In re Martin M.
Filed 5/2/13 In re Martin
M. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
In re MARTIN M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARTIN M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
G047568
(Super. Ct. No. DL042308)
O P I N I O N
Appeal
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Nick
A. Dourbetas, Judge.
Affirmed.
John F.
Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William W. Wood and
Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant
Martin M., a minor, contends the juvenile court imposed an unreasonable
condition on his probation. We disagree
and affirm the judgment against him.
FACTS
On
July 16, 2012, appellant admitted allegations contained in a wardship petition
that he shoplifted beer and illegally possessed alcohol in May 2011. The admission was part of a
the court declared appellant a nonward and placed him on probation subject to
various terms and conditions. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 725.) The court
also ruled appellant could move to withdraw his plea and have the allegations
dismissed in six months, in January 2013, if he complied with the terms of his
probation and had “no new legal violations.â€
Two weeks later, on August 1, 2012, a second petition was filed against appellant. The petition alleged appellant tampered with
and took personal property from several vehicles. The crimes were alleged to have occurred in
June 2012, but they were not brought to the court’s attention when it accepted
appellant’s plea on the first petition the following month. Consequently, they were not factored into the
negotiated disposition the court accepted in that matter.
The prosecutor did not
want that scenario to repeat itself.
While negotiating with the defense on the second petition, he was
willing to let appellant remain on probation as a nonward if he admitted the
new allegations. And, as before, he was
willing to let appellant move to withdraw his plea and seek a dismissal in
January 2013 if he complied with the terms of his probation and he had “no new
legal violations.†This time, however,
the prosecutor insisted on defining the term “no new legal violations†to include
both future violations of the law and any newly discovered violations that
appellant had committed in the past. To
that end, the parties’ disposition agreement stated appellant could only seek
to withdraw his plea if he had no new legal violations, “even predating
today.â€
Appellant, his attorney
and the prosecutor signed the agreement on September 14, 2012. However, when it was
submitted to the court later that day, appellant’s attorney objected to the
“even predating today†language on the basis it constituted an unreasonable
probation condition. The court did not
see it that way. Instead, it construed
the language as a permissible aspect of the parties’ agreement and accepted the
agreement as written. Thus, after
appellant admitted the allegations contained in the second petition, the court
continued him on probation as a nonward and determined he could seek to
withdraw his plea in January 2013, so long as he complied with the terms of his
probation and no new legal violations, either past or present, came to light
prior to that time.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the
notion that not only future, but prior violations of the law can doom his
probation is anathema to the goal of probation, which is to guide
served by conditioning his probation on past behavior because that is not
something over which he has any control.
Appellant’s argument
misses the point. He construes the
requirement that he have no new legal violations “even predating today†as a
condition of probation. But as the trial
court correctly observed, that requirement was actually part of the agreement
which allowed appellant to move to withdraw his plea in January 2013. We know this because the agreement about
possible plea withdrawal was conditioned on appellant not having any new legal
violations and complying with the
terms of his probation. Use of the
conjunction “and†indicates these were separate and distinct preconditions to
withdrawal, meaning the language about predated violations was not a component
of appellant’s probation. It is more
accurately read as a guarantee by the minor that he is worthy of lenient
treatment because he has not committed other—not yet discovered—crimes. We see nothing inappropriate about a plea
bargain that is so conditioned.
Moreover, our review of
the superior court file shows the trial court denied appellant’s request to
withdraw his pleas on January 16, 2013.
denial was not based on any new or newly discovered legal violations, but on
the fact appellant tested positive for marijuana five times between August and
December 2012. Because the court’s
decision to deny appellant’s motion to withdraw his pleas was based on grounds
unrelated to the condition that he have no new legal violations, the condition
no longer has any bearing on him. It is
simply off the table as far as this case is concerned. Therefore, appellant’s challenge to the
condition is moot, and there is no basis for granting him relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
BEDSWORTH,
J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
IKOLA, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] We take
judicial notice of the file pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision
(d) and 459, subdivision (a). (
306, fn. 2 [appellate court may take judicial notice of subsequent action
reflected in superior court records when it helps complete the context of the
case].)
