CA Unpub Decisions

P.G. (mother) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition seeking to have J.F., her four-year-old, placed with her or to grant her further family reunification services with unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court denied the petition and terminated mother’s parental rights to J.F. pursuant to section 366.26.[2] Mother appeals, and we affirm.

P.G. (mother) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition seeking to have J.F., her four-year-old, placed with her or to grant her further family reunification services with unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court denied the petition and terminated mother’s parental rights to J.F. pursuant to section 366.26.[2] Mother appeals, and we affirm.

S.J. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her son, J.O., based on her failure to reunify with him or establish that she had developed a beneficial parental relationship with him, the termination of which would be detrimental to him. We hold that because there was insufficient evidence to show that mother had developed a beneficial relationship with J.O., and because the juvenile court acted within its discretion in concluding that termination would not be detrimental to J.O., the court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights. We therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Stockwell, Harris, Widom, Woolverton & Muehl, a California professional corporation (the Stockwell firm), and three of its members, George Woolverton, Steven Harris and Edward Muehl (collectively Defendants), challenge an order denying their motion to reopen discovery. They contend our decision in a series of consolidated writ proceedings involving discovery matters and a motion in limine will result in a new trial so as to automatically reopen discovery with a new discovery cutoff date under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020.[1] They also contend, in the alterative, the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to reopen discovery on limited issues.
We conclude that our decision on pretrial matters involving discovery disputes and a motion in limine did not automatically reopen discovery, but the denial a discretionary reopening in these circumstances was an abuse of discretion. We therefore will grant the petition.

Angelica C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s May 29, 2013 jurisdictional and dispositional orders, contending that substantial evidence does not support the court’s order declaring minor Daniel T. II a dependent of the court pursuant to paragraph b-3 of the petition alleged under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) based on Mother’s alleged drug use.[1] She also contends that the court abused its discretion in making a dispositional order requiring her to submit to random drug testing. Mother does not appeal from the orders sustaining other allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b). Daniel T. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
We conclude that because Mother’s drug use was remote in time and had no causal nexus to substantial risk of serious harm to the minor, the jurisdictional order based on Mother’s alleged drug use is not supported by substantial evidence. We also conclude that the court abused its discretion in requiring Mother to submit to random drug testing. We reverse only as to the challenged jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

In the underlying action, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of making criminal threats pursuant to a plea agreement, and was sentenced in accordance with the terms of that agreement. His court-appointed counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant S.C. (mother) is the mother of three minor children, H.F. born in 1995, S.F. born in 1998, and B.C., born in 2011. Her two older children have the same father, J.F., and B.C.’s father is M.Z.
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition order removing custody of B.C. from her. According to mother, there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings based on her conduct and insufficient evidence to support the order removing B.C. from her.
We hold that because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based on the conduct of the children’s fathers are not challenged on appeal, they are sufficient to support the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency court jurisdiction over the children, and therefore we need not address mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings as to her. We further hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the disposition order removing B.C. from mother. We therefore affirm the jurisdictional findings and disposition order.

Mother Yolanda M. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her request for a contested hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] and terminating her parental rights over her eight-year-old son Manuel. We affirm.

Rhonda S. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court asserting dependency jurisdiction over her two daughters, T.F. and T.J., and removing them from her custody. Mother contends insufficient evidence supported the jurisdiction and disposition orders. We affirm the orders.

Defendant and appellant Ulises Orona (defendant) was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)[1]). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Roberto A. (“father”) is the father of the male infant, A.A. After federal authorities found child pornography on father’s computer, mother voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Father did not and appeals the court’s jurisdictional findings made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions[1] Code section 300, subdivision (d). He contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that his son was at substantial risk of being sexually abused, as required by subdivision (d). We sustain the court’s findings and orders.

Defendant Oscar Jovel was charged by information with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), as well as deadly weapon allegations (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant timely appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence.
We appointed appellate counsel to represent him. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) in which no issues were raised. The brief included a declaration from counsel that she reviewed the record and sent a letter to defendant explaining her evaluation of the record. Counsel further declared that she advised defendant of his right, under Wende, to submit a supplemental brief. Defendant did not file any supplemental brief with this court.
The jury trial took place over three days, and the testimony revealed the following facts: On September 13, 2012, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Jose Beltran was walking in the Koreatown neighborhood of Los Angeles, on his way home from work. He was approached by two men and a woman, on the corner of 8th Street and Berendo Street. Beltran identified defendant as one of the men who approached him.
The woman asked Beltran if he had any cigarettes. Beltran said that he did not have any, but defendant asked him, again, whether he had any cigarettes. Defendant then tried to grab Beltran’s cell phone, but Beltran held onto it, and the two struggled over the phone. Eventually, defendant was able to take the phone’s headphones from Beltran. Defendant handed the headphones to the other man, who tried to return the headphones to Beltran. However, defendant then stabbed Beltran in the side, and the headphones were not returned to him. The three people walked over to a nearby apartment building, and Beltran called police. Beltran testified that his attacker did not have any tattoos.

This appeal arises from a former employee’s action alleging breach of a written employment agreement by the act of terminating employment. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the employment agreement allowed the defendant employer, a private church school, to terminate the employee with or without cause. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and certain members of its board of trustees. Plaintiff former employee appeals. We affirm.

Appellant Rafael Meza was convicted of sex and sodomy with a child under age 10 in violation of Penal Code[1] section 288.7, subdivision (a), continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of section 288.5, subdivision (a) and aggravated sexual assault of a child (sodomy) in violation of section 269, subdivision (a)(3). The trial court sentenced appellant to 65 years to life in prison, plus a determinate term of 16 years in prison.
Appellant appeals, contending the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting his interviews with police. Respondent contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect appellant’s actual conviction on count 4 and the correct number of days of presentence custody credits. We correct the abstract of judgment and affirm the conviction on all other grounds.