S.W. v. Super.
Filed 5/2/13 S.W. v. Super.
Ct. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication
or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
S.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Real
Party in Interest.
E058034
(Super.Ct.No.
RIJ114244)
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for
Phillip Malisos for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Pamela J. Wall, County Counsel and
Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner S.W. (mother) asks this
court to direct the juvenile court to vacate its order of February 7, 2013,
denying her reunification services for
her daughter D.W. (child) and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions
Code, section 366.26
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] at which it will determine
whether to terminate mother’s parental rights.
Mother contends the juvenile court’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence. As discussed
below, substantial evidence supports the court’s order based on mother’s mental
disability that makes her incapable of benefitting from reunification services
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)). Given this
conclusion, we need not address mother’s argument that substantial evidence
does not support the court’s order based on mother’s failure to address the
problems that led to the removal of seven previous children (§ 361.5, subd.
(b)(11)). We therefore deny mother’s
petition.
Family
Maintenance – March to July 2012
On March 7, 2012, the Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a section 300 petition
alleging mother’s mental health issues and history of failure to regularly take
her prescribed medication prevented her from providing regular care to the
child. The petition also alleged mother
failed to reunify with seven previous children, has a history of abusing
controlled substances, has a criminal history for battery, assault and drug charges,
and has a history of engaging in domestic violence with the child’s father.
In the detention report filed March 7, 2012, DPSS recommended the juvenile court allow mother to retain custody
of the child and to provide her with family maintenance services. Mother had been staying at a sober living
home for the previous few weeks and it was reported that she was not taking her
medications and was constantly cussing and screaming at the child and “saying
scary things†to her like calling her the anti-Christ and telling people the
child needed to be “exercised.â€
At the
but permitted the child to remain in mother’s custody.
In the jurisdiction and disposition
report filed April
13, 2012, DPSS recommended the child remain
with mother on family maintenance. At
the jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on May 24, 2012, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, granted
family maintenance services to mother and denied reunification services to the
father.
Supplemental
Petition and Detention – July 2012
On July 17, 2012, DPSS filed a supplemental dependency petition under section 387,
in which it alleged mother was not taking her medications and “may be suffering
from delusions and hallucinations.†In
the detention report filed on that date, the social worker reported receiving a
referral from a person, who did not want to be identified, at mother’s new
sober living home. The referent told the
social worker that mother was not taking her medications, was acting crazy and
delusional, was making threats to hurt people, and said she was getting
messages to kill the child. The child
was removed from mother and placed in foster care. At the detention hearing held on July 18, 2012, the juvenile court ordered the child detained.
The jurisdiction/disposition hearing
was set for August
13, 2012.
In the report prepared for that hearing, DPSS recommended offering
mother reunification services. However,
mother’s counsel asked for a contested jurisdiction hearing on the supplemental
petition, which the court then set for September 11. In the addendum report filed for the
September 11 hearing, DPSS changed its recommendation, asked the court to deny
mother reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The reason for the changed recommendation was
that mother was not cooperating in obtaining a medication evaluation. This was important because mother’s therapist
stated mother could not benefit from reunification services until she first
addressed her mental health issues.
Mother’s mental health had deteriorated since the previous hearing, but
mother was not cooperating in efforts to stabilize her mental health.
On September 11, 2012, the juvenile court ordered mother to participate in two
psychological evaluations. The hearing
was continued to October 24.
Mother participated in two
psychological evaluations, both on October 1, 2012. Edward J. Ryan, Ph.D., prepared a report
dated October
9, 2012.
Dr. Ryan reported that mother cooperated only minimally with the
evaluation process, and that she presented as paranoid and delusional, with
poor insight and judgment. Mother told
Dr. Ryan she was not taking any medications.
The evaluation showed that mother functions “in the borderline range of
intelligence,†that is, about in the bottom 10 percent, which would limit, but
not completely rule out, her ability to benefit from services. Dr. Ryan concluded: “It is my opinion that
the level of pathology of her mental health issues is such as to preclude any
possibility of her benefitting from reunification services.â€
Robert L. Suiter, Ph.D., Psy.D.,
filed a report consistent with that of Dr. Ryan. During the evaluation, mother stated that she
was not taking any psychotropic medications.
Mother was “minimally cooperative†and her insight and judgment were
poor. Mother displayed overt
paranoia. Dr. Suiter administered to
mother a personality test, known as Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2 (MMPI-2). Mother asked many
questions during the test and took a very long time to complete it, but left
about 20 percent of the questions unanswered, which made the test results
unusable. Based on his interview with
mother, Dr. Suiter determined that mother was paranoid, delusional and
confused, with no insight into her mental illness or the reasons the child and
previous children had been removed from her care. Dr. Suiter opined that there was no
reasonable likelihood that mother could benefit from services in the next 6 to
12 months “given the nature of her mental disorder, her lack of insight and her
resistance to treatment.â€
On October 24, 2012, the juvenile court continued the hearing to November 28 because
mother’s counsel had just received the two psychological evaluations and needed
time to review them. On November 28, the
court continued the hearing to January 9, 2013, because
extensive testimony was anticipated and the court was engaged in trial on
another matter. On January 9, 2013, the hearing was continued to February 7.
The contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing was finally held on February 7, 2013. Mother did not contest jurisdiction, so the
juvenile court found true the allegation in the petition and declared the child
to be a dependent child under the amended petition.
The court heard first from Dr. Ryan,
who administered a psychological evaluation to mother on October 1, 2012 to determine whether she would benefit from reunification
services. Dr. Ryan testified that mother
completed all tests that he administered to her, but that she was
“resistive.†He concluded that the
possibility of mother becoming and remaining compliant with her medication was
“remote.â€
Dr. Suiter testified that he
conducted a psychological evaluation of mother, also on October 1, 2012, to
determine whether she would benefit from reunification services. Dr. Suiter administered a test to mother, but
could not score it because mother did not complete the threshold number of
questions. Dr. Suiter interviewed mother
and determined that she was “overtly psychotic†and “absolutely out of touch
with reality†and displayed “paranoid delusions†and “considerable
confusion.†In addition, mother was “unwilling
to acknowledge that she had any type of mental disorder†or needed
medication. Based on this, Dr. Suiter
opined that mother “couldn’t possibly benefit from services,†although she
could benefit from psychotropic
medications. Dr. Suiter expressed
under cross-examination that, although mother could possibly benefit from
reunification services if she were forced to take medications, he had concerns
about her “long-term compliance†with medications.
After hearing argument from the
parties, the juvenile court denied reunification services based on subdivisions
(b)(2)
title="">[3] and (b)(11)
hearing for June 10, 2013. That same
day, mother filed her Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition.
Mother contends the juvenile court’s
order denying her reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing
is not supported by substantial evidence under either the mental illness
provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), or the removal of a sibling
provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). As discussed below, substantial evidence
supports the court’s conclusion that mother’s mental illness renders her
incapable of benefitting from reunification services, and on this basis we
affirm the court’s orders.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)
provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is suffering
from a mental disability that renders him incapable of utilizing those services
. Section 361.5 reflects the
Legislature’s recognition that “it may be fruitless to provide reunification
services under certain circumstances.†(
825, 837.) A trial court’s order denying
reunification services is reviewed for substantial evidence. (A.A.
v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 242.)
Here, Dr. Ryan stated in his report
that mother’s mental health issues would prevent her from benefitting from
reunification services. Further, he
testified at the disposition hearing that, although mother could benefit from
medication, the probability of her becoming compliant and staying compliant is
“remote.†Dr. Suiter specifically stated
in his report that the nature of mother’s mental illness precluded her from
being able to benefit from any reunification services based on her “mental
disorder, her lack of insight and her resistance to treatment.†Further, he testified at the disposition
hearing that mother could not possibly benefit from reunification services
because of her mental condition and because of her unwillingness to both
acknowledge her mental condition and take medication to address the
condition. Both Dr. Suiter and Dr. Ryan
concluded that mother’s mental disorder rendered her utterly incapable of
benefitting from reunification services.
Mother argues that the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr.
Suiter cannot not be considered substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
orders because mother did not complete the single test she was asked to
complete. However, mother provides no
legal authority for her conclusion that this invalidates Dr. Suiter’s
conclusions. Based on Dr. Suiter’s
observations of mother’s behavior during the test and during his interview with
her, we find both his conclusion that mother was overtly psychotic and the
juvenile court’s reliance on this conclusion to be reasonable.
Finally, mother points to the testimony of both experts that mother
could possibly benefit from reunification services if she were to take her
medication. However, Dr. Ryan made clear
that the possibility of mother complying and remaining compliant was “remote.†Dr. Suiter also made it clear that, without
medication, mother “could not benefit from services†and that there was “no
likelihood . . . that she would voluntarily take
medication.†Thus, the court properly
denied father reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2),
and we need not address mother’s arguments regarding subdivision (b)(11).
Disposition
The petition is denied. The
juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P.
J.
We concur:
RICHLI
J.
MILLER
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All section references are
to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] The petition included
allegations regarding the child’s father.
Because father is not a party to this writ petition, he will be
mentioned only when necessary for clarity.
