P. v. Woods
Filed 1/25/13 P. v. Woods
CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
ROBERT LEE WOODS,
Defendant
and Appellant.
B239866
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA118773)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Reversed.
Sally
Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr.,
and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
>
Defendant Robert Lee Woods appeals from the judgment entered
following the jury verdict convicting him of
that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.7, subd. (a).)
proceeding, the jury also found that the robbery was committed for the
purpose of promoting criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) After a separate bench trial, defendant was
found to have suffered prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of
sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), 667, subdivisions (b) through
(i), and 667, subdivision (a), and to have served a prior prison term within
the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
He was sentenced to 45 years to life in state prison. Defendant contends there is insufficient
evidence to sustain the robbery conviction and the true finding on the gang
allegation, and the prosecutor committed Batson/Wheeler
error. We conclude the trial court’s
finding that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral reason for exercising a
peremptory challenge is not supported by the record. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.
I. The
Robbery
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on June 27, 2011, Araceli Sanchez was walking home with items she had purchased at
the grocery store. She noticed two men
with bicycles across the street. As she
passed, one of the men, whom she identified as defendant, approached from
behind and screamed at Sanchez to give him her wallet. She turned to face defendant, who was
standing two feet from her, pulled out her wallet, and gave it to him. He received the wallet in his left hand and
struck Sanchez in the face with his right.
She fell to the ground and defendant cursed her. He joined the other male across the street
and they rode away on their bicycles.
Sanchez went home and called 911.
She gave the operator a description of the two males, during which she
said the person who robbed her was wearing a white t-shirt. Sanchez spoke to Los Angeles Police Officer
Mike Leese and his partner. After
searching the area where the robbery occurred, Leese returned to the station to
look at tapes from video cameras that monitored the Imperial Courts Housing
Development, as the crime had occurred nearby.
He found a tape of the robbery taking place. Later, another officer who had viewed the
same tape, was monitoring live video feed from the Imperial Courts camera when
he saw someone who matched the description of the robber. He contacted Leese and directed him to that
location. As Leese arrived, he saw
defendant and another male walking between two buildings. As Leese and his partner exited the patrol
vehicle, the males ran. The officers
pursued and captured both men.
Sanchez was brought to where defendant and his companion were held
by police. She viewed each man
separately, and identified defendant as the individual who had taken her wallet
and punched her.
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A few days after the robbery, Rafael Mata, who was investigating the
crime, showed Sanchez a number of photographs and asked whether she recognized
anyone depicted. She identified and
initialed a picture of defendant and said he was the man who robbed her.
On April
19, 2011, Officer Ivan McMillan and his
partner had a conversation with defendant and filled out a field identification
card. Defendant admitted that he was a
member of the PJ Watts Crips gang, also known as the Project Crips, and said his
gang moniker was “Bam.†Defendant had a
“PJ†tattoo on the left side of his face.
Officer Francis Coughlin worked in a gang suppression unit and was
familiar with the Project Crips gang, having been assigned to its area as a
patrol officer for two years. The
Imperial Courts housing project is in Project Crips gang territory. The primary activities of the gang include
robberies, rapes, shootings, and narcotics sales.
including one that read, “soldier.â€
According to Coughlin, this particular tattoo meant that defendant was
willing to commit crimes for the gang to enhance its credibility and respect in
the community. The “PJ†tattoo on
defendant’s face demonstrated that he had put in work for the gang and was a
loyal and respected member. Coughlin believed
defendant was a member of the Project Crips gang. When asked a hypothetical question based on
the facts of the robbery, Coughlin opined that the crime was committed for the
benefit of the gang. The bases for his
opinion were: (1) committing the crime
benefitted the individual member because it demonstrated his loyalty to the
gang and his willingness to put in work for it; (2) violent crimes like robbery
benefit the gang “by creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the
communityâ€; (3) the blow to Sanchez’s face was unnecessary and emphasized the
gang’s willingness to commit violent acts against members of the community,
which causes citizens to not cooperate with police; and (4) the gang
benefitted from the proceeds of the robbery.
Martin Flores is on the panel of gang experts appointed by the
court. He regularly interacts with gang
members, working to reduce gang violence.
Flores reviewed the police reports in the case and the field
identification cards pertaining to defendant.
He spoke with defendant on two occasions. Flores is very familiar with the PJ Watts gang, as he has worked in
Imperial Courts with ex-gang members and families in the area.
Defendant admitted to Flores that he was a PJ Watts member, but said that he became less
involved with the gang six years earlier after a stabbing incident. Flores believed that defendant was no longer an active member of the
gang. Flores thought it was
significant that defendant had moved out of PJ Watts territory. Given a hypothetical based on the robbery, Flores stated the crime was not
committed for the benefit of a gang. His
reasons were: (1) the victim was a woman
and in the gang culture “women are hands offâ€; (2) the gang’s name was not
uttered; (3) no gang signs were thrown; (4) the communities are working hard to
put an end to gang violence, demonstrating that the individual was working on
his own; and (5) a gang member would be given no credit for committing a crime
against a woman.
Defendant testified that in June of 2011, he and his wife were
living on Rodeo Road, not in the Imperial Courts Housing Project. He acknowledged that in 2004, he was
convicted of robbery, and in 2005, of residential burglary. He stated that he stopped being a PJ Watts
Crips gang member in 2002 or 2003. At
that time, defendant was stabbed by individuals in the county jail and decided
that he no longer wanted to participate in the gang lifestyle.
After he was released from prison in 2009, defendant did not return
to Imperial Courts until the day he was arrested. On the day of his arrest, he went there to
visit relatives. He was arrested as he
was walking to the bus. Defendant denied
using the moniker “Bam,†and stated that Coughlin and other officers lied when
they testified to the contrary.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends there is
insufficient evidence to sustain the robbery conviction and the finding that
the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. We disagree.
In assessing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the whole record to determine whether
found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to supportâ€â€™ the
jury’s verdict. [Citation.]†(People
v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
The substantial evidence standard also applies to gang enhancement
findings. (People v. Villalobos (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310, 321-322.)
Defendant asserts it is clear that
the victim was mistaken when she described the perpetrator’s clothing. She insisted that the robber was wearing a
white t-shirt and the video established that he was shirtless. In addition, the victim did not mention that
her attacker had a tattoo and defendant points out that he has the initials
“PJ†tattooed on his face. Defendant
also claims the victim had only seconds to view the perpetrator and he did not
have any of the victim’s property on him when he was arrested. Thus, he suggests, the evidence establishing
that he assaulted and robbed the victim is insufficient as a matter of
law. He is incorrect.
The victim had an adequate opportunity to view her attacker. Defendant downplays this fact by arguing that
the victim was struck in the face and her ability to see must have been
impaired. This ignores Sanchez’s
testimony that she stood face to face with the robber from a distance of two
feet prior to handing over her wallet.
She identified defendant in a field showup three hours after the
incident, in a photographic lineup a few days later, at the preliminary hearing
and at trial. Moreover, she was certain
of her identification. At trial, she was
asked what it was about defendant that she recognized. She replied, “His face. I saw it very well when he came, and I don’t
forget his face.â€
Although it is true that there were discrepancies between the
victim’s version of events and the video of the crime, such as what the robber
was wearing, it was for the jury to weigh their significance. “Even when there is a significant amount of
a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the
finding.†(People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) The victim’s testimony was more than ample to
sustain defendant’s conviction.
With respect to the gang enhancement, defendant again emphasizes the
contrary evidence he presented and invites us to reconsider the matter. He relies on the cases of
1350 and In re Frank S. (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1192 and argues the lack of evidence that gang signs were thrown or
that other gang members participated in the robbery establishes the crime could
not have been committed with the intent to benefit the gang. We are not persuaded. In the present case, defendant was a PJ Watts
gang member, the crime was committed in the heart of PJ Watts territory, and
defendant and his companion fled to the safety of the Imperial Courts housing
project, an area that both experts stated was a PJ Watts stronghold. In addition, Daniel C. committed an
weapon. Here, defendant engaged in an
act of gratuitous violence, enhancing the gang’s criminal reputation in the
community and increasing fear in the neighborhood, thereby making it less
likely that residents would cooperate with police. The jury’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
exercising a peremptory challenge against an African-American juror was
pretextual and the court failed to make a sincere and reasoned evaluation of
the prosecutor’s justification as required by Batson/Wheeler. We agree.
The challenged juror was married and
had three children. She was employed as
a manager for a telecommunications company and her husband worked in construction. She had no previous jury experience and had
been the victim of vandalism. No one was
arrested for committing that offense.
She had a nephew who had been arrested for driving under the
influence. The juror had no opinion as
to whether the nephew had been treated fairly by the system. She believed she could follow the jury
instructions and thought she could give defendant a fair trial.
After the prosecutor exercised a
peremptory challenge to excuse the juror, defense counsel objected to the
excusal pursuant to Batson/Wheeler. The court found the defense had made a prima
facie showing that the challenge was the product of group bias.
juror “based on the occupation of her husband as a construction worker, or she
said he was in construction.†The
prosecutor said a challenge based on a person’s occupation is race-neutral,
acknowledging that she had no reason to challenge the juror for cause. Opposing counsel stated, “That seems like a
really facetious reason because there’s nothing about this case where — the
fact that her husband [is] a construction worker that would affect her ability
to be fair.†The prosecutor reiterated
that she was allowed to use her peremptory for whatever reason she chose as
long as it was a race-neutral one. The
court noted that there were four other African-American jurors in the jury box
and, without further inquiry, denied the defense motion.
Initially, defendant alleges that
the prosecutor’s reason was not supported by the record. He claims the “prosecutor’s explanation that
[the juror] could not be fair because she worked in construction appears to be
simply a pretext, especially since it was incorrect. It was not the prospective juror, but her
husband, who worked ‘in construction.’â€
Defendant misreads the record.
The prosecutor clearly stated that she excused the juror because of the
husband’s occupation.
As the trial court found a
burden shifted to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenge was
exercised for a race-neutral reason. (
360.) A prosecutor’s “‘justification
need not support a challenge for cause,
and even a “trivial†reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.’ [Citation.]
A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions,
gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons. [Citations.]â€
(People v. Lenix,
court that the peremptory challenges in question were exercised ‘on grounds
that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or
witnesses—i.e., for reasons of specific bias as defined herein.’ [Citations.]â€
(People v. Turner (1986) 42
Cal.3d 711, 720.) “The prosecutor
therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case
to be tried. [Fn. omitted.] The trial court then will have the duty to
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. [Fn. omitted.]†(Batson
v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at
p. 98.) “[T]he issue comes down to
whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be
credible. Credibility can be measured
by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how
improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has
some basis in accepted trial strategy.â€
(Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)
537 U.S. 322, 339.)
“We review a trial court’s
determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for
exercising peremptory challenges ‘“with great restraint.â€â€™ [Citation.]
We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a
constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to
distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.]
So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to
evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are
entitled to deference on appeal.
[Citation.]†(
833, 864.)
The difficulty in the present case
is that the trial court made no effort to evaluate whether the prosecutor’s
race-neutral explanation was credible; it simply accepted her reason for the
challenge. Although we recognize that a
juror’s occupation (or perhaps the spouse’s occupation) may be a sufficient
race-neutral reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, there must be a
connection between the occupation and the case being tried that explains why
the juror may be biased. For example, in
People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th
652, 677-678, a juror was excused in part because of her employment as a social
worker in the Department of Children’s Services. The prosecutor justified the challenge by
stating he believed that the juror might be too sympathetic to the defendant,
who would be presenting evidence of abuse and neglect during his childhood. The Supreme Court determined that the
prosecutor’s challenge was race-neutral.
Similarly, in People v. Landry (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 785, 790-791, the prosecutor excused a juror who worked in a
youth services agency because he believed that she might be biased in the
defendant’s favor. The appellate court found
a plausible connection between the juror’s occupation and a specific potential
bias.
Here, the trial court did not ask
the prosecutor to explain why the juror’s spouse’s employment in the
construction field was of concern in this case.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the prosecutor’s
explanation appears inherently implausible.
This was a generic strong-arm robbery trial. Even if we engage in rank speculation, we
cannot think of a reason why a juror who was married to a construction worker
would be biased against the prosecution.
Perhaps if the prosecutor had been asked to provide a more complete
explanation, she would have been able to provide a plausible race-neutral
reason for excusing the juror. Thus, we
are left with the question whether, in the context of this case, the juror’s
spouse’s employment alone was a race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut the
prima facie case of group bias.
The case of People v. Turner, supra,
42 Cal.3d 711, provides the answer.
There, the prosecutor excused an African-American juror because he was a
truck driver and had difficulty understanding the questions he was asked. In examining the reasons, the Supreme Court
wrote: “We note that the prosecutor
began his explanation by emphasizing that Mr. Chappell ‘was a truck driver,’ as
if that fact were a talisman whose invocation would somehow make the
discrimination disappear. On the
contrary, the remark suggests yet another impermissible group bias behind this
challenge, because trial by a jury from which working-class people are
systematically excluded is also a violation of the representative cross-section
rule. [Citations.] The cited cases refute any implication that
truck drivers as a class are not intelligent enough to be jurors. And the record refutes any such implication
as to Mr. Chappell individually.†(
prosecutor’s stated reason for his challenge was that “‘something in her work’â€
would “‘not be good for the People’s case.’â€
(Id. at p. 725.) The court found the reason “so lacking in
content as to amount to virtually no explanation.†(Ibid.) After the panel found the prosecutor did not
demonstrate that his challenges were exercised for race-neutral reasons, it
concluded that the trial court “failed to discharge its duty to inquire into
and carefully evaluate the explanations offered by the prosecutor.†(Id.
at p. 728.)
So it is here. The prosecutor steadfastly insisted that a
challenge based on a juror’s occupation alone was sufficient to defeat a claim
of group bias. She is incorrect. It cannot be the case that a prosecutor may
excuse a juror from a protected class merely by stating that the juror is an
architect, an accountant, or a construction worker. “If such vague remarks were held to satisfy
the prosecution’s burden of rebutting a prima facie case of group
discrimination, the defendant’s constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community could be violated with impunity.†(People
v. Turner, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p.
725.) Thus, the trial court had an
obligation to determine whether the prosecutor’s justification for excusing the
juror was a disguised attempt to mask group bias. Because the record does not support the
court’s conclusion that the challenge was race-neutral, the judgment must be
reversed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUZUKAWA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN,
P. J.
MANELLA,
J.
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