CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant and appellant John Ervin Terrill guilty of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1] The jury also found true that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant subsequently admitted that he had sustained three prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 10 years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to describe his convicted offense as “assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury” rather than “assault with a deadly weapon.” We agree and will direct the superior court clerk to amend the abstract of judgment.

A modification decision.

On September 22, 2010, an information charged defendant and appellant Joe Talevera Tovar and codefendants Duane Jaramillo and Anthony Rios, inmates in state prison, with one count of assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 4501.) The information also alleged one special prior offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The information also alleged multiple prior offenses as to the codefendants.
After a four-day jury trial, the jury found defendant guilty as to count 1. The trial court set a sentencing hearing, as well as a court trial regarding the prior offense.
At the hearing on April 01, 2011, defendant admitted the special prior and also entered a plea in case No. RIF10005536. In the instant case, the trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in state prison, with 102 days of credit for time served, to run consecutive with case No. RIF10005536.
However, the April 1, 2011, minute order states that the “[s]pecification of plea” is “[s]tate [p]rison 2 years 8 months,” and “[d]efendant is arraigned for pronouncement of judgment.” Also, the abstract of judgment shows that defendant was “convicted by” “plea”—not by a jury. We will direct the superior court to correct its April 1, 2011 minute order and the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant was found guilty by a jury.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Defendant Robert Sean Barbour originally challenged, on due process and equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of his indeterminate commitment pursuant to Proposition 83, which modified the terms by which sexually violent predators (SVP’s) can be released from civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.; unless otherwise stated, all statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code). In an unpublished opinion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), we found no due process violation and we remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether, under the equal protection clause, the People could justify treating SVP’s differently than mentally disordered offenders (MDO’s) and persons committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI’s) since no evidence was introduced in the trial court on the equal protection issue. (People v. Barbour (May 6, 2010, C061291) [nonpub. opn].)
The Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review with directions to us to vacate our unpublished decision. To avoid duplicating remand proceedings already ordered in McKee I, which allowed the People an opportunity to justify treating SVP’s, MDO’s and NGI’s differently under established equal protection principles, the Supreme Court also suspended further proceedings in defendant’s case pending finality of the McKee I remand proceedings.

Haifa and Mohamad Bedier (defendants) appeal from May 18, 2012 orders denying their nonstatutory motions to vacate their guilty pleas. Defendants challenge convictions entered in 2006 in order to eliminate them as a basis for deportation. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

This case involves two defendants, Jose Juan Rincon (Rincon) and Dominick Haning, Jr. (Haning). A jury found Rincon and Haning guilty of the same crimes: (1) first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459);[1] (2) shooting at an occupied aircraft (Pen. Code, § 246); (3) shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246); (4) fleeing a pursing peace officer and disregarding the safety of others while driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); (5) exhibiting a firearm with the intent of preventing arrest (§ 417.8); (6) driving a stolen vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and (7) being a felon or drug addict in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)).
In regard to one count of shooting at an aircraft (§ 246), the jury found true the allegations that Rincon and Haning personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). Haning admitted suffering (1) one prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)); (2) one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and (3) one prior conviction for which he served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Rincon to prison for a term of 13 years. The trial court sentenced Haning to prison for a term of 32 years.
Rincon raises two issues on appeal. First, Rincon asserts the evidence supporting his burglary conviction does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Second, Rincon contends the trial court erred by not staying the sentences for various convictions. (§ 654.) Haning contends the trial court erred by not staying the sentences for some of his convictions because the crimes involved an indivisible course of conduct. (§ 654.) We affirm the judgments.

On February 28, 2011, Frederick Denning was convicted of driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), driving with a measurable blood alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)) and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 23223). It was also found that Denning personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and had driven with a blood alcohol of 0.15 or more (Veh. Code, § 23578).
On May 2, 2011, Denning was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment, the execution of which was stayed for five years subject to a grant of probation. One of the terms of probation was that Denning was not permitted to drive a car unless licensed and insured as required by state law.
On June 20, 2011, the court granted Denning's request for a restricted license to drive to and from work and court-ordered programs and school.
On December 13, 2011, probation officers arrested Denning for driving with a suspended license and for driving in violation of the conditions of his probation.
Following an evidentiary hearing the court revoked probation and executed the previously suspended prison sentence.
Denning appeals contending the trial court erred in admitting a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) printout, which showed his license had been suspended in May 2011; that there is insufficient evidence that he willfully violated the conditions of probation; that the condition of probation which restricted his driving ability was vague and that the court abused its discretion in declining to reinstate him to probation in lieu of the prison sentence. We will find the challenge to the probation condition has been forfeited for failure to raise it in the trial court. We will reject the other contentions and affirm the trial court's decision.

Mother, Heather B., appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son and daughter.[1] Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We find no error and affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Keith Russell Mulvey asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende ).) Our review of the record discloses that a correction must be made to the abstract of judgment. Finding no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Ramon Mercado Ponce asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97 (Kevin S.). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende and Kevin S., we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

According to the trial court’s register of actions, plaintiff Kaye Hancock initiated this action on October 5, 2009, with a complaint that is not of record. In the April 2010 pleading at issue (the second amended complaint), plaintiff included seven counts[1] naming defendant County of Plumas (the County) either singly or together with the individual defendants Kelly Stane (now Kelly Murphy), a county employee who oversaw worker compensation issues; Kathleen Williams, the County’s Clerk-Recorder; and Melinda Rother, the Assistant Clerk-Recorder.[2] The seven counts assert theories of disability, age, and sex discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); harassment based on plaintiff’s handicap in violation of the FEHA; a failure to prevent the harassment in violation of the FEHA; retaliation against plaintiff in violation of the FEHA for reporting the harassment; and the unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical records in violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, § 56).
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had failed to produce necessary evidence either to support her theories or refute the affirmative defenses of defendants. It accordingly entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal in pro se.

A jury convicted defendant Sydney Joan Chaffer of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on Proposition 36 probation for three years.