CA Unpub Decisions

Following a jury trial, Ronald Allen Patala (appellant) was found guilty of assault upon an officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)),[1] receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)) and evading a pursuing officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court found true the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior conviction. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of five years eight months in state prison. As part of his sentence, he was ordered to pay $2,537.27 in victim restitution to the Dinuba Police Department. He contends this restitution order was unauthorized and we agree. Next, we reject appellant’s contention that we must make a “not true” finding or dismiss the personal use of a deadly weapon allegation attached to the charge of assault upon an officer, which was included in the information but not presented to the jury. Lastly, pursuant to appellant’s request, we reviewed the sealed portion of the record pertaining to discovery of police personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) and determine that the trial court followed proper protocol and did not withhold discoverable information from the defense.

Defendants Karl Schiersch and Pamela Schiersch (defendants) borrowed $250,000 and then defaulted. Defendants appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motion for summary adjudication by plaintiff CEN 1 Fund Limited Partnership (CEN Fund).
Defendants based their opposition to the motion solely on their objections to the supporting declaration submitted by CEN Fund. Defendants’ evidentiary objections lack merit and the trial court properly granted CEN Fund’s motion. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Richard A. Goldbaum was an inmate at the California Rehabilitation Center. He pleaded guilty to several charges arising from a scheme to smuggle marijuana into the facility. He appeals, contending that the trial court should have held a Marsden hearing when he indicated to the court that he wanted to withdraw his plea. He also points out an error in the minutes, repeated in the abstract of judgment, which does not correctly reflect the sentence pronounced by the court. We affirm the judgment, but order the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment corrected.

A jury convicted defendant, Lucia Martinez, of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). She was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life and appeals, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, the jury was incorrectly instructed and the order for direct restitution should be clarified to indicate that her liability is joint and severable with the codefendant’s. We agree with her last contention and reject the other two. Therefore, we will direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment and minutes of the sentencing hearing to indicate that her obligation for direct restitution is joint and severable with the codefendant’s. Otherwise, we affirm.

Paul Bressman, a medical doctor, appeals from a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate. In his petition, Bressman challenged the final administrative decision upholding the suspension of his clinical privileges after an administrative hearing of the Judicial Hearing Committee (JHC) of San Antonio Community Hospital. The hospital cross-appeals, challenging the court’s unfavorable findings in the judgment.
We are the sixth body called upon to review the evidence against Bressman after rulings against him by the Medical Executive Committee (MEC), the JHC, the hospital’s appeal board and board of trustees, and the superior court. As these other bodies have found, we also find that there is sufficient evidence to support suspension of Bressman’s clinical privileges.
We affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

A jury found Kascell Morgan guilty of false imprisonment and making criminal threats to his former girlfriend. (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237, 422.) The court imposed three years' formal probation. On appeal, Morgan contends the court erred in admitting evidence of two prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code section 1109.[1] We reject this contention and affirm.

It is axiomatic that, as here, the trustee of a trust may be found guilty of embezzling trust funds or assets. The law of embezzlement is not so much concerned with who has legal title to money or property, but with whether the defendant's use of money or property violated the purposes for which the defendant was entrusted with the money or property. Here, the record shows the defendant took large sums of money for his personal use from three family trusts for which he served as trustee. Because there is no dispute the defendant acted outside the purposes for which he was given control over the trusts' assets, there is sufficient evidence to support his theft convictions. We reject defendant's argument his convictions for theft from the trusts must be reversed because in civil proceedings a trust, as opposed to a trustee, lacks the capacity to sue or be sued. That circumstance is entirely unrelated to defendant's breach of trust and hence it has no bearing on defendant's culpability for the crime of embezzlement.

Appointed counsel for defendant Markus Lee Pace asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Anthony Robert Wilson asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Robert Andrew Tucker asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Laura Ann Smith was found guilty by a jury of animal cruelty. The trial court placed her on probation on the condition she serve 365 days in county jail.
Defendant’s ensuing appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124. In accordance with the latter, we will provide a summary of the offense and the proceedings in the trial court.
Defendant and Eunice Clark were neighbors. Both women owned two dogs. One of Clark’s dogs was a six- to seven-pound Chihuahua-Miniature Pinscher mix named Roxy. Despite Clark’s efforts, Roxy would escape from her yard once or twice every couple of weeks. Three or four of those times, Clark found Roxy playing with defendant’s dogs in defendant’s yard. Defendant had never said anything to Clark, but had complained to Clark’s son about Roxy coming into her yard.

S.W., mother, and T.S., father, appeal from orders of the juvenile court terminating their reunification services and placing the minors in long-term foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Father argues the court erred in finding that there was evidence of a substantial risk of detriment in returning the minors to his custody and that reasonable services were provided to him. Mother challenges the adequacy of the notice given pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and joins father’s arguments. Except as to Mother’s claim regarding the ICWA notice, we affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Lionel Nolan Winston asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error and will affirm the judgment.