CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendants Alexander Rey Dixon and Francisco Javier Nunez of assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a sharp instrument, and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury while in state prison (Pen. Code, § 4501;[1] count one) and possession of a sharp instrument while confined in prison (§ 4502, subd. (a); Dixon, count two; Nunez, count three). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found that each defendant had two strike priors. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
At sentencing on May 13, 2013, the trial court imposed a 25-year-to-life term on count one for each defendant, to run consecutively to the term they were then serving. The court stayed (§ 654) a 25-year-to-life term on count two (Dixon) and count three (Nunez).

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
In September 2012, by plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a))[1] and reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103), in return for a guarantee of five years of probation, including 180 days in county jail and a three-year sentencing lid if defendant violated probation. The factual basis for the plea was as follows: On the afternoon of September 9, 2010, defendant, driving a Chevrolet Blazer on State Route 88 in Amador County, forced the victim’s car (a Mazda Miata) into westbound lanes against traffic; then defendant dropped back, got behind the victim’s car, and moved to its right, again trying to force the victim into the opposing lane; then defendant got behind the victim’s car, went on the opposing lane side of the car, drove in front of it, and came into the victim’s lane, striking the front of the car and causing damages in excess of $400.

Appointed counsel for defendant Dustin Michael Kester asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Gary Lee Fowler asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende ).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant John Lawrence Halsema guilty of second degree murder, sustaining an allegation that his personal use of a gun resulted in death. While trial in the present matter was pending, another jury convicted defendant in a case of manufacturing a controlled substance (CM036509), for which he received a three-year county prison term. The trial court resentenced defendant to a determinate state prison term for the drug conviction, and imposed a consecutive indeterminate 40-year state prison term for the present offense (CM036062). As is pertinent in this appeal, the court also imposed a restitution fine of $280 and a general fine of $200 (with $580 in fees and assessments).

In August 2010, defendant Roberta Ann Beatty was charged with two felony offenses: commercial burglary and forgery of a prescription for drugs. In January 2011, defendant pled no contest to both charges. In March 2011, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation. Among the terms and conditions of her probation, defendant was required to complete Glenn County’s felony drug court program.
Twenty-one months later, on October 3, 2012, defendant appeared in the trial court for her “drug court graduation.” Defendant, her counsel, and probation were present at the graduation; the People were not represented. At the graduation hearing, defendant’s counsel made an oral motion to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors and dismiss them. The trial court granted counsel’s motion. On December 31, 2012, the trial court issued a written order reducing the felony charges to misdemeanors, dismissed the charges, and discharged defendant from probation in the interests of justice.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury convicted defendant Samuel Dixon of the unlawful possession of cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana while in state prison (Pen. Code, § 4573.6; undesignated section references are to this code). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted a strike prior (1992 first degree murder) (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court imposed six years (the midterm of three years, doubled for the strike prior) with one-third, or two years, to run consecutively to defendant’s current sentence, an eight-year determinate term and a 37 to life indeterminate term.
Defendant appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports his conviction for possession. We reject his contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Steven Anthony Denton pled no contest to arson in exchange for dismissal of an on-bail/own recognizance allegation as well as dismissal of case No. CR02911X (felony vandalism). The court granted probation for a term of five years and ordered defendant to register as an arson offender.
Defendant appeals. A certificate of probable cause was obtained. Defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea and enter judgment because there was a doubt as to his competence. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Shari Dugodansby appeals from the order dismissing her personal injury complaint against Team Islander, LLC and its owners, Bruce Hopper, Derrol Elliott and Daniel Boyle (collectively, defendants). Defendants’ demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on the ground Business and Professions Code section 25602[1] precludes plaintiff’s claim against them for injuries caused when an intoxicated guest drove away from their premises and subsequently injured plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in applying Business and Professions Code section 25602, because she styled her complaint against defendants solely as a claim for damages arising from defendants’ operation of a “disorderly house”[2] in violation of sections 25601 and 24200, subdivisions (e) and (f), and Penal Code section 316. (See fns. 4, 5 and 6, post.)
We affirm.

Defendant Mariah Ann Marie Chavez pled no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily and received four years of formal probation, including 180 days in county jail. Her probation conditions included the following: “You shall not be adjacent to any school campus during school hours unless you are enrolled or with prior written permission of the school administration or probation.”[1]
Relying on People v. Barajas (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 748, 760-763 (Barajas), defendant contends that “adjacent to” is unconstitutionally vague and should be replaced by “within 50 feet of.” The People contend that “adjacent to” is not vague, but suggests that if we conclude otherwise we should modify the condition in a manner consistent with Barajas.
We agree with defendant and Barajas that “adjacent to,” in the context of this probation condition, is impermissibly vague. But on this record we cannot say whether defendant’s proposed modification is appropriate. Furthermore, because the record does not show that defendant has ever committed an offense on or near a school campus, we cannot determine whether the probation condition was appropriately imposed. We therefore remand with directions that the trial court reconsider whether this condition should be imposed, and if so, to modify the condition in light of the facts of the case and the purpose of the restriction to be imposed on defendant.

The minor, D.F., admitted committing first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, vandalism, possession of burglary tools, and misdemeanor assault. The juvenile court placed the minor on deferred entry of judgment (DEJ), but subsequently found that the minor violated the terms of his DEJ. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation subject to various conditions, including 60 days in juvenile hall with 30 days of credit.
The minor now contends (1) the juvenile court erred in refusing to hold a hearing on whether DEJ should have been revoked, (2) denial of the hearing violated various constitutional provisions, and (3) there is an error in the disposition order.
We conclude (1) the juvenile court held a hearing when it revoked DEJ, (2) the hearing complied with federal and state constitutional provisions, and (3) the disposition order -- the juvenile detention disposition report -- must be corrected.
We will order a correction to the disposition order and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kenneth Lee Jenkins’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws when it imposed a restitution fine of $240. We affirm.
We dispense with a detailed recitation of the facts as they are unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal.
On August 30, 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or higher (DUI) -- offenses committed on November 5, 2011. On September 20, 2012, defendant pleaded no contest to failing to appear -- an offense committed in May 2012.

The minor A.B. admitted she came within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] in that she committed an assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on James E., a felony (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). The juvenile court granted the minor probation for up to six months under section 725, subdivision (a), subject to certain terms and conditions including that she pay victim restitution in the amount of $1,820, jointly and severally with two other participants in the assault upon the victim, with the opportunity for a hearing at which the minor could dispute the amount. Five months later, the minor’s attorney filed a written motion challenging the amount of the restitution order. After a hearing, the court ordered the minor to pay $1,639, jointly and severally with the other participants.