CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

On March 7, 2011, appellant pled no contest to one count of a six-count information that had been filed against him in January of that year. That count charged battery upon a peace officer with injury, in violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (c)(2).[1] The charging information also alleged a prior serious or violent felony under sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d) and 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), as well as a prior prison term served (see § 667.5, subd. (b)), both of which appellant admitted at the time of his no contest plea. The court later denied appellant’s motion, brought under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), to dismiss his prior strike, denied him probation, and sentenced him to serve five years in state prison. Appellant appeals, claiming an abuse of discretion by the trial court, but we affirm the judgment entered, including the sentence imposed.

The jury returned a finding that defendant is a sexually violent predator (SVP) as defined in the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) (the Act),[1] and the trial court imposed an involuntary civil commitment upon him for an indeterminate period. In this appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony on the nature of treatment received by committed sexually violent predators (SVP’s), and complains that he was committed on the basis of invalid evaluation regulations. He also claims that the Act, as amended by Proposition 83 in 2006, violates due process, ex post facto, double jeopardy and equal protection principles.
We find no error in the admission of relevant testimony that described the treatment of SVP’s. We further conclude that reliance on invalid regulations during the evaluation process of defendant did not result in prejudice to him. We conclude that in accordance with the California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), the current version of the Act does not contravene due process, ex post facto or double jeopardy considerations. Defendant established disparate treatment of SVP’s for equal protection purposes, but pursuant to the discussion in People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II), constitutional justification for the distinction exists. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Joshua Edward Harvest appeals from a judgment upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder. He contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the theories of aiding and abetting of implied malice murder and second degree felony murder. He also argues that the court erred in refusing to strike a co-perpetrator’s testimony who refused to answer any questions despite a grant of immunity. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Carlos Javier Lopez was convicted of stalking Veronica H. in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a).[1] The court found true allegations that defendant had prior convictions for stalking and battery on a spouse or cohabitant (see § 646.9, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2)) and had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to an eight-year prison term.
The information alleged that the stalking occurred from September 29, 2007 through August 2010. The stalking charge was based on a series of letters and voice mail messages from defendant to Veronica. The prosecution also admitted evidence of an uncharged offense, during which defendant threatened Veronica with a rifle.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by also admitting evidence that a rifle was found near Veronica’s residence two days after the uncharged threat. He further contends the trial court should not have admitted evidence that Jesus Lopez, Jr., who was arrested in connection with the rifle, claimed to be defendant’s nephew. Finally, defendant claims that he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credit. We will modify the award of presentence conduct credits but otherwise affirm.

Terry M. Johnson appeals from the judgment, which dissolved his marriage to Wendy D. Ward‑Johnson[1] and resolved the issues related to support, custody, and property division. Terry contends the trial court erroneously (1) upheld the validity of an interspousal quitclaim deed he executed in Wendy’s favor as to real property in Costa Mesa purchased by Terry and Wendy during the marriage (the Santa Ana Avenue property), and (2) denied Terry’s request that the community be reimbursed for the time, skill, and labor, which he devoted, as a general contractor, to improving the value of two additional properties that Wendy had acquired before the marriage and constituted her separate property.
We affirm the portion of the judgment awarding the Santa Ana Avenue property to Wendy as her separate property. Substantial evidence showed Terry’s execution of the quitclaim deed conveying his community property interest in the Santa Ana Avenue property to Wendy was not the product of undue influence.
We reverse the portion of the judgment denying Terry’s request for reimbursement to the community for the time, skill, and labor he devoted to Wendy’s separate property during the marriage. The trial court found Terry invested more than a minimal effort in the improvement of those properties. We remand to the trial court to determine the amount Wendy’s separate property increased in value as a result of Terry’s efforts and to order reimbursement to the community accordingly.

A jury found defendant Delbert James guilty of first degree burglary as charged in count one of the information, possession of a firearm by a felon as charged in count four, receiving stolen property (watches) as charged in count five, attempted first degree burglary as charged in count six, six counts of grand theft (firearm) as charged in counts seven through 12, and three counts of loitering as charged in counts 14 through 16. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 11 years and eight months.
In sentencing defendant on the six counts of grand theft (firearm), the court stayed imposition of sentence on all six convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In his appeal, defendant contends his six grand theft of firearms convictions constituted a single offense in violation of section 487, subdivision (d)(2), and that five of the six counts must be reversed. We note that, despite the fact defendant was not punished for these six felonies, “grand theft involving a firearm” is a serious felony under the “Three Strikes” law. (§ 667, subd. (a)(4); § 1192.7, subd. (c)(26).)
We agree with defendant that he should have been convicted of only one count of grand theft (firearm). We reverse five of his six convictions of grand theft (firearm).

An information charged defendant Joseph Coronado Martinez with continuously sexually abusing a child under age 14 over a two-year-period (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a); count 1)[1] and committing a forcible lewd act on her (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 2). Defendant initially pleaded not guilty to both counts. But after trial commenced, he changed his plea on count 1 to guilty, with the understanding he would be sentenced to a maximum prison term of six or 12 years. The People dismissed count 2 pursuant to section 288.5, subdivision (c). The court denied defendant’s request for probation and sentenced him to the low term of six years on count 1. (§ 288.5, subd. (a).) On appeal defendant contends the court abused its sentencing discretion by denying him probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

In a nonpublished opinion, First AFG Financial Corporation v. Security Union Title Insurance Company (Dec. 8, 2010, G042855) (First AFG I), we reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of First AFG Financial Corporation (First AFG), arising out of First AFG’s breach of contract and negligence causes of action against Security Union Title Insurance Company (Security Union), in a dispute over the recording of documents. We concluded insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding (1) there was a contract between First AFG and Security Union, and (2) Security Union owed a duty of care to First AFG.
On remand, the trial court set a trial date but then entered a revised judgment in favor of Security Union. The trial court later granted First AFG’s motion to vacate the revised judgment. The court then granted First AFG’s ex parte application to file a first amended complaint. Security Union appeals from the trial court’s order granting First AFG’s motion to vacate the revised judgment.
In its opening brief, Security Union argues the trial court erred in granting the motion to vacate the revised judgment because: (1) the court had the authority to enter the revised judgment; (2) retrial after an appellate court reversal based on insufficient evidence is prohibited; and (3) First AFG’s two new causes of action are barred by the “law of the case” doctrine.

In this marital dissolution case, Noel Turner (husband) challenges the court’s pendente lite award of attorney fees and costs to Kathrin Turner (wife).[1] Because the court failed to make the statutorily mandated finding on whether husband had the ability to pay the fees and costs of both parties, we reverse.

Defendant Jamion Lamarr Whitney was tried and convicted of five counts arising out of two separate jewelry store heists. As to a November 20, 2009 incident at a Kevin Jewelers store, a jury convicted defendant of (1) grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a))[1] and (2) second degree commercial burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). As to a November 30, 2009 incident at a Neiman Marcus store, defendant was convicted of (3) second degree commercial burglary, (4) grand theft, and (5) carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 12020, subd. (a)(4)). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted a prior prison term pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant to four years and four months in prison.
On appeal, defendant asserts prejudicial error occurred with regard to (1) the court’s refusal to sever the counts relating to the two separate incidents, (2) admonitions by the court during defendant’s opening statement pertaining to defendant’s potential testimony, and (3) alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Finding no error or prosecutorial misconduct, we affirm the judgment.

Abigail K. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested and combined six and 18-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e) & 366.22, subd. (a))[1] terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her four-year-old son M.K., two-year-old daughter R.G., and one-year-old son O.G. Abigail contends the juvenile court erred in finding that it would be detrimental to return the children to her custody and that she was provided reasonable services. We disagree and deny the petition.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that defendant and appellant K.M. (minor) committed misdemeanor battery on a police officer. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b).) Minor was thereafter placed on probation in the custody of her parents for a period of six months with various terms and conditions. Minor appeals from the judgment. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Julie H. appeals orders entered at a jurisdiction and disposition hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivision (b), and 361, subdivision (c)(1). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Julie's requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Julie's counsel requests leave for her client to file a supplemental brief in propria persona (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835) and also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88). The requests are denied.