CA Unpub Decisions

In this case the trial court instructed the jury that the testimony of a single witness can prove any fact -- except for that of defendant Amy Dianne Taylor-Ameneyro, which required supporting evidence. The court did not explain why the jury should treat defendant’s testimony differently from that of any other witness. Defendant contends this instruction was reversible error. We agree that it was error, but find it harmless under the standard of ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 57 s EAOIYO000001 xhfl Rep l "Chapman v. California (1967)386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]" Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705] ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 7 s EAOIYO000001 xpl 1 Chapman). Therefore we shall affirm, although we must remand the matter for correction of the abstract of judgment.

The minors admitted guilt on one count of rape or sexual penetration by force against the will of the victim while acting in concert with another person. Following an evidentiary hearing on the minors’ subsequent motions to withdraw their admissions based on learning disabilities and ineffective assistance, the juvenile court denied their motions to withdraw the admissions and committed the minors to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum period of nine years.
The minors now contend (1) although delinquency adjudications are traditionally made without a jury trial, the minors have a federal due process right to a jury trial in this case due to the lifetime residency restrictions; and (2) the juvenile court failed to advise the minors that they would be subject to sex offender registration and residency restrictions for life.
We conclude the minors do not have a right to a jury trial, and they fail to show prejudice resulting from improper advisement. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Robert Sean Barbour originally challenged, on due process and equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of his indeterminate commitment pursuant to Proposition 83, which modified the terms by which sexually violent predators (SVP’s) can be released from civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.; unless otherwise stated, all statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code). In an unpublished opinion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), we found no due process violation and we remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether, under the equal protection clause, the People could justify treating SVP’s differently than mentally disordered offenders (MDO’s) and persons committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI’s) since no evidence was introduced in the trial court on the equal protection issue. (People v. Barbour (May 6, 2010, C061291) [nonpub. opn].)
The Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review with directions to us to vacate our unpublished decision. To avoid duplicating remand proceedings already ordered in McKee I, which allowed the People an opportunity to justify treating SVP’s, MDO’s and NGI’s differently under established equal protection principles, the Supreme Court also suspended further proceedings in defendant’s case pending finality of the McKee I remand proceedings.

Defendant and appellant, Davion Dianta Holman, appeals from the judgment entered following his pleas of no contest to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] (count 1) and three counts of first degree robbery (§ 211) (counts 2, 3 and 4) and his admissions with regard to count 1 that he personally used a firearm, a handgun (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of and in association with and the specific intent to promote, further and assist a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Holman to 31 years in prison. We affirm.

Appellant Julio L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders establishing dependency jurisdiction over his daughter Brooklyn (born May 2010) and placing her in foster care. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)[1], that father hit mother in Brooklyn’s presence or that past instances of domestic violence placed Brooklyn at current substantial risk of harm. Father further contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not placing Brooklyn in his care or by according him unmonitored visitation. We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders but remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to amend count b-2 in the section 300 petition to conform to proof, as set forth in our disposition, infra.

Defendant Tony Rene Jackson appeals from the denial of his motion to quash the search warrant and his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5.[1] After denial of his motions, defendant agreed to plead no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon with four prior convictions (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3) in exchange for a sentence of four years.[2] The sentence consisted of the midterm of two years, doubled to four years due to defendant’s prior conviction of a serious felony. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a) – (d); 667, subd. (b) – (i).)
Defendant appeals on the grounds that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the facts alleged in the affidavit did not justify the search, and the good faith exception did not apply.

Defendant and appellant William N. Washington (defendant) appeals from the denial of his postjudgment motion for the return of property. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues and requesting a court review of the record. On December 24, 2012, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record and finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
After defendant was convicted of residential burglary, identity theft, commercial burglary and possession of a forged driver’s license, he filed a motion for the return of some of the property seized during a search of defendant’s motel room pursuant to a search warrant executed in 2006. The seized property included credit, debit, and identification cards, a savings ledger, a checkbook, and a wallet, all bearing names other than defendant’s. Other property seized included electronic devices such as a Blackberry, cell phone, a computer, computer parts and accessories, as well as a tool set, keys, documents, and a plastic container.
Some of the subject property had been reported stolen and had been admitted into evidence in defendant’s trial. A Blackberry cell phone was reported stolen later, prior to the hearing on the motion. Some of the property, including cash, a laptop computer, computer parts and accessories, a camera, and a car stereo, had not been reported stolen. However, the wires to the car stereo had been cut, and some of the items (a laptop computer, iPod and speakers) appeared to match a description of some property missing after a burglary to which defendant had confessed committing.

Defendant and appellant Tiffany McGlothin appeals from her conviction of first degree burglary entered upon a plea of nolo contendere. Defendant contends that the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining her, and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the detention. We find no merit to defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment. However, we direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment reflecting the restitution fine and the victim restitution order.

Haifa and Mohamad Bedier (defendants) appeal from May 18, 2012 orders denying their nonstatutory motions to vacate their guilty pleas. Defendants challenge convictions entered in 2006 in order to eliminate them as a basis for deportation. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

Defendant Jesse Solis Landaverde appeals from his conviction of forcible oral copulation, second degree robbery and kidnapping for carjacking. He contends: (1) allowing a uniformed officer to stand next to defendant while he testified was prejudicial error; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on a kidnapping special circumstance attached to the oral copulation charge (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (a)); and (3) the life sentence imposed on the kidnapping for carjacking conviction was an unauthorized sentence.[1] We modify the judgment to stay the sentence on the kidnapping for carjacking conviction, but otherwise affirm.

Barbara Ann Curran (appellant) appeals from a final judgment entered in favor of the City of Los Angeles acting by and through the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (collectively “the city”) after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the city’s demurrer to appellant’s complaint.[1] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the demurrer on the ground that appellant did not timely file a claim under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) (hereafter “the Act”).[2] We find that the complaint sufficiently alleges facts suggesting that the city waived the defense of untimeliness under section 911.3, subdivision (b). We therefore reverse.

A jury convicted defendants, Charles Deondra Jones and Kastin Decombre, of two counts of attempted robbery. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664, 211.) Defendants were each sentenced to 10 years and 4 months in state prison. We modify the judgments and affirm as modified.

Defendant and appellant Steven Romero (defendant) appeals from his murder conviction. He contends that the trial court erred in denying three Wheeler/Batson[1] motions and in the use of CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01, and 3.02 to instruct the jury. In addition, defendant contends that the jury’s findings of guilt and gang motive were not supported by substantial evidence and the cumulative effect of instructional error requires reversal of the judgment. Defendant also asks that we modify the abstract of judgment by striking the sentence enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1).[2] We find no merit in defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment. We also direct the trial court to correct clerical errors in the abstract of judgment.

The minor, Richard G., appeals from the juvenile court’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 wardship order. The juvenile court sustained felony allegations the minor carried a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of former Penal Code[1] section 12020, subdivision (a)(4). (Stats. 2004, ch. 247, § 7, p. 2981.) Section 12020, subdivision (a)(4) is now recodified at section 21310. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, §§ 4-5.) The minor was placed home on probation.
The minor contends there was insufficient evidence the weapon he possessed was a dirk or dagger. The minor further asserts unauthorized destruction of the knife denied him his due process right to review all legally admissible evidence and to an accurate record on appeal. We affirm the juvenile court order.