Corbin v. City of
Angeles Dept. of
Public Works
Filed 2/24/12 Corbin v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Public Works CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
NETTIE CORBIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS
ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
B230414
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC390720)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior
Court of
County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
Nettie
Corbin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen
A. Trutanich, City Attorney, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendants and Respondents.
introduction
Plaintiff
Nettie Corbin appeals from the trial court’s order granting a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement filed by defendants the City of Los Angeles Department
of Public Works, Eric Russell, and Mihran Sarkisian. Corbin contends she was unaware that she was
agreeing to retire as part of the settlement, and that the
agreement inherently conflicts with the provision of the settlement whereby the
defendants agreed that the settlement would have no effect on her pending
workers’ compensation action. We find no
merit in Corbin’s contentions and affirm the trial court’s judgment enforcing
the settlement agreement.
factual and procedural
background
Corbin
filed the present action in May 2008 against her employer, the City of
Los Angeles Department of Public Works, and her supervisors, Eric Russell
and Mihran Sarkisian (collectively referred to as the City), alleging various
causes of action such as discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
environment. In September 2010, a jury
trial commenced before Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Mary H.
Strobel. On the second day of testimony,
the trial was halted and the parties conducted a settlement conference before
Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Amy D. Hogue. Corbin was present and was represented by
counsel. The parties reached a
settlement.
Counsel
for the City stated on the record the terms of the settlement: Corbin agreed to first dismiss the two
individual defendants, and thereafter in exchange for payment of $15,000,
Corbin agreed to dismiss her case against the City, with prejudice and a waiver
of costs. The City agreed that it would
designate one individual to respond to inquiries from Corbin’s prospective
employers, and that individual would state only her dates of employment. Counsel for the City stated: “And if I forgot to mention it,
. . . Ms. Corbin is retiring as part of this agreement.” The court replied, “She will retire as part
of this agreement and fill out whatever paperwork there is.” The court noted that it would retain
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 664.6.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Finally, counsel for the City added that the
City also agreed that “this [the settlement] has no effect on [Corbin’s]
pending workers’ comp[ensation] action.”
Judge
Hogue then asked Corbin, “[H]ave you been following all this” Corbin replied in the affirmative. The court asked, “Are you okay with all these
terms” and “Do you approve of all of this”
Corbin responded to both questions in the affirmative. The matter having been settled, Judge Strobel
dismissed the jury.
Shortly
thereafter, Corbin refused to sign the written settlement agreement prepared by
the City. Corbin then attempted to file
a declaration (which stated it was being filed in pro. per. although she was
still represented by counsel of record), purporting to rescind the settlement
agreement. However, the declaration was
rejected for filing. The following
month, Corbin attempted to file an “objection to OSC re dismissal,” again in
pro. per. This document was also rejected
for filing.
In
early November 2010, the City filed a motion to enforce the oral settlement
agreement pursuant to section 664.6. The
City appended to the motion a copy of the reporter’s transcript from the
settlement conference, as well as a copy of the declaration Corbin had
attempted to file previously. Corbin
stated in her declaration that she was “rescind[ing] the settlement agreement
entered into with defendant . . . as I was under medication and
did not fully understand or comprehend the specifics of such
agreement/settlement. The only portion
of the agreement that I do not agree with and did not hear or understand was
that the City of Los Angeles requested that I retire from my job of over 13
years.” She also stated that she felt
coerced and forced to make a decision, and reiterated that her comprehension
was impaired by the medication she was taking.
Thereafter,
Corbin, through her counsel of record, filed opposition to the motion to
enforce the settlement agreement. Corbin
argued that the portion of the agreement regarding her retirement was ambiguous
and unenforceable because “[a] primary term that was negotiated and agreed to
the Settlement by all parties was that [Corbin] was to be allowed to maintain
her pending workers[’] compensation claims against the City, and that the
Settlement of this case would in no way interfere with the resolution of her
worker[s’] compensation cases.” Corbin
argued that in the workers’ compensation cases she “is entitled to retraining
and reassignment within the City’s available job openings. Thus retirement is contradictory to
retraining and reassignment.” She argued
that there was no meeting of the minds on the material terms of the contract,
and therefore no contract formation had occurred. Corbin contended that “since there are
diametrically opposed conflicting terms in this settlement contract which can
be excised out of the agreement, and the rest of the agreement can still be
upheld, then the Court should excise out the conflicting terms and uphold the
rest of the Settlement Agreement.” She
further asserted that the City “w[ould] not be harmed in any way by the Court
striking the contradictory terms and enforcing the remaining terms and
conditions of the Settlement Agreement.”
Concurrently
with the opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement, Corbin filed a
substitution of attorney, indicating she would proceed in pro. per.
Hearing
on the motion to enforce the settlement was held in January 2011. The court stated that the fact the workers’
compensation claim was “carved out as part of the settlement” did not mean that
the court could not enforce all portions of the settlement. The court determined that “whatever monetary
compensation could be obtained by Ms. Corbin in the workers’ compensation
proceeding will not be affected by the settlement.” The court ordered that Corbin would be deemed
to have resigned, stating, “The record is clear — I have a copy of the
transcript, I’ve read it — that the fact of the retirement was not a hidden
term, it was plainly stated. The judge
asked you if you understood, Ms. Corbin; and you agreed to the
provisions.”
The
court filed an order granting the City’s motion to enforce the settlement
agreement. The court ordered the entire
action dismissed with prejudice, and deemed Corbin to have resigned from her
employment with the City, specifying that the judgment would serve as proof of
her resignation. The City was ordered to
pay Corbin $15,000. The court thereafter
entered a judgment of dismissal.
This
timely appeal followed.
discussion
When
a party files a motion to enforce a settlement agreement under section 664.6, a
trial court may enter judgment pursuant to a stipulated settlement if the
stipulation is made orally on the record before the court. “These requirements minimize the possibility
of conflicting interpretations of the stipulation or its effect. [Citations.]
A section 664.6 motion is appropriate, however, even when issues
relating to the binding nature or terms of the settlement are in dispute,
because, in ruling
upon the motion, the trial court is empowered to resolve these disputed issues
and ultimately determine whether the parties reached a binding mutual accord as
to the material terms. [Citations.]” (In re
Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 905 (Assemi).) “[I]n ruling upon
a section 664.6 motion for entry of judgment enforcing a settlement agreement,
and in determining whether the parties entered into a binding settlement of all
or part of a case, a trial court should consider whether (1) the material terms
of the settlement were explicitly defined, (2) the supervising judicial officer
questioned the parties regarding their understanding of those terms, and (3)
the parties expressly acknowledged their understanding of and agreement to be
bound by those terms. In making the
foregoing determination, the trial court may consider declarations of the
parties and their counsel, any transcript of the stipulation orally presented
and recorded by a certified reporter, and any additional oral testimony. [Citations.]
The standard governing review of such determinations by a trial court is
whether the trial court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 911.)
“Consistent
with the venerable substantial evidence standard
of review, and with our policy favoring settlements, we resolve all
evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences to support the trial
court’s finding that these parties entered into an enforceable settlement
agreement and its order enforcing that agreement.” (Osumi
v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
I. Mutual
Consent
Corbin
argues on appeal, as she did in the trial court, that she did not hear or
comprehend during the settlement conference that she was agreeing to retire
from City employment. She argues that a
valid contract was not formed because there was no mutual consent—that is, no
meeting of the minds—regarding the material terms of the agreement. We disagree.
In
ruling on the City’s motion pursuant to section 664.6, the trial court was
empowered to determine whether the parties reached a binding mutual accord as
to the material terms of the settlement.
(Assemi, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 905.)
“A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which
apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” (Weddington
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810; see also Civ.
Code § 1636 [contracts must be enforced according to the “mutual intention of
the parties as it existed at the time of contracting”].) “‘The existence of mutual consent is
determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what
the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to
believe.’ [Citation.] Outward manifestations thus govern the
finding of mutual consent required by Civil Code sections 1550, 1565 and 1580
for contract formation.” (
Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual
consent is upon the acts of the parties involved. (Meyer
v. Benko (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 937, 942 (Meyer).)
Although
she does not phrase her argument in these terms, in effect Corbin is contending
that a material mistake of fact—namely, that she did not hear or understand
that she was agreeing as part of the settlement to retire—prevented contract
formation. “A unilateral [fn. omitted]
mistake of fact may be the basis of relief.
(1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 295, p.
248.) However, such a unilateral mistake
may not invalidate a contract without a showing that the other party to the
contract was aware of the mistaken belief and unfairly utilized that mistaken
belief in a manner enabling him to take advantage of the other party. [Citation.]”
(Meyer, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 944.)
Corbin has failed to present any evidence in support of either
requirement. She does not point to any
evidence demonstrating that the City knew or should have known that she failed
to hear or understand that she was agreeing to retire. Because the City would have had no reason to
know that she did not comprehend the terms of the agreement, it could not have
unfairly used that mistaken belief to take advantage of her. Plainly stated, moments after counsel
declared in clear terms that Corbin would agree to retire from City employment,
the court asked Corbin if she understood and agreed to all of the terms of the
settlement, and she said she did. Viewed
objectively, Corbin’s actions would lead a reasonable person to believe that
she understood and consented to retire as part of the settlement
agreement. Under these circumstances,
her belated declarations regarding her subjective understanding of the
agreement are irrelevant. “‘“The
parties’ undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract
interpretation.” [Citation.]’ (Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center v. Shewry (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 964, 980.)” (Steller
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 175, 185 (
We
conclude the trial court had before it substantial evidence to find that the
parties reached a binding mutual accord as to the material terms of the
agreement, including that Corbin agreed to retire from City employment as a
condition of the settlement.
to Retire Did Not Conflict With the Provision of the Settlement Agreement
Permitting the Workers’ Compensation Action to Proceed
Corbin
further contends that the trial court’s order should be reversed because the
term requiring her retirement inherently conflicts with the provision that the
settlement would not affect her pending workers’ compensation action. She asserts that the relief available in her
workers’ compensation action necessarily included reassignment within available
job openings, and therefore a term requiring her retirement would indeed have
an effect on her pending workers’ compensation action. Thus, the trial court’s determination that
the retirement term would not affect her workers’ compensation claims against
the City was erroneous.
Here,
the court had to draw an inference from the available objective evidence
regarding the parties’ contractual intent.
Specifically, the court had to determine, based on the parties’
objective manifestations of agreement and intent, what a reasonable objective
observer would believe was the intended purpose and effect of the statement
that “this [the settlement] has no effect on [Corbin’s] pending workers’
comp[ensation] action.” At first blush,
the meaning of that statement is arguably ambiguous. Did the parties mean that the settlement
would have literally no effect on the workers’ compensation action, including
no effect on the remedies potentially available in that action Or did they simply mean that Corbin would be permitted
to continue to pursue her workers’ compensation action, and that the settlement
was not intended to encompass the workers’ compensation claims (Cf. Steller,
supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 175.)
Clearly
the parties intended the latter. Given
the fact that an unambiguous material term of the settlement was that Corbin
was agreeing to retire from City employment, the parties could not possibly
have meant that the settlement would have no effect on the remedies available
to Corbin in her workers’ compensation action.
The only reasonable interpretation of the statement is that the parties
meant to clarify that Corbin would be permitted to continue to maintain her
workers’ compensation action. As such,
there is no conflict between the two provisions of the agreement, and there is
no justification for rescinding either provision.
disposition
The judgment enforcing the settlement agreement is
affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
the City.
SUZUKAWA,
J.
We concur:
WILLHITE,
Acting P. J.
MANELLA, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Unless
otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
