicate finding that the minor, D.H., Jr. (the minor), is adoptable. We shall affirm.

Shannon S., mother of 12-year-old Dylan M., appeals from the order of the juvenile court sustaining the petition, adjudging the minor a dependent, and ordering placement out of the home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 355, 356, 358, 395.)[1] Mother argues that the jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g) (hereafter section 300(g)) and the dispositional order are not supported by substantial evidence and that failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) compels reversal. The Department of Health and Social Services (Department) has conceded the ICWA notice error and we reverse to permit compliance with the ICWA. We further conclude the juvenile court did not properly consider whether the provisions of section 300(g) were satisfied at the time of the jurisdictional hearing and reverse to permit the juvenile court to apply the proper standards in evaluating whether the minor comes within the provisions of section 300(g).

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
In case No. 12F07052, a first amended complaint charged defendant Cody Keith Garland with making criminal threats (count one; Pen. Code, § 422),[1] violating a protective order (count two; § 166, subd. (c)(1)), and brandishing a deadly weapon (count three; § 417, subd. (a)(1)). All counts were alleged to have occurred on or about October 1, 2012. Defendant was also alleged to have served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In case No. 12F07057, a first amended complaint charged defendant with unlawfully taking or driving a motor vehicle (counts one, three, & five; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); receiving a stolen vehicle (counts two, four, & six; § 496d, subd. (a)); receiving stolen property (count seven; § 496, subd. (a)); and passing a fraudulent check (count eight; § 476). Counts one and two were alleged to have occurred on or about and between August 27 and September 2, 2012; counts three and four were alleged to have occurred on or about and between August 7 and September 8, 2012; counts five and six were alleged to have occurred on or about and between October 24 and October 26, 2012; count seven was alleged to have occurred on or about and between August 29 and October 26, 2012; and count eight was alleged to have occurred on or about October 26, 2012. The same prior prison terms were alleged as in case No. 12F07052.

Appointed counsel for defendant Aric Raymond Sands has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant has filed a supplemental brief seeking additional credit. We shall affirm the judgment.