In re P.B
Filed 12/31/12 In
re P.B. CA2.1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re P.B., a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B239071
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PJ45267)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Morton Rochman, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Tanya
Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Toni R. Johns Estaville, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
P.B. appeals from the juvenile
court’s order declaring her a ward of the court after sustaining a petition
alleging she committed grand theft from the person of another, and
officer attempting to discharge his duties.
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support her
conviction on either count. We remand
the matter to the juvenile court with instructions to calculate appellant’s
predisposition credits and otherwise affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November
2011, 15-year-old defendant P.B., was the subject of a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602 petition alleging that she committed grand theft from the
person of another (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c);
count 1); and resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer attempting to
discharge his duties (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
The
juvenile court sustained the petition, finding both counts 1 (a felony) and 2
(a misdemeanor) true beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court declared appellant a ward of the court, and ordered her
suitably placed. This appeal followed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon
of September
30, 2011, 12-year-old Manuel B. went to a
football game at Sylmar High School. While at the high school,
Manuel found himself walking with appellant, whom he did not know, and her male
companion, and appellant asked if she could “borrow†Manuel’s cell phone.
Manuel held his
phone out to appellant in his open palm and appellant took it. Appellant never made a phone call. Instead, she asked her companion for a phone
number, appeared to punch random numbers into the phone and then ran off with
Manuel’s phone. Manuel was scared; he
did not run after appellant and did not report the incident to anyone, but two
security guards had witnessed the incident.
A few minutes
later, school police officer George Flores overheard another officer telling
appellant she could not attend the game and had to leave. Flores watched appellant move away from the ticket booth. At about the same time, Flores received information
that appellant was the suspect in a robbery that had just been reported at the
football game, and he was ordered to detain her. Flores followed appellant who, by then, was running toward the front of
the school. As he ran after her, Flores, dressed in his full
uniform (“badge, gun, belt, everythingâ€) shouted, “Stop,†“Stop running,†and
“School police†at appellant, who at most three or four car lengths in front of
him. There was one bystander between
Flores and appellant. Appellant turned
back to looked toward Flores at one point, but continued sprinting away to avoid him. Appellant was apprehended by other officers.
Appellant
presented no evidence in her defense.
DISCUSSION
1. Grand theft from the person of another
Appellant
maintains there is insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that she committed grand theft from the
person of another because there is no evidence she intended to steal at the
time she took Manuel’s phone. She
insists that, at most, the evidence shows she meant to borrow the phone and
only developed the intent to steal it after the phone was in her possession. We disagree.
a. Standard
of proof
“The
standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same
as the standard in adult criminal trials.â€
(In re Jose R. (1982) 137
Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) We apply the usual
standard of review governing claims by criminal defendants challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. We review
the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if it
discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
juvenile court reasonably could have deduced from the evidence, defer to its
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve all
decision. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371–1373.) If circumstances reasonably justify the
court’s findings, reversal is not warranted even if the evidence might also
reasonably support a contrary finding. (
11; In re Brandon G. (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079–1080.) The test
is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion, not
whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment will not be set aside for
insufficiency of the evidence unless there exists no hypothesis upon which
there is sufficient substantial evidence to support it. (People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; In
re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994–995.) The same standard of review applies to cases
such as this involving circumstantial evidence.
(People v. Catlin (2001)
b. Governing
law
Section
487, subdivision (c) makes it a felony offense for a person to, among other
things, steal, take, or carry away the personal property of another with the
specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property. (See CALJIC 14.02; People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 796.) The defendant must harbor the intent to steal
at the time the victim is dispossessed of the property. (In re
Jesus O. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 859, 867.)
Intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof. To determine if the intent has been
established, we consider whether it may be inferred from facts and surrounding
circumstances, i.e., determined by circumstantial
evidence. (See People v. Cole (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 41, 48.)
c. Substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings
We
conclude the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant
intended permanently to deprive Manuel of his cell phone when she took it from
his hand. Appellant asked Manuel if she
could borrow his phone, which he took to mean she wanted to use it to place a
call. But, once appellant had possession
of the phone, she did not make a call.
Rather, she only pretended to do so before running off when Manuel asked
if she planned to give it back.
Appellant
insists this evidence shows she intended only to use the phone when she took it
from Manuel’s hand. One could reasonably
infer from this evidence that appellant did not form the intent to steal the
phone until after it was in her possession.
Indeed, even Manuel testified, in a somewhat disjointed fashion, that at
one point he may have believed appellant “was going to give [the phone]
back.†But the juvenile court’s
conclusion that appellant intended to steal the phone from the outset is also
reasonably inferred from the evidence.
There is no evidence appellant made any effort to restore the phone to
Manuel’s possession. And, Manuel seemed
to realize he was wrong to trust appellant almost as soon as he had handed her
the phone, because something about her conduct made him suspicious and he was
concerned about whether he would get it back.
The evidence is susceptible to both interpretations. Nevertheless, the trial court’s finding that
appellant committed grand theft from the person of another must be upheld
because the record supports an inference that she intended to steal the phone
when she took it from Manuel on the pretense of borrowing it to place a call.
2. Resisting Arrest
Appellant
also maintains that count 2 cannot stand because there is insufficient evidence
that she willfully resisted, obstructed or delayed an officer in the
performance of his duties. Specifically,
appellant insists there is insufficient evidence to show that she heard Flores
yelling at her to stop or that she knew his commands were directed at her. The record reflects otherwise.
law
To
establish a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), the prosecution must
show that (1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace
officer, (2) who was engaged in the performance of his duties, and (3) the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the other person was a peace
officer engaged in the performance of his duties. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.) “The offense is a general intent crime,
proscribing only the particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference
to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. (In re
Muhammad C., at p. 1329.) As with
appellant’s first assertion of error, this contention is reviewed for
substantial evidence.
One
can resist, delay or obstruct an officer in the discharge his duties in a
number of ways, one of which is to run from an officer attempting to effect a
detention of that person. (See
1164, 1175.)
Appellant
does not contest that Flores was a peace officer engaged in the performance of
his duties when he was attempting to detain her. Instead, she insists the evidence is
insufficient to show that she knew or should have known that he was trying to
stop her because there was another person on the sidewalk at the time Flores
was yelling, “stop running,†and she could have believed that Officer Flores’s
commands were directed at that person.
But
Flores testified that he yelled at her to “stop,†“stop running†and “school
police†at appellant alone, as she ran from him. There is no evidence that the bystander
Flores passed on the street while chasing appellant was moving, let alone that
he had been or was running, hence no reason why Flores would ever have ordered that
person to stop running. The only
evidence was that appellant ran from a uniformed officer chasing after her who
was yelling at her to stop, and that she continued running until other officers
caught her. There is no evidence to
support a conclusion that appellant reasonably could have believed Flores’s
command to stop was directed at another pedestrian, who was either standing
still or at least not running, rather than at anyone other than herself. The record contains sufficient evidence to
support an inference that appellant knew or should have known that Flores’s
order to stop was directed at her. Her
failure to comply with that order constitutes, as the juvenile court found,
intentional resistance, delay or obstruction with Flores’s ability to perform
his duties as a peace officer.
3. Confinement
credit
Appellant contends, and the Attorney
General concedes, that the juvenile court erred by failing to award and
calculate her credit for time spent in custody prior to the juvenile court’s
sustaining of the petition.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
At
the disposition portion of appellant’s hearing on January 5, 2012, the court
set appellant’s maximum period of confinement at three years and four months
“aggregated†and ordered her to remain detained pending acceptance at a suitable
placement facility. The court did not
mention any predisposition custody credits being awarded for time appellant
spent in custody pending her adjudication.
The adjudication/disposition minute order states: “Minor is given predisposition credit of PROBATION
days. CALCULATE.†A juvenile court must calculate and give
credit for the number of predisposition days in custody, including time spent
in juvenile hall. (§ 2900.5, subd. (d);
550, 556–557.) The court may not
delegate that duty. (
1058, 1067.) Thus, the court here failed
to fulfill its responsibility.
Here,
a December 13, 2011 probation report reflects that appellant was arrested and
released on September 30, 2011, the day she committed the instant
offenses. A nondetained petition was
filed on November 29, 2011. But another
probation report states that a warrant for the cell phone theft was issued on
November 17, 2011 and appellant was “detained†on November 18, 2011.
29, 2011 reflects that appellant was to remain in custody pending a hearing on
December 13, 2011. The probation report
states that appellant had been detained for 26 days.
January 4, 2012 each reflect that appellant was detained. A January 5, 2012
reflects that appellant was detained pending suitable placement.
The
parties agree that appellant is entitled to an award of predisposition custody
credits. However, the record contains
insufficient information to enable us to determine the proper number of
predisposition custody credits to which she is entitled.
be remanded to the juvenile court to calculate appellant’s predisposition
credits. (In re Antwon R., supra,
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 353; In re Pedro M.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.)
DISPOSITION
The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to calculate
appellant’s predisposition credits. In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED.
JOHNSON,
J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD,
Acting P. J.
CHANEY,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Appellant did not object to the juvenile court’s erroneous
delegation of the calculation of her custody credits. Nevertheless, section 1237.1, which prohibits
raising errors in custody credit calculations on appeal unless the claim was
raised in the trial court, does not apply in juvenile appeals. (In re
Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350–352.)
