CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Rodger Kevin Black appeals from an order sentencing him to prison following a violation of probation. He contends: (1) the court should have limited his prior waiver of presentence credits to a total of 180 days, the amount he agreed to; and (2) portions of his sentence must be stayed under Penal Code section 654.[1] We agree with the first contention and the Attorney General concedes the second.

Defendant Clifford Vecera was convicted following a jury trial of second degree robbery and assault with a firearm after he shot a pizza deliveryman and took money from him. He argues for the first time on appeal that an accomplice’s testimony violated his due process rights, because she was improperly compelled to testify to a specific version of events. We disagree and affirm.

After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of second degree murder with personal use of a firearm, carrying a concealed firearm with a prior misdemeanor firearms conviction, and carrying a loaded firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 12022.53, subd. (d); 12025, subd. (b)(1), and 12031, subd. (a)(1).)[1] The trial court sentenced him to 40 years to life in state prison. He appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in (1) instructing the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1403, an instruction regarding the jury’s consideration of gang activity, and (2) admitting into evidence the factual circumstances relating to appellant’s prior misdemeanor conviction. We find no merit in either contention, and hence affirm the conviction.

In this juvenile dependency matter, K.B, the mother of the dependent child, and A.M., the child’s paternal grandmother, separately appeal from the orders denying the paternal grandmother’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] and her motion for change of placement.[2] In both her section 388 petition and her motion, the paternal grandmother sought to remove the 18-month old child from placement with her foster parents, who had provided the child’s home for nearly all her life and who wished to adopt her. The paternal grandmother also requested that the child be permanently placed with her.
Appellants contend that the juvenile court violated the statutory requirements that relatives be given notice that the child has been removed from the parents (§ 309, subd. (e)(1)) and their requests for placement assessed under the preference for relative placement (§ 361.3). They also contend that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the section 388 petition and in denying mother’s request for a continuance of the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The mother additionally argues that since the order denying the section 388 petition must be reversed and the matter remanded for assessment of the paternal grandmother’s request for relative placement, the judgment terminating her parental rights under section 366.26 must also be reversed. For the reasons stated below, we determine that none of the juvenile court’s rulings constitute an abuse of discretion, and therefore we will affirm the challenged orders.

Appellant Sado Labtis, a self-represented litigant, filed an action against respondents CitiMortgage, Inc. (CitiMortgage) and CR Title Services, Inc. (CR Title Services; hereafter, sometimes collectively CitiMortgage) in which she sought to prevent the foreclosure of her townhome in Sunnyvale. The trial court denied Labtis’s request for a preliminary injunction staying the trustee’s sale during the pendency of the action, sustained CitiMortgage’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal.
On appeal, we understand Labtis to contend for a number of reasons that the trial court erred in denying her request for a preliminary injunction. CitiMortgage argues that all of Labtis’s contentions lack merit and, in any event, the appeal is moot. For the reasons stated below, we agree that the appeal is moot. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits.

This case involves business loans made by respondent Heritage Bank of Commerce ("Bank") to defendant borrowers, four named limited liability companies, for the purpose of property development. The Bank brought an action for judicial foreclosure (first cause of action against borrowers), specific performance and appointment of a receiver (second cause of action against borrowers), and breach of guaranty (third cause of action against guarantors). The Bank obtained a right to attach order and an order for issuance of a prejudgment writ of attachment against the property of Erin Garner and Susan Garner as trustees of the Erin Garner Living Trust Dated 1997 ("Trust") and other guarantors who were trustees of various trusts.
Erin Garner, Sue Garner, and the Trust appeal from that right to attach order.[1] (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(5).)[2] Appellants state that the "sole issue" on appeal is whether respondent Bank laid "a proper, specific evidentiary foundation" for a prejudgment writ of attachment. They argue that this court must reverse the trial court's orders because they were "totally unsupported by admissible, competent evidence." Their arguments are essentially a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence. They do not argue that the evidence, if admissible, was insufficient.
We affirm.

Petitioner Kirn Kim challenges the Governor’s reversal of the parole board’s 2011 decision to grant him parole. He contends that ruling was erroneous as a matter of law and must be reversed. However, because the Governor has recently let stand a 2012 decision granting Kim parole, Kim’s challenge to the Governor’s earlier reversal is now moot. We therefore dismiss his petition.

Appellant Kenneth Ray Bishop, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of nolo contendere of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11379, subd. (a)) with a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)), and two prior convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). We will correct the abstract of judgment and affirm.

On August 23, 2011, appellant, Robert Allen West, pled no contest to the offense commonly known as petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666)[1] and admitted enhancement allegations that he had served three separate prison terms for prior felony convictions. He entered his plea with the understanding that he would receive a sentence of four years, with two years to be served in custody and two years on mandatory supervision (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B)). On October 25, 2011, the court struck one of appellant’s prior prison term enhancements and imposed the agreed upon four-year term as a split sentence, with two years to be served in Kern County Jail and the remaining two years on mandatory supervision.
Insofar as the record reveals, appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing.

A jury convicted appellant, Roberto Cortez, of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); count 2), and appellant admitted enhancement allegations that he had served three separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a charge of committing a forcible lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); count 1), and pursuant to the prosecution’s motion, the court dismissed the count 1 charge. The court imposed a prison sentence of 11 years, consisting of the eight-year upper term on the substantive offense and one year on each of the three prior prison term enhancements.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant himself has filed with the court a document, to which we will refer as a letter brief, in which it appears he argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. We affirm.

Defendant Tyrone Allen Wilson was convicted in case No. BF131206A of possessing cocaine base for sale and maintaining a place for the purpose of selling, using, or giving away a controlled substance. Gang enhancements for those two counts were found true, and Wilson also was convicted of the substantive offense of gang participation. In case No. BF123662A, the court found that Wilson violated his probation in a prior case by committing the current offenses. It sentenced him to a total of 10 years.

Melissa D. appeals a juvenile court order, made at a six-month review hearing, terminating her reunification services as to her dependent child, Violet A. Melissa challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding she did not make substantive progress with the provisions of her case plan and there was no substantial probability Violet would be returned to Melissa's custody in the next six months. Melissa also contends it was in Violet's best interests to order additional reunification services. We affirm the order.

Daniel R. appeals an order denying his request for custody of his son, D.R., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388.[1] He also appeals an order terminating his parental rights under section 366.26. We reverse.

Lisa Kristin Farmer (Kristin) appeals from an order denying a permanent restraining order against her former husband, Fred S. Totah.[1] On appeal, Kristin asserts that the court abused its discretion because (1) the court failed to consider her reasonable fear of Fred, (2) a three-month time period in which there were no incidents was not a basis for denying the restraining order, (3) the court found multiple instances of abuse had occurred, (4) there was a "grave risk" of future harm, and (5) the burden on Fred of being subject to the restraining order was outweighed by the danger to Kristin. We affirm.