CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants, Rosemary Anderson and Richard Brown, appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to certify a number of classes of employees allegedly injured by respondent Total Renal Care’s employment policies and practices. Appellants alleged that respondent violated California wage and hour laws and failed to issue paychecks in compliance with Labor Code section 212. Below, appellants specifically sought to certify three classes: (1) employees who were not given a “meal break,” (2) employees whose paychecks failed to comply with Labor Code section 212, and (3) employees who were required to take their meal break early in the first hour of their shift. As we shall explain, the court did not err in failing to certify classes related to the meal period claims based on the court’s finding that individual matters predominated the determination of these claims. Nor do we find that remand is required in light of Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Brinker). However, we reverse the court’s denial of the class certification motion concerning the Labor Code section 212 paycheck claim. It appears that the court failed to specifically rule on that claim, and it is sufficiently distinct from the other claims that we cannot infer a ruling on it based on the court’s orders. Consequently we remand the matter for reconsideration.

Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent E1 Films Canada Inc. (E1) on its breach of contract claims against defendant and appellant Syndicate Films International, LLC. The trial court ruled that E1 met its burden to show it was entitled to a refund of payments made in connection with an agreement for the Canadian distribution of certain films.
Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support the judgment with respect to either liability or damages for breach of contract, and that prejudgment interest should not have been awarded. We affirm. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that appellant breached the agreement and that E1 was entitled to damages in the amount of $1,390,000 plus prejudgment interest.

We revisit a dispute between abutting landowners over the scope and extent of a driveway easement. In 2011, we affirmed a judgment in favor of the dominant tenement owner concerning its rights in a non-exclusive driveway easement. (Zacky v. Dillon (Jan. 6, 2011, No. B217352 [nonpub. opn.] (Zacky I).)[1] We also directed the trial court to clarify certain terms of its judgment on remand. It conducted further proceedings and issued its judgment following appeal. Appellant Scott Zacky, trustee of the owner of the dominant tenement (Zacky) appeals and contends that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction on remand and in effect reversed Zacky I. We disagree and affirm.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and Joseph Billingsley on the complaint filed by plaintiff and appellant Edith San Jose. Appellant alleged she was injured after being struck by an MTA bus driven by Billingsley. The trial court ruled that appellant’s complaint was untimely, having been filed more than six months after the rejection of her government tort claim.
We affirm. The undisputed evidence showed that appellant filed her complaint more than six months after her claim was rejected. Contrary to appellant’s effort to create a triable issue of fact, nothing in the applicable statutory scheme precluded the MTA from administering its claims handling through a third party, and evidence showing the third party’s consistent rejection of claims did not indicate a constitutional violation.

Defendants and appellants, Fernando Romero and Eric De La Cruz, appeal their convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder, with a principal-armed firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 182, 12022).[1] They were each sentenced to prison terms of 26 years to life.
The judgments are affirmed.

Defendant and appellant, Raymond Andrew Mark, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for grand theft and displaying a false license plate (2 counts) (Pen. Code, § 487; Vehicle. Code § 4463).[1] He was sentenced to probation for three years.
The judgment is affirmed.

Claudia Guidara filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging an order from respondent superior court overruling her demurrer. We requested a response from real party in interest Dianna Santos and notified her we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) We shall now issue the writ.
It is apparent from the face of the complaint that Santos’s claims against Guidara are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Santos filed her complaint on January 4, 2011. Santos alleged she had suffered damages caused by Guidara in a motor

Mother Renee A. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her son Terrance T. She contends that because of the strong bond she and Terrance shared, termination was improper. She submits that the court should have instead ordered a legal guardianship, which would have preserved her right to maintain contact with Terrance. But, significantly, although Renee initially contested the recommendation by the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) that her parental rights be terminated, she subsequently withdrew her contest and submitted on the Agency’s recommendation. In doing so, she waived her right to challenge the juvenile court’s order. We thus affirm.

Joshua James Whitehorse appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after he entered a plea of no contest to multiple offenses. His attorney has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (see Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738), in order to determine whether there is any arguable issue on appeal. We find no arguable issue and affirm.

Ronald Dean Jones (appellant) appeals from his convictions and sentence for one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (a)), and one count of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). A sentencing enhancement for being armed with a firearm while in the course of dissuading a witness was also found to be true by the jury (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel’s declaration states that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant has also been advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.

A modification decision.

The City of Santa Rosa (the City) adopted Ordinance 3902 (the Ordinance) requiring certain applicants for residential development permits to annex their property into a special tax district and pay a tax. The tax was intended to help “close the gap between the revenue generated by new development and the cost of providing [ ] needed public services” for the development.
The Home Builders Association of Northern California, Inc. (the Association) sued the City and others to invalidate the Ordinance. The trial court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment — concluding the Ordinance was unconstitutional — and entered judgment for the Association. The court also awarded the Association $243,417.50 in attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.[1]
The City appeals the order awarding attorney fees. It contends: (1) the court erred by concluding the litigation conferred a “significant benefit . . . on the general public or a large class of persons” under section 1021.5; (2) the court did not conduct the “financial burden” analysis required by section 1021.5; (3) the amount of fees awarded was excessive; and (4) the court abused its discretion by denying the City’s request for discovery.
We agree with the City the award of attorney fees for unexplained attorney travel time to file the complaint was an abuse of discretion, and we modify the court’s order to reduce the fee award by $1,800. In all other respects we affirm the order.

The juvenile court committed the minor Greg F. (appellant) to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), dismissing his most recent juvenile delinquency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602),[1] which alleged an offense that did not qualify him for DJF commitment (§ 733, subd. (c)), and reaching back to an earlier petition that alleged a DJF-eligible offense (§ 707, subd. (b)). On appeal, we reversed the order of commitment. We concluded the court lacked authority under section 782 to dismiss a minor’s most recent petition, following the minor’s admission to the allegations of that petition, in order to commit him to DJF. The California Supreme Court then reversed our decision and remanded the matter to this court to decide appellant’s remaining contentions. (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 420.) We find no merit in these contentions and affirm the order of commitment.

Defendants, Thomas K. Peterson, M.D. and his professional corporation, Thomas K. Peterson, M.D., Inc., have moved to dismiss the purported appeal of plaintiffs, Marguerita Ray and Frederick Hagen. On January 6, 2012, judgment was entered in favor of a codefendant, St. Francis Medical Center, and against plaintiffs. The judgment was signed by the Honorable Rose Hom. On March 5, 2012, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the January 6, 2012 judgment in favor of the codefendant, St. Francis Medical Center.