CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Dolores Flores appeals from the trial court’s granting of a motion for nonsuit on her cause of action for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).[1] The only cause of action remaining in the case when the court ruled on the motion was Flores’s claim that defendant Kern County (county) failed to engage in an interactive process to identify and implement a reasonable accommodation (§ 12940, subd. (n)). We hold that the trial court did not err in granting the motion on this cause of action.

Plaintiff appeals from the order sustaining without leave to amend defendant’s demurrer to his petition for writ of mandate. The petition sought replacement of or compensation for property seized by defendants from plaintiff, an inmate of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The demurrer asserted plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law and defendants had no clear, present, and ministerial duty to return the property to plaintiff or to compensate him for it. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling and affirm.

In this dissolution action, wife challenges an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees and costs to husband’s attorneys. She contends the trial court abused its discretion in making the award because it relied on an incomplete income and expense declaration and insufficient information about husband’s finances, husband was disentitled to an award of fees and costs because he withheld information, and the amount of the award was excessive. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant, Cheng Pao Her, of evading a peace officer (count 1/Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), resisting arrest (count 2/Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), driving under the influence (count 3/Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and being under the influence of a controlled substance (count 4/Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding the court found true two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant Melvin Johnson pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and was placed on probation for three years. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) He challenges the denial of a suppression motion and asserts that knowledge requirements must be added to drug- and alcohol-related probation conditions. We agree that the alcohol-related condition must be modified but uphold the language of the drug-related condition and denial of the suppression motion. The probation conditions will be amended and, as so modified, the judgment will be affirmed.

Together with fellow Norteno gang member Jacob Robles, appellant Julian Gonzalez agreed to kill Felix Estrella at the request of a gang leader. Unfortunately, Gonzalez and Robles mistook John Hernandez as their quarry and killed him. A woman, Ashley Tyson, was shot in the abdomen and seriously wounded.
Gonzalez and Robles were charged with multiple crimes in connection with this gang-related shooting. Gonzalez was convicted after jury trial of murder (count 1; Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 3; § 246). He was acquitted of attempting to murder Ashley Tyson (count 2). Gonzalez was sentenced on count 1 to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus two consecutive firearm enhancement terms of 25 years to life each pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). Robles subsequently pled guilty to all counts and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Both men were ordered to pay an $11,191 victim restitution fine.
Gonzalez challenges his sentence on four grounds. First, he claims the restriction set forth in section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2) precludes imposition of a firearm enhancement on count 1. Second, Gonzalez argues that even if the court was authorized to add one firearm enhancement to his base term on count 1, imposition of a second firearm enhancement was barred under section 12022.53, subdivision (f). The first argument has no merit but the latter contention is convincing. Next, Gonzalez argues that he and Robles should be held jointly and severally liable for the victim restitution fine and that the trial court erred by retaining jurisdiction over future restitution claims. We agree that codefendants should be held jointly and severally liable for the restitution fine but uphold the reservation of jurisdiction. The judgment will be modified to strike one of the section 12022.53 enhancements and to amend the restitution order. As so modified, the judgment will be affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant Robert Jessie Alvarez of first degree murder with special circumstances and attempted robbery. It also found true that Alvarez personally used a knife in the commission of the offenses. The trial court found that Alvarez had served three prison terms. Alvarez was sentenced to life in prison without parole on the murder conviction and terms were imposed for the enhancements; the term for the attempted robbery conviction was stayed.
Alvarez contends there were numerous errors that warrant reversal of his convictions: (1) error pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) in jury selection, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) the felony-murder special circumstance is unconstitutional. Additionally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds a life-without-parole sentence is not subject to enhancement and asserts clerical error in fixing presentence conduct credit.
We will direct that the clerical error be corrected. We reject Alvarez’s other challenges to his convictions and sentence and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jermale Keeton (defendant) was charged with solicitation to commit murder (count I - § 653f, subd. (b)[1]) and active participation in a criminal street gang (count II - § 186.22, subd. (a)). The amended information alleged defendant committed the murder solicitation for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The amended information further alleged defendant has previously been convicted of a felony as defined in sections 667, subdivisions (c)-(j) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(e), and previously served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Witness David Strickland testified that he had been a member of the Country Boy Crips gang from ages 14 to 20. Strickland had suffered juvenile adjudications for petty theft, grand theft auto, participation in a criminal street gang and receiving stolen property.
In October 2010, Officer Ryan Kroeker searched Strickland’s car and discovered marijuana. Officer Kroeker asked Strickland if he would be willing to provide “information” in exchange for leniency. The two entered into a written agreement. Initially, Strickland was to help Officer Kroeker with four cases. Strickland satisfied this initial obligation, but continued to work with Officer Kroeker. According to Officer Kroeker, Strickland would provide information leading to arrests or seizures and would be paid “as much as $150” or “as little as $50.”
On the afternoon of April 8, 2011, defendant called Strickland. Defendant asked whether Strickland had been “hanging around my homeboy Nathaniel [Johnson].” Strickland responded affirmatively, and said he spent time with him every day. Defendant said he was trying to find Johnson, but did not say why.

Plaintiff appeals from a postjudgment order awarding defendant[1] his attorney fees based on provisions found in the contract between the parties. Plaintiff contends the award was inequitable because defendant breached the contract. Defendant prevailed in the trial court by establishing plaintiff’s claim on the promissory note and second deed of trust was barred by the antideficiency statutes. We conclude the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to the prevailing defendant, even though he prevailed by establishing the contract was unenforceable. Accordingly, we affirm.

In March 2011, defendant Alvin Dalton shot his next door neighbor, Danetta H., and her two teenage children, Dazhane H. and Dezmon H., after intervening in a physical altercation involving defendantʼs girlfriend, Lora White. As a result of the shooting, Danetta died from a gunshot wound to the head, Dazhane suffered serious injuries requiring surgery, and Dezmon suffered superficial injuries.
After defendantʼs first trial ended in a mistrial, a second jury convicted him of one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187; count 1) and two counts of unpremeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, 664; counts 2 & 3). The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally used a handgun in the commission of each count (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that he intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of each count, causing death or great bodily injury in counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.53, subds. (c); count 3, (d); counts 1 & 2). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 2 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 83 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument by misstating the law regarding heat of passion; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the enhancement allegations required proof of the union of act and intent; (3) the trial court erred in imposing a $296 probation report fee without first making a determination of defendantʼs ability to pay; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing a $10,000 restitution fine. Defendant also raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims in connection with each of his contentions. We affirm.

Homero Corona Mendoza appeals following his convictions on a number of felony and misdemeanor sex crimes. Defendant presents the following three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted lewd and lascivious act with regard to count 2; (2) the trial court erred by sentencing defendant to one year in jail on count 8 because the maximum punishment for the crime is 180 days in jail; and (3) the abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect the statutory bases for the imposition of various penalty assessments. We will remand for modification of the sentence and correction of the abstract of judgment, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant/defendant Jose Madrigal Paz shot and seriously wounded his employer, Edward Trindade, when Trindade fired him for being drunk on the job. Defendant fired three shots into Trindade’s chest and back, and took away Trindade’s cell phone to prevent him from calling for help. When Trindade pleaded that he was going to die, defendant suddenly decided to help the gravely wounded man and drove him to the hospital. Trindade survived his wounds.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged of count I, attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664/187), with the special allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); count II, assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), with the special allegations that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and count III, possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant was sentenced to the midterm of seven years for count I, attempted murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm allegation. The court stayed the terms imposed for the remaining counts and special allegations pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error when it denied his request to instruct the jury on personal use of a firearm pursuant to section 12022.5, as a “lesser included enhancement” to special allegation charged as to count I, attempted murder, that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). We affirm.

Ruben Silva, Jr. (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of second degree murder committed for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), (5), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2).[2] His motion for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life plus two years and ordered to pay restitution and various fees, fines, and assessments.
On appeal, we reject defendant’s claims he is entitled to reversal because (1) the trial court failed to clear up the jury’s confusion regarding the elements of aiding and abetting, (2) the trial court erred by instructing with CALCRIM No. 3261, and (3) the jury was inadvertently given a copy of a legal memorandum that addressed the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We agree, however, that the sentence on count 2 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, we modify the sentence on count 2, but otherwise affirm.

A modification decision.