City of South Gate v. S&M Auto Sales
Filed 2/24/12
City of South Gate v. S&M Auto Sales CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
CITY OF SOUTH
GATE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S&M AUTO
SALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
B231345
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC380303)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Charles F. Palmer, Judge.
Affirmed.
Michael
B. Montgomery for Defendant and Appellant.
Alvaradosmith,
Keith E. McCullough, Kevin A. Day, and Gregory G. Snarr for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
S&M Auto Sales (S&M) appeals
from a judgment denying its claim for compensation for loss of business
goodwill in this condemnation action brought by the City of South Gate (South
Gate). Following a bench trial, the
trial court concluded that S&M failed to prove by a
entitled to compensation for loss of goodwill under the prerequisites of Code
of Civil Procedure section 1263.510.
trial court’s determination are not well taken, and thus we affirm the
judgment.
I. The Eminent Domain
Action
On
November 7, 2007, South Gate filed a complaint in
located at 4861 Firestone Boulevard (the property) for “the construction and
development of the Firestone Boulevard/Atlantic Avenue Intersection Improvement
Project.” When the complaint was filed,
the property was owned by Salvador Jauregui (Salvador) and Norma Jauregui
(Norma), who are not parties to this action, and leased by their daughter
Monika Jauregui (Jauregui), doing business as S&M.
On
June 30, 2009, South Gate sought an order for prejudgment possession of the
property. The proceedings were
temporarily halted in July 2009, when Norma filed a
the property as one of her assets. On
November 3, 2009, the bankruptcy court granted South Gate’s motion for
relief from the automatic stay to allow the city to proceed with the eminent
domain action, and on November 16, 2009, the superior court granted South
Gate’s request for an order to take prejudgment possession of the
property. The order authorized South
Gate to take possession of the property 31 days after service of the order
(i.e., on December 17, 2009).
Because
Jauregui had not relinquished possession of the property by December 17, South
Gate sought and obtained an additional order directing the sheriff to enforce
the terms of the prejudgment order, including by removing vehicles from the
property, if possession was not transferred by December 21, 2009. Accordingly, on about December 20, 2009,
Jauregui moved her business from the property to 400 East Manchester
(Manchester location). She moved solely
because the court ordered her to do so.
The Manchester location was much smaller than the property, requiring
Jauregui to sell some of S&M’s inventory at a loss.
II. The Present Action for
Compensation for Lost Business Goodwill
After
vacating the property, Jauregui sought compensation for lost business
goodwill. The parties were unable to
agree on the amount of lost goodwill for which S&M was entitled to be
compensated, and thus the issue was tried to the court on November 1 and 2,
2010. Jauregui testified on her own
behalf and called business appraisal expert Dave Girbovan, who testified that
S&M suffered lost goodwill as a result of the forced relocation to the
Manchester property. South Gate called
Jauregui and Girbovan under Evidence Code section 776, as well as relocation
expert Jesse Ortiz. Neither S&M nor
South Gate introduced into evidence an expert appraisal of S&M’s lost business
goodwill.
On
January 4, 2011, the court entered judgment for South Gate. In its statement of decision, the court
stated that S&M had failed to meet its burden of proving lost goodwill
under section 1263.510, explaining as follows:
“1. Code of Civil Procedure section
1263.510(a) (‘Section 1263.510(a)’
provides, in pertinent part: ‘(a) The owner of a business conducted on theproperty taken . . . shall be compensated for loss of goodwill if the
owner proves all of the following: (1)
The loss is caused by the taking of the property . . . . (2) The loss cannot reasonably be prevented
by a relocation of the business or by taking steps and adopting procedures that
a reasonably prudent person would take and adopt in preserving the
goodwill. (3) Compensation for the loss
will not be included in payments under Section 7262 of the Government
Code. (4) Compensation for the loss
will not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded to the owner.’
“2. The property owner, S&M Auto Sales,
has the burden to prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, each of the four
prerequisite conditions for compensation set forth in Section 1263.510(a). City of
Santa Clarita v. NTS Technical Systems (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 264, 269-270;
Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v.
Attisha (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 357, 367-368.
“3. Whether the conditions for compensation
have been met is a matter for the trial court to resolve. ‘Only if the court finds these conditions
exist does the remaining issue of the value of the goodwill loss, if any, go to
the jury.’ Ibid., 137 Cal.App.4th 264 at [270].
“4. For purposes of Section 1263.510(a),
‘“goodwill” consists of the benefits that accrue to a business as a result of
its location, reputation for dependability, skill or quality, and any other
circumstances resulting in probable retention of old or acquisition of new
patronage.’ Code of Civil Procedure
section 1263.510(b).
“5. S&M is a dba of Monika Jauregui
(‘Monika’
. Monika signed a lease forthe property located at 4861 Firestone Boulevard (the ‘Jauregui Property’
inSouth Gate in September 2007 and obtained a business license in October 2007 to
sell automobiles at the Jauregui Property.
“6. S&M moved from the property in
December 2009 because the City had obtained from this court its Further Order
Allowing Enforcement of Order for Prejudgement Possession, filed herein
December 17, 2009 (the ‘Possession Order’
. The court’s issuance of the Possession Order was the only reason S&M
vacated the Property. Upon vacating the
Property, S&M moved to 400 East Manchester (the ‘Relocation Property’
.“7. Prior to moving to the Relocation
Property, Monika looked for other sites by driving around the area of the
Property, but found no sites comparable to the Property. Monika spent three days following the time
she became aware of the Possession Order looking for a property to relocate
to.
“8. This court issued its statement of
decision in the right to take trial, finding in favor of South Gate and against
S&M on March 3, 2009. At this point
in time, S&M had exhausted all legal challenges to the constitutionality of
South Gate’s eminent domain action and knew, or should have known[,] that there
were no impediments to South Gate moving forward with its project on the
Jauregui Property.
“9. On November 16, 2009, this court granted
South Gate’s motion for possession of the Jauregui Property. The court’s order stated that South Gate was
going to take possession on the 31st day after service of the order, which took
place on November 16, 2009. [Internal
record reference omitted.]
“10. In her supplemental response to
Interrogatory No. 41 which was verified by her and served on July 1, 2008,
Monika stated that S&M was formulating a strategy regarding relocation
should it be necessary, which S&M intended to implement, including based
upon rulings it receives on its right to take and/or other legal
challenges. [Internal record reference
omitted.] This indicates that Monika was
aware of the need for a relocation strategy as early as July 1, 2008 and that
she was, in fact, formulating one. In
fact, during 2007 and 2008, she made no efforts to identify relocation
sites.
“11. Monika for the first time began to seek a
relocation property on December 17, 2009 and found the Relocation Property
between December 17 and December 20, 2009.
She looked at no other sites.
“12. In her trial testimony, Monika was unable
to recall the number of cars sold by S&M at the Jauregui Property in either
2007 or 2008. Monika further testified
that S&M did not prepare or maintain profit and loss statements, income
statements, cash flow analyses, or budgeting documents.
“13. S&M’s business appraisal expert, Dave
Girbovan (‘Girbovan’
testified that he used the seller’s discretionaryearnings methodology to determine if S&M had goodwill at the Jauregui
Property and its value. This method
involves determining the business’s gross profit by subtracting the cost of
goods sold from the net sales and then subtracting [the] operating expenses
which results in ‘seller’s discretionary earnings,’ which represents the funds
remaining in the business after all expenses and costs have been paid. Fixed assets are then deducted to find the
goodwill of the enterprise.
“14. S&M’s actual cost of goods sold for
each vehicle sold by it in 2007 and 2008 is reflected in the ‘deal jacket’ for
the purchase of the vehicle. S&M’s
tax returns for 2007 and 2008 were prepared using the ‘deal jackets’ for all
cars sold in the pertinent calendar year.
However, for reasons unexplained at trial, while all of the 2007 and
2008 ‘deal jackets’ were produced during discovery, Girbovan was not given the
‘deal jackets’ prior to preparing his expert report or giving his expert
deposition in this case.
“15. In reaching his opinion regarding whether
there was good will, Girbovan utilized the sales numbers for 2008 as they
appeared in the tax return, but did not utilize the costs of goods numbers
reflected in the 2008 tax return.
Rather, he divided costs of goods into two components, cost of vehicles
and refurbishing costs and as to each component, calculated a different number
than that reflected in the ‘deal jackets’ and the tax returns.
“16. With respect to the cost of vehicles,
Girbov[a]n performed a margin analysis of a handwritten list of S&M sales
transactions for a three month period in 2008, which handwritten list had been
prepared by Monika and her mother. In
his trial testimony, Girbovan asserted that his margin analysis resulted in a
cost of goods margin of 78.6% which he then applied to the tax return sales
figures from 2008 to determine the cost of vehicles. The cost of goods sold margin reflected in
the 2008 tax return was 92%.
“17. With respect to the cost of refurbishment
component of cost of goods for 2008, Girbovan did not utilize the actual cost
of refurbishment reflected in the ‘deal jackets,’ which he had not been
provided, or the tax returns, but did an analysis of tax returns from a
separate dealership at a different location to develop a ‘refurbishment
adjustment.’ Girbovan conceded that in
developing this ‘refurbishment adjustment’ he did not ask anyone affiliated
with S&M whether the percentage he calculated was accurate, whether the
cars sold at the separate dealership were similar to the cars sold by S&M, or
whether S&M’s refurbishment costs were detailed in its records. Girbovan testified, when informed that actual
refurbishment costs for each vehicle sold are reflected in a line item on the
‘deal jackets,’ that he should have reviewed and considered the S&M ‘deal jackets.’
“18. Exhibit 133 is a chart reflecting
Girbovan’s valuation of S&M’s goodwill ‘in the before condition’ based on
calendar year 2008 operations. In his
trial testimony, Girbovan testified that if the actual cost of goods sold
reflected in the 2008 tax return is utilized, rather than Girbovan’s cost of
vehicle margin analysis and refurbishment adjustment, the resulting seller’s
discretionary earnings is a negative number which Girbovan further testified
indicates that S&M had no goodwill at the Jauregui Property.
“19. The court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence, based on the testimony received at trial, that it is not reasonable
to utilize Girbovan’s cost of vehicle margin analysis or his refurbishment
adjustment in determining whether S&M had goodwill at the Jauregui Property
because the actual costs of vehicles and refurbishment were reflected in the
S&M ‘deal jackets’ and in the S&M tax returns. Rather, the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that utilizing the seller’s discretionary earnings methodology
with the actual cost of goods sold as reflected in the tax returns and the
‘deal jackets,’ instead of the cost of vehicle margin analysis and
refurbishment adjustment which Girbovan employed, is a more reasonable and
accurate basis for determining whether S&M had goodwill at the Jauregui
Property. As noted above, Girbovan
testified that with these changes, the seller’s discretionary earnings
methodology employed by him as reflected in Exhibit 133 results in a negative
seller[’]s discretionary income which, in turn, indicates an absence of good
will. Thus, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that S&M had no goodwill at the Jauregui
Property and therefore lost no goodwill as a result of the taking of the
Jauregui Property by South Gate and has therefore failed to meet its burden
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1263.510(a)(1). On this basis alone, judgment must be for
South Gate and against S&M.
“20. As a separate and independent basis for
finding that S&M had no goodwill at the Jauregui Property, the court
further finds that with respect to Girbovan’s cost of vehicle margin analysis
and his refurbishment adjustment, he has relied upon a goodwill valuation
methodology that does not value S&M’s actual business but instead values a
hypothetical business operating at S&M’s facility. Thus, under Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v. Mesdaq (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
1111, 1118, Girbovan’s expert testimony is inadmissible as being without
sufficient foundation and speculative and there is no admissible evidence that
S&M had goodwill at the Jauregui Property and lost goodwill as a result of
the taking of the Jauregui Property by South Gate.
“21. Based upon the court[’]s findings as
reflected in Paragraph Nos. 6 through 12 hereof, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that S&M has failed to meet [its] burden of
proving that any loss of good will could not have been reasonably prevented by
a relocation of S&M and adopting procedures that [a] reasonably prudent
person would take and adopt in pursuing good will as required by Code of Civil
Procedure section 1263.510(a)(2).”
Notice
of entry of judgment was served on January 5, 2011. S&M timely appealed.
S&M
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Girbovan’s
expert opinion testimony. S&M also
contends that the trial court erred in concluding that S&M had not
established that it (1) lost goodwill as a result of the move, or
(2) acted reasonably in relocating to the Manchester location. We consider these issues below.
I. Applicable Legal
Standards
“Historically,
lost business goodwill was not recoverable under eminent domain law. [Citation.]”
(City and County of San Francisco
v. Coyne (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1522 (Coyne).) Believing this
unjust, the Legislature in 1975 enacted section 1263.510 in order “to provide
monetary compensation for the kind of losses which typically occur when an
ongoing . . . business is forced to move and give up the benefits of
its former location.” (
Muller (1984) 36 Cal.3d 263, 270.)
“Thus, a business owner’s right to compensation for loss of goodwill is
a statutory right, not a constitutional right. . . . [¶]
. . . [I]f the owner of a business being conducted on the
property taken establishes certain preconditions, he or she is entitled to
compensation for the loss of goodwill that results from the taking.” (Coyne,
supra, at p. 1522.)
Section
1263.510 sets forth the prerequisites for an award of compensation for loss of
business goodwill in eminent domain proceedings, as follows: “The owner of a business conducted on the
property taken, or on the remainder if the property is part of a larger parcel,
shall be compensated for loss of goodwill if the owner proves all of the
following: [¶] (1) The loss is caused by
the taking of the property or the injury to the remainder. [¶]
(2) The loss cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the
business or by taking steps and adopting procedures that a reasonably prudent
person would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill. [¶]
(3) Compensation for the loss will not be included in payments under
Section 7262 of the Government Code.
[¶] (4) Compensation for the
loss will not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded to the
owner.” (§ 1263.510, subd. (a).) Section 1263.510 defines goodwill as “the
benefits that accrue to a business as a result of its location, reputation for
dependability, skill or quality, and any other circumstances resulting in
probable retention of old or acquisition of new patronage.” (§ 1263.510, subd. (b).)
“Compensation
for loss of goodwill in eminent domain proceedings ‘involves a two-step
process. Whether the qualifying
conditions for such compensation [citation] have been met is a matter for the
trial court to resolve. Only if the
court finds these conditions exist does the remaining issue of the value of the
goodwill loss, if any, go to the jury.
[Citations.]’ (
Systems (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 264, 269-270, fn. omitted.) ‘Under section 1263.510, subdivision (a), the
business owner has the initial burden of showing entitlement to compensation
for lost goodwill.’ ([
1107.) Where, as here, the entitlement
to business goodwill is disputed, ‘the determination of that dispute, including
the resolution of any disputed factual issues, is for the trial court.’ (Emeryville
Redevelopment [Agency v. Harcros
Pigments, Inc. (2002)] 101 Cal.App.4th [1083,] 1119.)” (Coyne,
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1522-1523.)
Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Excluding the Valuation Testimony
of S&M’s Expert Witness
Pursuant
to Evidence Code section 801, the opinion testimony of an expert witness is
admissible only to the extent that it is based on matter “of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject to which his testimony relates.”
(Subd. (b).) The trial court is
required to exclude expert opinion testimony if it concludes that the testimony
is “based in whole or in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis
for such an opinion.” (Evid. Code, §
803.) In ruling on the admissibility of
expert opinion testimony, the court enjoys broad discretion. (See City
of San Diego v. Sobke (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 379, 395.) Hence, we review for abuse of discretion
S&M’s claim that the court erred in excluding Girbovan’s testimony. (Ibid.)
Section
1263.510 does not provide any guidance as to how the value of lost goodwill
should be calculated. Consequently, “the
courts have recognized that ‘there is no single method by which to measure
goodwill’ [citation] and that ‘“‘[e]ach case must be determined on its own
facts and circumstances . . . .’”’ [Citation.]
Nevertheless, the evidence presented to a jury regarding lost goodwill
‘“‘must be such as legitimately establishes value’”’ [citation] and ‘generally
represents the present value of the anticipated profits of the business.’ [Citations.]
In other words, while there are no explicit statutory requirements
regarding an expert’s use of a particular methodology for valuing lost
goodwill, the expert’s methodology must provide a fair estimate of
hypothetical or speculative uses of a condemned business. [Citations.]”
(Redevelopment Agency of San Diego
v. Mesdaq, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1129.)
In
its statement of decision, the trial court said that it excluded Girbovan’s
testimony because Girbovan failed to demonstrate that his methodology for
valuing lost goodwill was based on a fair estimate of S&M’s actual value,
rather than the value of a hypothetical business operating on the property. For the following reasons, the court’s
exclusion of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion.
Girbovan
testified that he calculated lost business goodwill by subtracting “cost of
goods sold” (composed of “cost of vehicles” and “refurbishing costs”
from “netsales.” S&M’s tax returns for the
relevant years reflected “net sales” of $1,733,666 and “cost of goods sold” of
$1,598,647. But while Girbovan used the
“net sales” figure reported on the tax returns to calculate lost goodwill, he
did not use either the reported “cost of goods sold” figure or the actual “cost
of vehicle” and “refurbishing costs” reflected on the “deal jackets” maintained
by S&M for the relevant period.
Instead, he assumed that the “cost of goods sold” was $1,438,943
($159,704 less than reported on the tax returns), which he determined by (1)
calculating the “cost of vehicles” for a three to five-month period and then
projecting that cost over the remaining nine to 12 months, and (2) assuming
that S&M’s reconditioning costs were the same as those of a similar but
unrelated used car lot owned by Salvador and Norma. Girbovan conceded that he never asked S&M
for its actual refurbishing costs (records of which the business apparently
maintained), and never asked anyone at S&M whether the other car lot sold
similar cars.
Girbovan
testified that he made adjustments to the reported “cost of goods sold” because
“there were problems with the cost of goods sold number; there were problems
with the beginning inventory numbers; there were problems with the ending
numbers. It didn’t accurately track the
cost of the vehicles.” Girbovan never
explained what these problems were, however, or how his methodology corrected
the problems.
Further,
Girbovan did not establish any industry support for the methodology he
adopted. The sole testimony in this
regard was as follows:
“[The
Witness:] This is a book that’s widely
recognized in the appraisal profession called ‘Valuing Small Businesses and
Professional Practices,” by Shannon Pratt, Robert Riley and Robert
Weiss. . . . Chapter 8 is
devoted to justifying the income statement.
One part of Chapter 8 is adjustments for cost of goods sold, noting that
inventories can be different, noting that accounting practices vary
significantly one year to the next and even within the same company. And that cost of goods sold adjustments are
part of the adjustments that can be made to normalize an income statement and
valu[e] a business.
“The
Court: But did you find any of those
things, that there had been changes in the valuation, that there had been
change in the accounting
“The
Witness: Yes.
“The
Court: With respect to S&M
“The
Witness: Yes. The beginning and ending inventory. There was beginning and ending inventory in
2007. There was no beginning and ending
— sorry. Beginning and ending inventory
in 2008.
“The
Court: Okay. Go ahead.
“Q: . . . [D]id the methodology you
used comply with the text that you have referred to [Valuing Small Businesses and Professional Practices]
“A: Well, the fact that adjustments are
necessary, yes, they only get into a couple minor adjustments, but —”
Taken
as a whole, Girbovan’s testimony suggests that cost of goods sold adjustments
can be appropriate in some circumstances, but does not establish that the particular
adjustments he made in this case were consistent with the text he cited or with
any other accepted industry approach.
Further, Girbovan never explained why his methodology, which relied on
cost estimates, more accurately
reflected S&M’s costs than did the deal jackets, which reflected
costs. Finally, while it is true, as
S&M suggests, that courts have at times permitted experts to estimate
future anticipated profits, it cites no cases for the proposition that an expert
may reject actual cost data in favor of hypothetical cost data.
“As
one appellate court has observed, ‘There is a limit to imaginative claims
. . . . To say that only
the witness’ valuation opinion has probative value, that his “reasons” have
none, ignores reality. His reasons may
influence the verdict more than his figures.
To say that all objections to his reasons go to weight, not
admissibility, is to minimize judicial responsibility for limiting the
permissible arena in condemnation trials.
The responsibility for defining the extent of compensable rights is that
of the courts.’ (Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed
[(1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 60,] 69.)” (
Although
Girbovan was not required to use any specific methodology in valuing goodwill,
nothing in the case law or statutory authority cited suggests that his
methodology accurately evaluated loss of goodwill. Hence, the trial court acted within its broad
discretion in excluding Girbovan’s expert opinion testimony. (Evid. Code, § 803.)
Further, because S&M’s claim
for lost goodwill was based entirely on Girbovan’s testimony, on this record
S&M was not entitled to any compensation for lost goodwill.
The trial court thus properly
entered judgment for South Gate.
III. S&M’s Contentions
Are Without Merit
S&M
contends that, for at least five independent reasons, the trial court erred in
striking Girbovan’s appraisal and entering judgment for South Gate. None of these contentions has merit:
1. S&M contends that the trial court
was required to award compensation for lost goodwill because South Gate
“conceded loss of goodwill damages” in an appraisal prepared by its own
expert. We do not agree: Whatever the contents of the South Gate’s
appraisal may have been, neither party introduced it at trial, and thus the
appraisal could not have supported an award for S&M.
2. S&M contends that South Gate did
not extend relocation services to it, and thus “[a]ny duty of S&M to
actively pursue relocation was obviated by [the] CITY’s utter failure and
refusal to perform its obligations under [the] relocation statutes and
rules.” Whatever the factual merits of
this contention might be, it is legally irrelevant. Under section 1263.510, subdivision (a),
S&M was required to prove both
that it suffered a loss as a result of the taking of the property
be prevented by a relocation of the business.
Because S&M did not establish that it suffered lost goodwill as a
result of the taking, its asserted justification for failing to timely seek an
adequate relocation site has no bearing on its right to recover.
3. S&M contends that Girbovan’s
opinion should have been admitted because the “discretionary earnings methodology”
on which he relied “is an accepted methodogy.”
Perhaps so, but the court did not exclude Girbovan’s opinion because it
was based on a discretionary earnings methodology. Instead, as discussed above, the court
excluded Girbovan’s opinion because it relied on inaccurate cost estimates.
4. S&M contends that the trial court
struck Girbovan’s appraisal because Girbovan did not review the deal jackets
before preparing it. Not so: The court never had the opportunity to
“strike” (or to admit) Girbovan’s appraisal because S&M never offered it
into evidence. Further, the court’s
exclusion of Girbovan’s opinion was unrelated to his review of the deal
jackets.
5. S&M contends that the trial court
erred in concluding that Girbovan’s use of “comparative market data” was not
reliable because “[s]uch a methodology is accepted.” S&M is correct that comparable market
data has been appropriately relied on in some circumstances, but suggests no
reason why the court was required to accept it here, when actual cost data was readily available.
The
judgment for the City of South Gate is affirmed. The City shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUZUKAWA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P.
J. WILLHITE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all
further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Jauregui began leasing the property in
September 2007, and began selling used cars and trucks on the lot in October
2007.
